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Chapter 1
Introduction
“Health is (. . . ) without doubt the first good and the foundation of all the other goods of
this life” as was recognized by Rene´ Descartes already in 1637. Health has both intrinsic
and instrumental value, while it is central to our well-being and a prerequisite to the
functioning as an agent (Anand, 2002; Sen, 2002). In other words, health is a universal
human aspiration and a basic human need (Marmot, 2007). The right to the highest
attainable level of health is enshrined in the charter of the World Health Organization
(WHO) and many international treaties (e.g. United Nations, 2000). Despite this right, a
majority of people in the world do not enjoy the good health that is biologically possible
(CSDH, 2008).
Most notably, there is a strong association between health and socioeconomic status
(SES), with the socially and economically disadvantaged enjoying worse health; irrespec-
tive of whether it is measured by morbidity, disability or mortality (see Antonovsky, 1967;
Adler et al., 1994; Smith, 1999; Marmot, 1999; Cutler et al., 2008 for overviews). Inequal-
ities are substantial and striking. For example, Case and Deaton (2005) show that in the
US at age 20, men in the bottom quartile of household income already report worse health,
on average, than do men in the top quartile at age 50. In Glasgow, UK, life expectancy
of men in the most deprived areas was 54 years, compared with 82 years in the most
affluent (Hanlon et al., 2006). Even in an egalitarian country such as the Netherlands
striking differences in health and longevity by socioeconomic status exist. Individuals
with a university degree live, on average, 6 to 7 years longer than those who finished only
primary school, while the difference in life expectancy in good health can be as much as
16 to 19 years (CBS, 2008).
Inequalities in, for example, income are to some extent tolerated for economic reasons
since income incentives are inevitable to stimulate effort, skill, and enterprise. Inequality
in income has the potential to increase the size of total income from which, in principle,
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the society as a whole can gain through taxation (Anand, 2002). Also, income clearly
can be more easily redistributed than health. Health, in contrast, is a special good, a
basic necessity of life, and as such inequalities in health constitute inequalities in people’s
capability to function. This is considered as a denial of equality of opportunity (Rawls,
1971; Anand, 2002). Recently, the Commission on Social Determinants of Health of the
World Health Organization (WHO) vociferously defended the view that inequalities in
health by social and economic status are to a large extent avoidable by reasonable action,
such that they can be labeled as inequities (CSDH, 2008). The lack of opportunity to
achieve good health because of inadequate social arrangements is considered a serious
social injustice (Sen, 1985; 2002), and it is an ethical imperative to tackle inequities in
health (CSDH, 2008).
Apart from the argument of social justice, addressing the dependence of health on
socioeconomic position, and thereby improving average population health might have
economic motives too. First, there could be substantial savings on age-specific health care
expenditures. Better health is also able to increase labor supply, productivity, educational
attainment, and savings and investment (Bloom and Canning, 2000). Historically, health
has been the major contributor — even above educational attainment — of economic
growth, also in developed countries (Barro, 1997; Suhrcke et al., 2006). Finally, an unequal
society in which large health inequalities exist has less social cohesion, less solidarity and
more stress, which is potentially detrimental to economic development (Deaton, 2003). In
sum, breaking the connection between low education, poor health and early labor force
exit could raise national wealth. Due to these strong social and economic motives, it is no
surprise that the primary health-related goal of current governments all over the world is
the reduction of health inequalities.
To this aim, it is vital to understand why socioeconomic differences in health exist, but
this is generally not easy. Both health and socioeconomic status are multidimensional and
dynamic, and the relationship between them may reflect different effects and feedbacks
over the course of life. Does low economic status in early life lead to the development
of health problems in middle and later life? Or, does poor health interfere with the
acquisition of education and, subsequently, the chances of securing, or holding onto, a
well-paid job? Over the years progress has been made in characterizing the relationships
between the various dimensions of socioeconomic status and health over the life cycle
and in understanding the relative importance and directions of causal pathways. Before
1985 scholars thought that poverty and access to medical care were the main drivers of
inequalities in health (Adler and Ostrove, 1999). Above a certain poverty line, income
and other socioeconomic variables were not expected to have any influence on health.
3This threshold model was challenged most forcefully by the seminal Whitehall studies
(Marmot et al. 1984; 1991), in which even among British civil servants, all with a salary
way beyond the poverty line, socioeconomic status as measured by occupational hierarchy
had a negative impact on mortality. Since then the relationship between health and
socioeconomic status has been labeled a gradient, since mortality and ill-health continue
to drop as one goes up the SES ladder (Adler et al., 1994; Deaton, 2002a).
In recent years, epidemiological and sociological research has used longitudinal studies
to examine the role of behavioral, material, psychosocial and healthcare related pathways
in explaining SES-health associations (Marmot et al., 1997b; Van Lenthe et al., 2002;
Lynch, 2003; van Oort et al., 2005; Skalicka et al., 2009). The focus of these studies has
been mostly on the effect of SES on health, while economists have recently emphasized
the importance of the reverse impact of health on SES through ability to work (Smith,
1999; 2005a; 2007; Case and Deaton, 2005). Obviously, it could be that there are so-called
third factors influencing both socioeconomic status and health, triggering a spurious cor-
relation between them. Potential confounders are for example time preference (Fuchs,
1982; Barsky et al., 1997), and intelligence and cognitive ability (Auld and Sidhu, 2005;
Deary, 2008). Although the importance of third factors is non-negligible, the direct causal
pathways from SES to health and vice versa seem more important (Elo and Preston, 1996;
Cutler and Lleras-Muney, 2008). Two causal pathways are beginning to emerge as par-
ticularly important in explaining the SES-health gradient. First, there is a non-negligible
life-long effect of education on health (Oreopoulos, 2006; Smith, 2007; Silles, 2009). Sec-
ond, there is a large effect of health on income that operates through employment (Smith,
1999; 2005a; Case and Deaton, 2005). In contrast, although large health differences across
income groups are visible, economists argue that these do not derive from a causal impact
of income on health (Adams et al., 2003; Contoyannis et al., 2004; Frijters et al., 2005;
Smith, 2007; Cutler et al., 2008), although some epidemiological scholars disagree with
this tentative conclusion (e.g. Marmot, 2002; Herd et al., 2009).
Despite the wealth of literature available and improved knowledge on socioeconomic
differences in health, very little robust causal evidence is available. For example, the
effect of education on health outcomes has been found in a couple of studies (Oreopoulos,
2006; Silles, 2009) but was found insignificant in numerous other studies (Clark and
Royer, 2007; Mazumder, 2008; Albouy and Lequien, 2008). Moreover, the underlying
mechanisms responsible for these potential pathways are largely unclear. For example,
even if education is found to be protective for health, it is not known why the more
educated are healthier. Without knowledge of the mechanisms, it is difficult to design
policies that are effective in reducing disparities (Deaton, 2002a). In sum, two important
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gaps remain in the literature: (i) robust causal evidence on the most important pathways,
and (ii) knowledge of the mechanisms that underlie these causal pathways.
The aims of this thesis are to help fill these two gaps in the literature by taking an
economic approach. We will exploit econometric techniques to estimate the causal effects,
while we will use and develop an economic model to help understand the underlying mech-
anisms. The contribution of this thesis is twofold. First, exogenous variation in SES and
health is exploited to estimate robust causal evidence of the pathways anticipated to be
most important in generating SES differences in health: (i) the effect of education on
health and mortality, and (ii) the effect of health on employment and income. By exploit-
ing quasi-natural experiments we are able to control for possible third factors influencing
both socioeconomic status and health. Second contribution is a theoretical framework of
health and socioeconomic status over the life cycle that captures many important mecha-
nisms that potentially create health disparities across socioeconomic groups. This helps us
to understand the underlying mechanisms responsible for the causal pathways indicated
above.
The first part of this thesis — chapters 2 and 3 — provides a descriptive analysis how
health evolves over the life cycle and whether the pattern is different across socioeconomic
groups. Cutler et al. (2008) noted that “(. . . ) differential patterns of causality make a
single theory of socioeconomic gradients in health difficult to imagine. We suspect, though,
that the right theory will emphasize the lifecycle.” Inspired by this idea, chapter 2 aims
to give an idea how health and health inequality evolve over the life cycle, correcting for
possible cohort effects deriving from differences between subsequent generations. These
differences between generations could for instance derive from changes in health systems,
medical technology and broader social and economic developments. Cohort effects are
not just a nuisance distorting the life cycle picture but are important for predicting the
consequences of population ageing and are of intrinsic interest. For example, cohort effects
show whether average health and inequality in health have increased or decreased over
generations. It turns out that in the Northern-European countries average self-reported
health has been stable over generations, such that cohort effects do not distort the life
cycle profile of average health in these countries. Overall inequality has decreased over
generations, yet socioeconomic inequality remained stable. Apparently, despite efforts to
improve population health and reduce socioeconomic inequalities in health, over the last
generations this was not particularly successful. The remaining chapters of this thesis try
to understand the nature of socioeconomic differences in health, such that policy can be
more intelligently and successfully conducted.
5Chapter 3 reviews the economic, sociological and epidemiological literature on socioe-
conomic inequalities in health over the life cycle and presents a descriptive analysis of how
health evolves over the life cycle for different socioeconomic groups in the Netherlands.
The latter allows identification of the timing of events in health and socioeconomic status,
and helps gauge the extent to which data are consistent with various causal pathways.
The analysis serves as a precursor to the causal analyses later in this thesis. The results
reveal that the life cycle profile of socioeconomic differences in health in the Netherlands
is very similar to that in the US. This suggests that fundamental mechanisms linking age,
health, income, and education are relatively unresponsive to policy parameters. On the
basis of this analysis, and the related literature, two mechanisms seem particularly impor-
tant in generating the large association between health and socioeconomic status. First,
there appears to be a large effect of health on income that operates through employment.
Second, there seems to be a non-negligible life-long effect of education on health.
The second part of this thesis — chapters 4 and 5 — makes use of quasi-natural
experiments to investigate whether this descriptive evidence derives from genuine, causal
effects. Chapter 4 exploits the change in the Dutch compulsory schooling law in 1928,
which raised the compulsory years of education from 6 to 7, to provide exogenous variation
in education that allows identification of a causal effect of schooling on mortality. By
comparing individuals born in 1916, which were allowed to drop out of school after 6
years of schooling, with individuals born in 1917, who were the first obliged to stay in
school for the full 7 years, in a Regression Discontinuity Design (RDD) we are able to
estimate the causal effect of an extra year of education on the probability of dying between
ages 81 and 89.
Chapter 5 exploits acute hospitalizations as exogenous variation in health to estimate
the causal effect of ill-health on employment and disposable income. Since shocks to
one’s health are not randomly distributed across the population, we employ a propensity
score matching approach combined with differences-in-differences to correct for the non-
experimental nature of the data. It is perhaps not surprising that health impacts on
employment and, given that replacement rates of disability insurance are smaller than 100
percent, personal earnings. It is more interesting to investigate the effects on disposable
income after behavioral responses by the individual that experienced the health shock
and his/her other household members. In other words, chapter 5 aims to investigate the
formal and informal mechanisms of income protection after a health shock. If health
shocks reduce disposable income permanently, this potentially has serious consequences
for household welfare, through reduced consumption (Attanasio and Davis, 1996; Deaton,
2002b; Blundell et al., 2008).
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For the policy purpose of reducing socioeconomic health inequalities it is extremely in-
teresting to analyse whose employment and disposable income are least protected against
health deterioration. The protection may for example differ by education since highly ed-
ucated professionals have more human capital that is not contingent on physical health.
Lower educated, unskilled workers rely more on their physical health. Should they lose
this, their relative earnings capacity will fall by more. More highly educated individuals
may also be better at managing their disease, for example, through adherence to medi-
cation (Goldman and Smith, 2002), such that it impinges less on their earning capacity.
Differences by employment sector may also be anticipated. In the public sector, where
there is less exposure to competition and consequently salaries are more regulated and
less tied to productivity, employment and earnings should be less responsive to ill-health.
The employer, rather than the disability insurance scheme, protects against the economic
consequences of ill-health.
The quasi-natural experiments exploited in chapters 4 and 5 confirm the descriptive
analysis that there is a strong effect of (i) education on mortality, and (ii) health on income
through constrained employment. Regarding (i), even among an elderly population of
over 80 we find a significant protective effect of education on mortality. The probability
of dying between ages 81 and 89 is reduced by 2 to 3 percentage points, which translates
into 4-6 percent relative to the baseline probability. We can conclude that at least part
of the strong association between education and health outcomes derives from a causal
effect of years of schooling on mortality. There is obviously pre-sample selective mortality
and our estimates cannot be taken as indicative of the mortality effect of education at all
ages. However, if education has a non-negative effect on mortality at all ages, a relatively
larger group of lower educated individuals will have passed away before the age of 80,
compared to their higher educated peers. In that case our estimates constitute a lower
bound on the total effect of education on life expectancy.
Regarding (ii), a significant effect of ill-health on employment and disposable income
is confirmed. Disposable income on average drops by 8 percent three years after a sudden
deterioration of health, which represents a 92% replacement rate. Two other important
considerations follow from the study. First, while Disability Insurance (DI) is developed to
insure personal income, it cannot prevent disposable household income to drop. Striking
is that household income drops by a larger amount than personal income, which indicates
spill-over effects to other household members, possibly reflecting a fall in the earnings of
the spouse as a result of meeting the care needs of the disabled person. Second consider-
ation is that the drop in disposable income is not evenly spread over society. Groups in
the lowest socioeconomic classes — those in the bottom quartile of personal income, and
7the lower educated — are the most vulnerable to lose their jobs. At the same time this is
translated into higher relative drops in personal and household disposable income. The
average actual replacement rate of 80% faced by individuals in the lower income quartile
compared to the average of 92%, does probably imply that the experience of a health
shock by the poor would not only raise the observed income inequalities, but also put a
non-negligible proportion of individuals in this group at risk of poverty.
Despite these advances in knowledge of the main causal pathways determining the
SES-health gradient, little is known about the mechanisms that produce them. Without
a better understanding of the mechanisms that lead to the observed health disparities,
identification of policies that are effective in reducing them is typically hard. Case and
Deaton (2005) argue that it is extremely difficult to understand the relationships between
health, education, income and labor force status without some guiding theoretical frame-
work. The standard economic model of the demand for health (Grossman, 1972a; 1972b)
has proved extremely useful in providing a framework for the demand for health and
medical care but cannot explain a number of the most salient features of the SES health
gradient. It is no surprise then that recent reviews of the literature (e.g., Cutler et al.,
2008) point to the absence of a unifying theory of SES and health over the life cycle and
emphasize the importance of developing one.
The last part of this thesis — Chapter 6 — aims to help fill this gap. Our starting point
is the Grossman model (Grossman, 1972a; 1972b) and the extended version presented by
Case and Deaton (2005). Our contribution is as follows. First, we address three significant
problems identified in the literature with the Grossman model by introducing decreasing-
returns-to-scale (DRTS) in the health production function (as in Ehrlich and Chuma,
1990). This addresses (i) the indeterminacy problem for investment in medical care, (ii)
the inability of the model to reproduce the observed negative relation between health
and the demand for medical care (e.g., Zweifel and Breyer, 1997), and (iii) the model’s
lack of capacity to explain differences in the effective rate of health deterioration (not
just the level of health) between different socioeconomic groups (Case and Deaton, 2005).
Yet, utilization of medical services and access to care explain only part of the association
between SES and health (e.g., Adler et al., 1993). Our second contribution is therefore
to incorporate many potential mechanisms in the model that could explain disparities in
health by SES and to include a multitude of potential bi-directional pathways between
health and dimensions of SES. One important concept in our work is “job-related health
stress”, which can be interpreted broadly and can range from physical working conditions
(e.g., hard labor) to the psychosocial aspects of work (e.g., low status, limited control,
repetitive work, etc). The notion here is that job-related health stress can include any
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aspect of work that is detrimental to health and as such is associated with a wage premium
(a compensating wage differential). Other important features of the model are lifestyle
factors such as preventive care, and healthy and unhealthy consumption. The model
integrates a life cycle approach, and the concepts of financial, human and health capital
(Muurinen and Le Grand, 1985). The focus is on understanding the SES-health gradient
as the outcome of rational (constrained) individual behaviour, and the framework applies
to individuals who have completed their education and participate (or have participated)
in the labor-force.
We find that greater initial wealth, permanently higher income (over the life cycle)
and a higher level of education induce individuals to invest more in curative and in
preventive care, shift consumption toward healthy consumption, and enable individuals
to afford healthier working environments (associated with lower levels of physical and
psychosocial health stresses) and living environments. The mechanism through which
initial wealth, permanent income and education operate is by increasing the marginal
cost of, and demand for, curative care. The greater marginal cost of curative care in
turn increases the health benefit of (and hence demand for) preventive care and healthy
consumption, and the health cost of (and hence reduced demand for) unhealthy working
and living environments, and unhealthy consumption. Jointly these gradually lead to
cumulative health advantage with age. Our model thus holds considerable promise in
explaining empirical health patterns. Such a model has not been available before and
economists have highlighted the significance of its development (e.g., Case and Deaton,
2005; Cutler et al., 2008).
Part I
Socioeconomic Differences in Health
over the Life Cycle

Chapter 2
Health and Income across the Life
Cycle and Generations in Europe
An age-cohort decomposition applied to panel data identifies how the mean, overall
inequality and income-related inequality of self-assessed health evolve over the life
cycle and differ across generations in 11 EU countries. There is a moderate and
steady decline in mean health until the age of 70 or so and a steep acceleration in the
rate of deterioration thereafter. In southern Europe and Ireland, where development
has been most rapid, the average health of generations born in more recent decades
is significantly better than that of older generations. This is not observed in the
northern European countries. In almost all countries, health is more dispersed among
older generations indicating that Europe has experienced a reduction in overall health
inequality over time. Although there is no consistent evidence that health inequality
increases as a given cohort ages, this is true in the three largest countries — Britain,
France and Germany. In the former two countries and the Netherlands, at least for
males, the income gradient in health peaks around retirement age, as in the US. In
most European countries, unlike the US, there is no evidence that income-related
health inequality is greater among younger than older generations.
—————————————–
This chapter is based upon:
Van Kippersluis, H., T. Van Ourti, O. O’Donnell, and E. van Doorslaer (2009), “Health and income
across the life cycle and generations in Europe”, Journal of Health Economics 28(4): 818-830.
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2.1 Introduction
How does the distribution of health evolve over the life cycle and is it changing across
generations? How do socioeconomic disparities in health change as individuals age and
are they narrowing, or widening, across generations? These questions are addressed using
comparable panel data from 11 European countries. The analysis is pertinent not only
to gauging the consequences of the rapid population ageing occurring in Europe and
elsewhere, but also to determining the causes of the socioeconomic gradient in health and
the extent to which European countries have been successful in reducing such disparities
over time. Knowledge of how the distribution of health changes over the course of the
life cycle is key to understanding individual behaviour with respect to retirement, saving,
health insurance and the utilisation of health care, and, consequently, to the formation of
public policy concerning pensions, health financing, and health and social care. Evidence
of generational differences in health is essential for accurate monitoring and projection
of trends in population health, and can signal potential determinants of health, such as
living conditions in childhood.
Beyond a certain age it is anticipated that health will begin to decline. But at what
age, on average, does this decline set in? What is the rate of decline? And from which
age does this accelerate such that the deterioration in health becomes rapid? The answers
to these questions have important implications for a wide range of policies including, for
example, increases in the retirement age that are being implemented, or considered, in a
number of European countries. Besides identifying the average rate of change in health
across the life cycle, it is also important to establish whether health becomes more or less
dispersed as a cohort of individuals ages. Deaton and Paxson (1998) argue that if shocks
to health are permanent, then their cumulative effect will result in health being more
widely dispersed at older ages. In this case, there would be welfare gains from pooling
risks across periods to provide protection against the cumulative deterioration of health,
or at least its financial consequences, but these may not be realisable given the enforceable
insurance contracts currently offered by markets (Diamond, 1992; Cochrane, 1995; Pauly
et al., 1995). Divorcing health financing contributions from risks, as is done in most
European social insurance and tax financed systems, may partially solve this problem but
relies on within, as well as between, generation solidarity that could become increasingly
strained as a cohort ages and redistribution from the healthy to the unhealthy increases.
A further implication if health dispersion does indeed increase with age is that ageing of
the population would lead to greater total inequality in health, providing there were no
offsetting differences across generations.
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The existence of socioeconomic inequality in health in Europe and elsewhere is firmly
established (Adler et al., 1994; Van Doorslaer et al., 1997; Mackenbach et al., 1997; 2008;
Smith, 1998; 1999; Van Doorslaer and Koolman, 2004), but its causes are not yet well
understood. Examination of how the socioeconomic gradient in health varies across the
life cycle can help reveal its origins (Case et al., 2002; Smith, 2007; Currie et al., 2007). For
example, there is some US evidence of the gradient peaking around retirement age (Elo
and Preston, 1996; Smith and Kington, 1997; Deaton and Paxson, 1998; Smith, 2005a).
This is consistent with the gradient in large part reflecting income losses from illness-
induced interruptions to work, which obviously cease after retirement. While a couple
of European studies confirm this inverse U-shape in the age profile of the health-income
gradient (Van Ourti, 2003; Kamrul Islam et al., 2009), others show that it continues to
prevail post retirement (Gerdtham and Johannesson, 2000; Burstro¨m et al., 2005), albeit
less so for an occupation based measure of socioeconomic status (Marmot and Shipley,
1996), and even to increase in early old age (Chandola et al., 2007). This is relevant to
an ongoing debate, to which we aim to contribute, over whether the relationship between
health and socioeconomic status follows a process of cumulative advantage, with early
life disparities in health becoming magnified over the life cycle (Ross and Wu, 1996;
Lynch, 2003; Wilson et al., 2007; Kim and Durden, 2007), or whether health problems
that inevitably arise in the course of time act as a leveller and so narrow socioeconomic
disparities in old age (Kunst and Mackenbach, 1994; Elo and Preston, 1996; Deaton and
Paxson, 1998; Beckett, 2000; Case and Deaton, 2005; Herd, 2006; Kim and Durden, 2007).
The distribution of health may differ between generations because of changes in the
health system, such as the extension of coverage, or advances in medical technology that
are effective for the treatment of age-specific conditions. Differences in the health, eco-
nomic and social conditions experienced in early childhood are also potentially important
contributors to inter-generational differences in health. There is considerable evidence
supporting a strong link between early childhood, even intrauterine, experiences and
health in later life (Barker, 1995; Case et al., 2005; van den Berg et al., 2006; Bozzoli et
al., 2007). The socioeconomic gradient in health may differ across generations in response
to changes in wider social and economic disparities (Pappas et al., 1993; Preston and Elo,
1995; Deaton and Paxson, 1998). These cohort effects potentially confound age effects,
but they are also of interest in their own right. Not least for the purpose of predicting
the consequences of population ageing, one wants to know whether younger generations
are, on average, healthier than older generations, whether health inequality is increasing
or decreasing, and whether the socioeconomic gradient in health is becoming more or less
steep over time.
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In this paper we describe how the distribution of health and income-related health
inequality evolve over the life cycle and differ across generations in 11 European Union
(EU) countries. This is the first study to disentangle age and cohort effects for the mean
level of self-assessed health, as well as for overall and income-related health inequality,
across a large number of European countries. It enables us to establish whether the life
cycle evolution of health and its socioeconomic gradient are consistent across countries.
Any observed differences in the age profiles may reflect differences in welfare systems
and their consequences for the way in which age, health and income interact. The 11
countries studied span the north and south of Europe and so differ in the scale and
timing of the economic and social development, as well as changes in public health and
nutrition conditions, experienced over the lives of the adults represented in the data. We
examine whether this heterogeneity is reflected in the size and nature of generational
differences in the distribution of health.
The analysis is closely related to that of Deaton and Paxson (1998), who describe
how average self reported health, its variance and its correlation with income vary with
age in US cohorts. They find that average health declines with age at a surprisingly
constant rate. This finding is confirmed for Britain by Sutton (2004) and for Sweden by
Burstro¨m et al. (2005). The US and European studies are less consistent with respect to
the direction of the cohort effect. Deaton and Paxson (1998) find that average health is
lower for older cohorts but there is no difference between cohorts born after 1945, while
Sutton (2004) and Burstro¨m et al. (2005) find that younger cohorts report lower health.
Deaton and Paxson (1998) find that the variance in health is increasing up to the age of
60, after which it remains constant. This is only partially consistent with their prediction
that, if health shocks are permanent and not perfectly correlated across individuals, then
the variance should be monotonically rising with age for a fixed cohort of individuals.
The incomplete empirical verification may be due to selective mortality but it could also
indicate invalidity of the assumptions made about the evolution of health. Deaton and
Paxson assume that health shocks are additive and independent, and so health follows a
random walk. If instead one assumes multiplicative shocks deriving from the depreciation
of health capital (Grossman, 1972b), then the prediction of increasing variance with age no
longer holds1. We add to Deaton and Paxson’s previously sole analysis of the relationship
1Deaton and Paxson (1998) propose that the evolution of health is given by hi,t = hi,t−1 + ui,t
(Deaton and Paxson, 1994). Assuming zero covariance between lagged health and the health shock
(u), var(hi,t) − var(hi,t−1) = σ2u > 0 if health shocks are not perfectly correlated across individuals.
But if health evolves according to a depreciation process, hi,t = hi,t−1(1 − δi,t), where δi,t ∈ [0, 1)
represents the stochastic rate of depreciation that is assumed independent of the level of health, then
var(hi,t)−var(hi,t−1) = −2δ¯tvar(hi,t−1)+E(h2i,t−1)E(δ2i,t)− (E(hi,t−1))2 δ¯2t (Goodman, 1960). The first
2.2 Data and measurement of health 15
between age and the variance of health with the purpose of improving understanding
of how health evolves over the life cycle. We also seek to establish whether Deaton
and Paxson’s finding of a smaller variance among later born cohorts, indicating that the
distribution of health in the US is becoming more compressed, is confirmed for European
countries.
Deaton and Paxson (1998) find that the income gradient in health is greater among
younger cohorts in the US, such that socioeconomic inequality in health has been rising
while total health inequality, measured by the variance, has been falling. Kamrul Islam
et al. (2009) find that socioeconomic inequalities in reported health have been increasing
over time in Sweden, but Ferrie et al. (2002) and Burstro¨m et al. (2005) find little or
no evidence of increasing socioeconomic inequality in morbidity in the UK and Sweden
respectively2. We substantially extend the evidence on how socioeconomic inequality in
health is changing across Europe through analysis of common measures of health and
income from 11 EU countries.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2.2 describes the data
and the measurement of health using utility scores to scale self-reported health categories.
This procedure avoids the assumption, made by Deaton and Paxson (1998), that health
declines linearly across categories and results in a more plausible age profile of health. The
implications for the measurement of health inequality are also discussed here. Section 2.3
presents the methodology for separating age from cohort effects using the panel data. In
section 2.4 we present the results and in section 2.5 their robustness is checked to different
aspects of the methodology. In the final section we summarise the results and discuss their
implications.
2.2 Data and measurement of health
We use data taken from the full eight waves (1994-2001) of the European Community
Household Panel (ECHP). The ECHP was designed and coordinated by the European
Statistical Office (EUROSTAT). It consists of a panel of private households providing
data on socioeconomic, demographic and health characteristics of non-institutionalised
individuals aged 16 or older. We restrict attention to adults aged 18 and above. The
term in the latter equation is negative, while the second term is positive; which is larger depends upon
the distribution of δi,t. For example, if the depreciation rate is a constant, then the variance will be
decreasing over time (Deaton and Paxson, 1994).
2Burstro¨m et al. (2005) do report that inequalities in life expectancy and QALYs have been increasing
over time. Pappas et al. (1993) also find increasing socioeconomic inequalities in mortality in the US.
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questionnaire is standardized across all countries. We use all waves that are available
for 11 EU member states: Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy,
the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain and the United Kingdom. Luxembourg is not included
due the small size of the sample and Austria, Finland and Sweden are not analyzed due
to the limited number of available waves (respectively 7, 6 and 5). For Germany and
the UK, we do not use the original ECHP samples (which only ran for the first three
waves) but instead use the corresponding waves from the German Socio-economic Panel
(GSOEP) and the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS)3. One wave (9) of the BHPS
is dropped because of an inconsistency in the health question (Herna´ndez-Quevedo et al.,
2008) and the 2002 wave (12) is added as a replacement. As a result, we analyse exactly
eight waves for all countries. Table 2.2 in the appendix lists the sample sizes and some
descriptive statistics from the data. All analyses are conducted separately for each of the
11 countries.
The two key variables in the analysis are health and income. The ECHP income
measure is annual disposable (i.e. after-tax) household income, including income from
work, investments, property, private transfers, pensions and other direct social transfers.
Indirect social transfers (e.g. reimbursement of medical expenses), in kind benefits and
imputed rent from owner-occupied accommodation are not included. Income is divided
by the OECD modified equivalence scale in order to account for differences in household
size and composition4. In the BHPS an additional file is used to derive the annual dis-
posable income (Bardasi et al., 2007). Concerns about the appropriateness of disposable
income as an indicator of the living standards of the elderly (see e.g. Van Ourti, 2003;
Fahey et al., 2004) are less worrisome here as it is only used to rank individuals within
cohorts/generations.
Information on health is from the question, “How is your health in general?” with a
five-point response scale ranging from very good to very bad. A potentially important
difference in the UK — to which we return later — is that the BHPS question instructs
respondents to rate their health relative to others of the same age5. This self-assessed
health (SAH) variable is widely used and is known to be a very good predictor of other
health outcomes, including mortality (see e.g. Idler and Benyamini, 1997). One important
drawback is that it is ordinal and so statistics, such as the mean, variance and other
3The BHPS only covers Great Britain, but for convenience we refer to the UK throughout the text.
4The OECD scale gives a weight of 1.0 to the first adult, 0.5 to the second and each subsequent person
aged 14 and over, and 0.3 to each child aged under 14 in the household.
5The SAH question in France and Germany was consistent with the other ECHP countries but a 6
and 10 point scale respectively was used and responses were recoded into the common 5 point scale by
Eurostat.
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inequality measures, cannot be computed directly from it. Some scaling is required. A
simple 1 to 5 scale for very bad to very good health is obviously arbitrary and imposes a
number of restrictions, including that movements between subsequent SAH categories
always represent the same change in health, which may distort patterns observed in
summary statistics of the scaled health variable. Our strategy is to transform the ordinal
SAH information onto an interval scale and then adopt summary measures of inequality
that are suitable for a variable with this measurement property.
We attach utility scores to the SAH categories using data from the 2001 Canadian
Community Household Survey (CCHS), which is a large scale household survey that
contains data on both the five-point SAH question available in the ECHP and a general
health measure on an interval scale — the Health Utility Index Mark 3 (HUI3) (Furlong
et al., 2001; Feeny et al., 2002). The HUI3 uses a multi-attribute function to transform
an individual’s health status measured on eight domains into a utility score derived from
community preferences over health states (Furlong et al., 2001; Feeny et al., 2002). The
index is scaled such that a value of 0 represents death and 1 indicates perfect health. It
has been shown that the profile across SAH categories of HUI3 is concave with the health
difference between very good and good SAH being smaller than that between good and
fair (see Van Doorslaer and Jones, 2003). We attach the SAH category specific means of
HUI3 computed from the Canadian sample to the respective SAH categories in the ECHP
data. Obviously this is somewhat restrictive in that it does not allow for any differences
between the EU countries and Canada in the profile of mean health utility across SAH
categories. But this is no more restrictive than imposing the same arbitrary scale on
SAH categories across all countries and there is no information available that would allow
the scale to differ across countries. Moreover, a multi-attribute utility function estimated
from French data proved to be very similar to the original function estimated from the
Canadian data (Le Gale`s et al., 2002).
The interval scale property of the HUI3 has consequences for the summary statistics
used to measure overall and income-related health inequality. The concentration index
has been a popular measure of income-related health inequalities (Wagstaff et al., 1991;
Van Doorslaer et al., 1997), but in a recent contribution Erreygers (2009a) has shown
that its validity crucially depends upon the scaling of the underlying health variable. If
the scaling is interval (as is the case for the HUI3), the concentration index will have the
following undesirable properties: (i) its bounds will depend on the minimum, maximum
and average value of health, (ii) its value will differ depending upon whether health
(HUI3) or ill-health (i.e. one minus HUI3) is examined, and (iii) its value will not be
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invariant to a positive linear transformation6. These properties may obscure the life cycle
profile and generational differences in income-related health inequality. For example, the
first property implies that the life cycle profile of average health will influence the life
cycle profile of the concentration index; and the third property implies that changing
the location of the HUI3, which is essentially arbitrary, may change the generational
differences in the concentration index. Using an axiomatic approach, Erreygers (2009a)
derives an adjusted concentration index that does not have these drawbacks, but preserves
other desirable properties of the concentration index as a measure of income-related health
inequality7. A similar argument holds for measures of total health inequality. For example,
the variance, the coefficient of variation and the Gini index all require that the underlying
health variable has ratio scale properties. Application of one of these three measures to
the interval scaled HUI3 leads to the same three undesirable properties. Erreygers (2009b)
develops an adjusted Gini index that does not have these deficiencies. It is similar to the
adjusted concentration index, except that individuals are ranked by health, rather than
income. The issue does not arise for mean health. Although mean health is only uniquely
defined up to a positive linear transformation of the interval scaled HUI3, its life cycle
profile is not affected. The latter follows from the fact that the mean of a positive linear
transformed variable equals the positive linear transformation of the mean, which is not
the case for the traditional measures of total and income-related health inequalities8.
For a given SAH category, older individuals tend to have lower health as measured
by HUI3 (Lindeboom and van Doorslaer, 2004). It is likely that this reflects both the
inability of a crude ordinal measure such as SAH to capture all the variation in health and
age differences in the thresholds of true health at which health is reported to be very poor,
poor, etc (ibid). To allow for variation in HUI3 by age and sex within SAH category, and
so simultaneously correct for age-sex heterogeneity in reported SAH, we assign the SAH
category, age-sex specific means of HUI3 from the Canadian data to ECHP observations
6Note that calculation of the concentration index requires a cardinal measure of health and so it cannot
be computed while SAH is left on an ordinal scale.
7The adjusted concentration index is defined as 4 E(hi)bh−ahCI(hi) where CI(hi) is the standard concen-
tration index (Wagstaff et al., 1991), and bh and ah are the maximum and minimum of the health variable
hi.
8Define h˜i = c + dhi, c > 0, d > 0, then, of course, E(h˜i) = c + dE(hi). The value of mean health
depends on the values of c and d, but its life cycle profile, represented by the difference in mean health
between age groups, is invariant up to multiplication by the scalar d. The latter does not hold for
the standard concentration and Gini indices (Wagstaff et al., 1991) since CI(h˜i) =
dE(hi)
c+dE(hi)
CI(hi) 6=
c + dCI(hi). For the adjusted concentration and Gini indices (Erreygers, 2009a-b) we have an even
stronger result since their values are independent from c and d, i.e. 4E(h˜i)CI(h˜i)
b˜h−a˜h =
4E(c+dhi)CI(c+dhi)
c+dbh−c−dah =
4[c+dE(hi)]
dbh−dah
dE(hi)CI(hi)
c+dE(hi)
= 4E(hi)CI(hi)bh−ah .
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within the respective SAH category9. Figure 2.1 illustrates, using the CCHS data for
males, the impact on age profiles of applying age-sex specific HUI3 scores to the SAH
categories. Profiles are presented for the health measure’s central tendency (mean), total
inequality (adjusted Gini) and income-related inequality (adjusted concentration index).
For each statistic, the age profile is presented for SAH categories scaled using: (i) 1 (very
bad) to 5 (very good), as in Deaton and Paxson (1998), (ii) category means of HUI3, (iii)
category and age-sex specific means of HUI3. A fourth graph for each statistic shows the
profile using the actual HUI3 score for each observation.
Figure 2.1: Sensitivity of age profiles to scaling of self-assessed health (SAH), Males.
Source: Authors’ calculations on basis of the 2001 Canadian Community Household Survey (CCHS).
Using the simple 1-5 scaling of SAH, the profile shows a rather implausible near linear
decrease in mean health with age. This is similar to what was found by Deaton and
Paxson (1998). Using the SAH category specific HUI3 scores has little impact on the
profile for mean health but when age-sex specific scores within each SAH category are
used the profile displays greater concavity indicating, as seems plausible, that mean health
declines more rapidly at older, than at younger ages10. We conclude that SAH alone is
too crude a measure to capture the age profile of mean health but scaling it by age-sex
9Lindeboom and van Doorslaer (2004) find no evidence of variation by income in the thresholds for
reporting SAH in the 1994-95 CCHS data. Consequently, we allow only for variation in HUI3 by age and
sex, and not by income, within a given SAH category.
10For the mean, the age profile drawn from the SAH category, age-sex specific means of HUI3 is
necessarily identical to that drawn from the observation specific HUI3 scores.
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specific utility scores yields plausible results. For the adjusted Gini, moving from the 1-5
scaling of SAH to age-sex specific utility scores within each SAH category brings the age
profile closer to that obtained from the observation specific utility scores. But, of course,
the magnitude of the dispersion can never reach that obtained from the individual specific
scores. At any given age, the adjusted Gini using the age-specific HUI3 scores is about
three times smaller than that obtained from the actual scores. The age profile of the
adjusted concentration index is less sensitive to the method of scaling SAH.
Since the BHPS question instructs respondents to rate their health relative to others
of the same age, one would expect there to be less age-related variation in reported
SAH and more age-related variation in true health within each SAH category in the
UK. Application of age-specific means of HUI3 within each category may therefore be
particularly appropriate for the UK data and help to correct for the inconsistency in the
wording of the SAH question relative to the other countries.
2.3 Decomposition of age and cohort effects
The longitudinal nature of the ECHP makes it possible to perform a true cohort analysis.
Following the same individuals over time identifies the age effect by observing how their
health changes as they age. In order to identify the cohort effect, we group observations
by birth year intervals and compare, for example, mean health of two cohort groups at
the same age across different waves. This is done through cohort level regression analysis,
as in Deaton and Paxson (1998). This avoids the imposition of any restrictions on the
nature of the age and cohort effects at the individual level, which would be unavoidable
if the regression analysis were conducted at that level.
Although, ideally, one would construct a cohort specific to each birth year, this would
result in too few observations per cohort in each wave. Instead, we construct 13 cohorts
of five-year birth intervals. Since there are very few observations in the oldest cohorts we
exclude individuals born before 1912. The youngest cohort was born within the period
1972-1976, with an average age of 20 in the first wave and of 27 in the last wave. The
oldest cohort was born between 1912 and 1916, with an average age of 80 in the first wave
and 87 in the last.
It is the ageing over time within a cohort that identifies the age effect. The cohort
effect is identified through comparison between consecutive cohorts at three overlapping
ages across waves. This is illustrated in Table 2.1. The youngest cohort ages on average
from 25 to 27 during the last three waves of the panel and can be compared with the
second cohort that covers this average age span over the first three waves. Likewise, the
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Table 2.1: Average ages of the three youngest cohorts across the panel
Cohort 1 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27
Cohort 2 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32
Cohort 3 30 31 32 33 34
second and third cohorts both span the 30-32 age range during the last and first three
waves respectively.
We compute each of the three statistics — mean, adjusted Gini index and adjusted
concentration index — for SAH category, age-sex specific HUI3 scores (hereafter referred
to as scaled SAH) for each cohort in each wave and estimate both the age and cohort
effects by regressing each statistic on a full set of age and cohort dummies. Because it is
likely that health dynamics differ across sexes, all analyses are performed separately for
males and females. These regressions are based on 104 observations, i.e. 8 waves times
13 cohorts. We use a separate dummy for each cohort, but the construction of the age
dummies is more subtle. We need to ensure that the age range captured by any given age
dummy does not span more than one cohort defined by a five-year birth interval. Single
year age dummies would, of course, suffice but leave too few degrees of freedom. Instead,
we enter a combination of one and two-year age dummies to indicate the average age of
each cohort in each wave11.
We use all observations present in the first wave (1994). The 1994 cross-sections are
made representative of the non-institutionalised populations in that year through appli-
cation of the ECHP first wave sampling weights (Eurostat, 2003). To keep subsequent
waves of the unbalanced panel representative of the 1994 populations, and so deal with
health related attrition that has been found in these data (Jones et al., 2006), we con-
struct and apply attrition corrected weights. For all wave 1 observations, we use probit
regressions to predict the probability of remaining in the sample at each of the subsequent
waves as a function of the following wave 1 explanatory variables: sex, income, household
composition, thirteen 5-year age dummies, five SAH dummies and an interaction between
SAH and age. The wave 1 ECHP provided sampling weights are then multiplied by the
11More precisely, dummies are defined as follows: dummy1 (age=20), dummy2 (age=21,22), dummy3
(age=23,24), dummy4 (age=25), dummy5 (age=26,27), etc. Note that these age dummies only cover the
average age of the cohort in a particular wave. So there is no dummy for ages 18-19. For the UK this
structure is not suitable since the dummies do not correctly embed the overlap in ages between five year
birth cohorts given that one wave of the panel is omitted. We therefore used six year birth cohorts and
a combination of 1, 2 and 3 year age dummies for the UK. This ensures an overlap of three years for
consecutive cohorts, as for the other countries.
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inverse of these (wave specific) predicted probabilities and, for each wave, this product
is used to weight each observation in the calculation of the three statistics of interest12.
These statistics are regressed on the set of age and cohort dummies using OLS.
Note that while application of attrition corrected weights helps deal with health related
attrition, there may still be some unavoidable bias from pre-sample (i.e. before the first
wave) mortality and institutionalisation. If the unhealthiest have already died or been
institutionalised by the time a given cohort reaches old age at the beginning of the sample
period, the mean health of this cohort will be overestimated. This must be kept in mind
when interpreting the estimated cohort effects.
2.4 Results
Before presenting the main results we show how each of the three statistics of interest
differ by age without disentangling the life cycle and cohort effects. This serves as a point
of reference against which to gauge the effect of making the age-cohort decomposition. In
Figure 2.2, we present for each age group the mean, adjusted Gini index, and adjusted
concentration index of scaled SAH, separately for males and females. These age profiles
derive from straightforward regressions with only age dummies13. The point estimates,
presented with 95% percent confidence intervals, show differences from the reference cat-
egory of 20-24 years. Intercepts are not shown in the graphs to facilitate cross-country
comparison of the curvature of the age profiles, and not their levels which are potentially
more prone to cross-country reporting heterogeneity. Countries are arranged geographi-
cally by northern and southern Europe, with Ireland included in the latter group because
it bears closer resemblance to those countries with respect to the main results presented
below.
For all three statistics, the unadjusted age profiles display a remarkable degree of
consistency across countries. In most countries, there is little difference in mean health
over the age range of 20-40, between 40 and 70 there is a steady decrease in health and
this becomes much steeper above the age of 70. The deterioration of health with age
is less steep in the UK, the Netherlands, Belgium, Denmark and Ireland than in other
countries. For the UK, it seems likely that this is at least partly due to the different
wording of the BHPS SAH question that asks respondents to rate their health relative to
others of the same age. The adjusted Gini index of health seems to increase with age in
12In order to apply this method, we exclude observations that join the panel after the first wave.
13Since the dependent variables are constructed for cohorts of individuals of different sizes, we use
robust standard errors to correct for the resulting heteroskedasticity, if any.
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all countries and the rise is most pronounced at higher ages. The increase is shallower in
Belgium, Denmark, Ireland, the Netherlands and the UK. In most countries, the adjusted
concentration index increases with age, reaching its peak in the age range in which most
people retire (i.e. 55-65) before decreasing. Another striking observation from these
graphs is that the age profiles for males and females show very little difference, especially
for the mean and the adjusted Gini index. For the adjusted concentration index, gender
differences are somewhat larger. For males there is often a clear peak around retirement
age, while for females the pattern is more gradual, and the peak often occurs somewhat
earlier.
In Figure 2.3, we present the life cycle (light) and cohort (dark) profiles for each of
the three statistics that derive from the age-cohort regression analysis described in the
previous section. Again we present coefficients, which show deviations from the reference
age (20-24) and cohort birth-year (1972-76) groups. For example, when the cohort pro-
file for the mean lies below the horizontal at zero, it implies that earlier born cohorts
experience worse health at any given age. For every country, tests strongly confirm the
joint significance of all the age dummies and of all the cohort dummies for both the mean
and the adjusted Gini index. For the adjusted concentration index, both the age and the
cohort dummies are jointly significant, usually at much less than 5%, in every case but
for the cohort dummies for females in Greece and Spain, and the age dummies for males
in Germany14.
For mean health, in general, the life cycle profiles hardly differ from the unadjusted age
profiles presented in Figure 2.2. Health changes little as individuals age between 20 and
40. From the age of forty health begins to decline but there is often a levelling, or even an
improvement in health between 55 and 65. The flattening of the profile around retirement
age has been observed in other studies (e.g. Deaton, 2008). Deaton (ibid) conjectures
that it could result from the pre-retirement group being particularly intolerant to the
onset of health problems. This may be motivated by the incentives created by disability
insurance in the pre-retirement age range. More optimistically, it could reflect a positive
impact of retirement on health — a ‘honeymoon phase’ (Atchley, 1976).
Beyond the 65-70 years age range, health begins to deteriorate rapidly. In a number
of countries, the degeneration of health appears to be even more compressed into the
advanced years once control is made for differences in health across generations. Com-
parison between Figures 2.2 and 2.3 confirms that this is true for Greece, Ireland, Italy,
Portugal and Spain. These differences in the age profiles reflect strong cohort effects in
these (mostly) southern European countries, which are observable in Figure 2.3. In each
14All test statistics are reported in table A.2 in Van Kippersluis et al. (2008).
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of these countries, older generations have markedly worse health than their younger coun-
terparts (at a given age). Horsman et al. (2003) estimate a difference in HUI3 of 0.05, or
more, to represent a clinically important change in health. Usually the health difference
between the youngest and oldest cohort is around 0.1, so this is a substantial improvement
in health over generations. Notably, four of these countries are southern European and
the fifth, Ireland, has also experienced very rapid economic and social development over
the period spanned by the lives of the adults represented in these data. It is conjecture,
of course, but it seems plausible that the generational differences in health we observe
reflect the advances that have been made in these countries over the post-war era. In
most of the northern European countries (Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany and the
Netherlands) the cohort effects are jointly significant, but there is no evidence of any clear
improvement or deterioration in average health across generations. In the UK generations
born before 1930 for males and 1940 for females actually report significantly better health,
on average, than more recently born cohorts. This is surprising given gains that have been
recorded in objective indicators of population health, such as life expectancy. It may re-
flect generational differences in health expectations that confound the reporting of health,
or it could be an artefact stemming from the reference to age in the BHPS SAH question,
although one would expect the latter to affect the age profile more than the cohort profile.
While different cohort effects for the northern and southern countries (including Ireland)
clearly emerge, differential rates of (pre-sample) institutionalisation may have contributed
to this. Greater use of residential, long-term care in northern countries will raise the mean
health of older generations of the non-institutionalised individuals included in the samples
relative to their counterparts in the southern European samples. Generational differences
in mean health may then be more apparent in the southern samples.
With few exceptions, there is an upward gradient in the cohort profile for the adjusted
Gini index indicating that health is more dispersed among older generations. This is
consistent with what Deaton and Paxson (1998) found for the US. The tendency towards
reduced inequality in health among younger generations is strongest in the countries
that also show an improvement in average health (Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and
Spain). In the northern, more industrialized countries, particularly in France, Germany,
the Netherlands, the compression of the health distribution among younger generations
is less pronounced. The UK is the only country in which there is less health inequality
among older cohorts — although only significantly for females — which may be related to
the age reference in the SAH question, although, again, one would expect this to impact
more on the life cycle profile than the cohort effects.
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There is less consistency across countries in the life cycle profiles of the adjusted Gini
index. The tendency for inequality to increase with age that was observed for all countries
in Figure 2.2 appears to be driven by the cohort effects. Once these are controlled for there
is evidence that health becomes significantly more unequally distributed as individuals age
only for France, Germany, Dutch females and the UK. For these countries the evidence
is even stronger than that found for the US by Deaton and Paxson (1998) in support
of their hypothesis that the variability of health increases over the life cycle due the
cumulative effect of permanent health shocks. But in the remaining countries, the life
cycle profile of the adjusted Gini index displays a variety of patterns after the age of
50 and is actually significantly decreasing with age in Spain and for females in Ireland.
There is no emergence of a stylised fact that health consistently becomes more unequally
distributed as a cohort ages.
After taking out the cohort effect, the adjusted concentration index continues to show
some sign of peaking around retirement age only for British, Dutch, French, and Irish
males and Danish females. But the precision is low, indicated by wide confidence intervals,
and the profiles could not be described as having a distinct inverted U-shape. In a few
cases income-related health inequality is increasing over the life cycle (Greek males and
Dutch females) and in Italy it is falling. In most countries, particularly for females, the
cohort profile of the adjusted concentration index is flat. Unlike what Deaton and Paxson
(1998) found for the US, there is little evidence from Europe that the income gradient
in health is becoming steeper among younger generations. There is evidence that this is
occurring only among Dutch females. For many of the others, if anything, the trend is in
the opposite direction. But it is evident that the confidence intervals for the concentration
index are often substantially wider than those for the other statistics and this might reflect
a difficulty in separately identifying the age and cohort effects for this statistic.
2.5 Robustness checks
In this section we check the robustness of the results to allowing for possible period
effects and extending the number of waves to better disentangle age from cohort effects.
All results are available on request from the authors.
2.5.1 Allowing period effects
The regressions underlying Figure 2.3 do not allow for any period effects. That is, variation
in health from year-to-year that is common to all ages and cohorts. Period effects are not
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taken into account in the basic analysis for two reasons. First, it seems likely that any
common year-to-year variation in health over the span of eight years is much less important
than age and cohort differences. Second, it is well known that unrestricted age, cohort and
period effects cannot all be separately identified (Weiss and Lillard, 1978) and, even with
restrictions, it might be overly ambitious to attempt to disentangle all three effects from
only eight years of data. Yet, period effects on the distribution of health certainly cannot
be ruled out entirely a priori. They could derive from a business cycle effect operating
through labour market conditions, levels of stress, consumption of alcohol or accidents
(Ruhm, 2003; 2005). Any changes in disability insurance eligibility rules may also affect
the reporting of health. It is also possible that innovations in medical technology over the
period of the study could impact on the distribution of health, although it seems unlikely
that our health measure is sufficiently sensitive to pick this up.
Since we are intrinsically interested in the age and cohort effects and we expect the
period effects, if any, to mainly derive from business cycle fluctuations, it seems most
appropriate to achieve identification by constraining the period dummies to be orthogonal
to a linear time trend (Deaton, 1997). This essentially ensures that all trends in the data
are attributed to the cohort and age effects. The interpretation is now of a fixed age
profile, a cohort-shift in this profile and period effects stochastically moving the data off
the profile. Practically, with the orthogonality constraint and restricting the coefficients
of the period effects to sum to zero, this boils down to estimating the regression with six
period dummies, defined as in Deaton (1997).
For most countries and statistics, the period dummies were not jointly significant
(especially for males)15. In any case, the inclusion of period effects lowered the precision
of the estimates of the age and cohort effects greatly, while the patterns of the age and
cohort profiles remained similar.
Since our time frame is rather short, making it difficult to separate cycles from a trend,
we also experimented with year specific macroeconomic indicators — GDP growth and
the unemployment rate — to capture any business cycle effect. Using Belgium as a test
case, the regression analyses were repeated with the addition of each of the two macro
indicators separately and jointly. The addition of GDP growth had a similar impact
on the point estimates to the inclusion of the restricted period dummies, but without
15For males, only Denmark, Italy, Portugal and the UK have significant period effects for the mean.
Only Spain has significant period effects for the adjusted Gini index. The effects for the adjusted con-
centration index are significant for British, German, and Portuguese males. For females, significance of
the period effects is found for Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Portugal, Spain and UK for the
mean. For the Gini index German, Greek, Italian, and Spanish females have significant period effects.
Finally, for the concentration index only German females have significant period effects.
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inflating the confidence intervals as much. Only for the mean health of females was GDP
growth significant. Adding the unemployment rate to the regression had a larger impact
on the age coefficients for all statistics, although it was significant only in the regression
of the concentration index for females. It appears that this variable is competing with
age to pick up the over time variation, leading to a distorted age profile. Including both
indicators gave equivalent results as adding the unemployment rate to the regression.
Since allowing for period effects, either through dummies or macro indicators, reduces the
precision of the estimates while leaving the age and cohort profiles much the same, we
prefer the more parsimonious specification.
2.5.2 Extending the number of waves
All the analyses use eight waves of data taken from the ECHP for most countries and
from the BHPS and GSOEP in the cases of the UK and Germany. The latter two panels
run for more than eight waves, providing an opportunity to examine whether eight waves
are sufficient to adequately identify age and cohort effects. For the UK, we repeated the
analysis using 13 waves of the BHPS (1991-2004). While with eight waves the cohort
effects are identified through the comparison of two adjacent cohorts at common ages
across waves, with 13 waves it is possible to compare three different cohorts at the same
age. As anticipated, this resulted in more precise estimates of the age and cohort profiles.
But the shapes of these profiles hardly changed, except for the age profile of the adjusted
concentration index for males which is no longer significant. This supports our warning
at the end of section 4 that it appears more difficult to separately identifying the age and
cohort effects for the adjusted concentrated index. Overall though, our findings suggest
that an eight year time span is sufficient to identify the patterns of the age and cohort
effects.
2.6 Conclusion
In the context of ageing European populations, it is vital to identify both how the distri-
bution of health evolves as individuals age and also how it is changing across generations.
A cross-sectional analysis of the relationship between health and age does not suffice as
this age profile is confounded by generational differences in the distribution of health.
Not surprisingly, we find average health to decline with age. More interesting is the
consistency in the pattern of this decline. In most countries, there is a gradual but steady
fall in mean health from early adulthood until around the age of 50. The deterioration
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in health generally levels off in middle-age before accelerating rapidly beyond the age of
70. Deaton and Paxson (1998) found a less plausible linear decline in health in the US,
most probably because they imposed the restriction that differences in health are constant
between all adjacent SAH categories. The middle-age plateau in the profile of mean health
is rather puzzling. It may simply be an artefact of the insensitivity of SAH to changes
in health in this age range, although the use of age-sex specific HUI3 scores within each
SAH category makes this less likely. The decline in mean health between the ages of
70 and 80 is substantial and clinically significant. This rapid deterioration suggests that
while health might not be a significant physical constraint on raising the retirement age
toward 70, currently it would be a substantial constraint beyond that age. Of course, few
individuals will wish to work until their health makes it physically impossible to continue
and so the expected rapid decline in health after 70 may encourage individuals to retire
well before that age while their health still permits them to enjoy their increased leisure
time. While these issues are central to the debate currently being conducted in many
European countries in response to proposals to raise the retirement age, we should be
careful not to overstep the implications that can be drawn from our descriptive analysis.
We have identified how health changes on average with age but not why it does so. We do
not know what role retirement itself plays in determining the age at which health begins
to decline rapidly. It could well be that a rise in the retirement age would shift the age
profile of health, although whether it would be most likely to shift outward or inward is
difficult to establish from the current evidence (Charles, 2002; Shan et al., 2005; Neuman,
2008).
The retirement age is seldom, if ever, increased for the generation currently approach-
ing it. Assessment of whether population health is likely to be a constraint on this policy
therefore requires knowledge of the extent to which the age profile of mean health is
shifting out for younger generations. Our results indicate that this is happening in south-
ern Europe and in Ireland but not in northern Europe. The groupings of countries are
consistent with anticipated differences in the timing of health benefits from improved
nutrition, living conditions and access to medical care over the course of the last cen-
tury and also with evidence on cohort differences in adult height across Europe (Garcia
and Quintana-Domeque, 2007). Garcia and Quintana-Domeque find that the same four
southern European countries that are included in the present study, plus Ireland, experi-
enced increases in mean height much later than northern European countries. Bozzoli et
al. (2007) confirm this finding and demonstrate that the post neonatal mortality rate is
negatively and strongly correlated with the mean height of a cohort in adulthood. This is
consistent with a strong life-long impact of health conditions experienced in infanthood
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(Barker, 1995; Case et al., 2005; Van den Berg et al., 2006). It suggests that the gains
in adult health for younger generations that are observed in the ECHP data for the four
southern European countries and Ireland, but not for the northern countries, are due
to the more marked improvements over the course of the last century in the childhood
health conditions registered in southern Europe. It is tempting to relate this to the later
economic development of the five mentioned countries but Bozzoli et al. (2007) do not
find any role for national income in explaining increases in adult height.
The absence of any evidence of health gains to younger cohorts in northern European
countries is perhaps surprising given continuing declines in age-specific mortality rates
(Lafortune and Balestat, 2007) but it does not contradict two other European studies
that used EQ-5D scores to scale SAH in a way that resembles what we did using the
HUI3. Sutton (2004) actually found reported health to be worse among younger cohorts
in the UK. Burstro¨m et al. (2005) found the same result in Sweden up to the age of
45, but beyond this age reported health was better for younger cohorts at any given age.
Moreover, Crimmins (2004) showed that morbidity and disability show different trends
for the elderly and it is possible that generational differences in health expectations are
obscuring gains in health when measured by SAH. There is good evidence from the US
of substantial year-on-year declines in age specific disability rates (Manton et al., 2007).
The evidence on disability trends for other OECD countries is less consistent (Lafortune
and Balestat, 2007).
We find a dramatic fall in health inequality over time in all 11 European countries
studied except France, Germany, the Netherlands and the UK, where it only slightly
decreased or remained stable. This finding of lower variability in health among younger
cohorts is consistent with Deaton and Paxson (1998) and implies that both the US and
Europe have succeeded in decreasing the degree of inequality in population health over the
past century. But, consistent with other European studies (e.g. Kunst et al., 2005), there
is no evidence of falling socioeconomic inequality in health across generations. While this
may be considered a failure, it should be judged alongside the US evidence of increasing
socioeconomic inequality (Deaton and Paxson, 1998).
We do not find consistent empirical support for Deaton and Paxson’s (1998) hypothesis
of rising variability in health over the life cycle. But the prediction is confirmed for
the three largest countries — France, Germany and the United Kingdom — and more
emphatically so than is true for the US (Deaton and Paxson, 1998). These are not the
three health systems that one would immediately think of as being least likely to provide
effective health care such that health shocks accumulate and dispersion increases over the
life cycle. Rather than attempt to reconcile the evidence with the hypothesis, it is perhaps
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more appropriate to reconsider the theory. It may well be that a model of permanent,
additive and uncorrelated health shocks does not best describe the evolution of health
and so cannot predict the course of its variability over the life cycle. The issue deserves
further study.
Without controlling for cohort differences, we confirm US evidence (Elo and Preston,
1996; Smith and Kington, 1997; Deaton and Paxson, 1998; Smith, 2005a) of an inverse U-
shaped income gradient in health that peaks around the retirement age. But after taking
account of cohort effects, the inverse U-shape prevails only for British, Dutch, French,
and Irish males and Danish females. In fact, while the dummies for age and cohort effects
are still jointly significant in most countries, for males as well as for females, there is no
single dominant pattern appearing for the majority of countries. In general, it simply
seems much harder to disentangle age and cohort effects with sufficient precision for the
adjusted concentration index than for the mean and adjusted Gini index of SAH.
An important potential limitation of our study is that we identify the cohort effects
from only three overlapping ages in only two adjacent cohorts. The strong assumption we
have to impose is that health differences between cohorts at these three ages are represen-
tative of the differences over the whole life-span. While we have confirmed the robustness
of our results for the UK using 13, rather than 8, waves, a pseudo-panel approach of a
long series of cross-sections would provide more identifying information and may allow
testing of whether the cohort effects merely shift and do not tilt the age profiles. It would,
however, lose the cross-country dimension of the present study. A second limitation is the
absence of institutionalised individuals in the ECHP. Our attrition corrected sampling
weights correct for the onset of institutionalisations during the time period of our panel,
but not for any pre-sample mortality and pre-sample institutionalisation. We thus cannot
exclude that mean health of the very old is overestimated and that the cohort effects
would be steeper in the absence of such pre-sample biases. Given differential rates on
institutionalisation in the north and south of Europe, this may be confounding the north-
south comparison of cohort effects. A third, unavoidable limitation is that we can only
correct for selective attrition based on observable, and not unobservable, characteristics.
Despite these limitations, our findings appear relatively robust to a number of method-
ological choices and restrictions imposed by the data. Future work should concentrate
on whether age and cohort profiles in health differ by socio-demographic groups within
countries. This would allow consideration not only of how individuals age on average, but
how the health of certain socioeconomic groups deteriorates relative to that of other SES
groups (Case and Deaton, 2005).
Appendix
Tables
Table 2.2: Descriptive Statistics
FRA GER NL UK GR ITA POR SPA BE DK IRE
Obs. Wave 1 13166 11829 9048 7809 11859 16657 10936 16883 6427 5652 9472
Obs. Wave 2 11623 11041 8140 6841 10506 15488 10208 14006 5749 4919 7572
Obs. Wave 3 11039 10518 7786 6618 9640 14967 9671 13066 5316 4385 6405
Obs. Wave 4 9926 10053 7347 6359 8877 13672 9281 11754 4812 3956 5678
Obs. Wave 5 9156 9413 6769 6105 8837 14239 10019 11835 4809 3851 5462
Obs. Wave 6 8523 8948 6200 5550 8331 13553 9762 11198 4443 3623 4621
Obs. Wave 7 7902 8480 5731 5287 8104 12692 9461 10424 4150 3425 3720
Obs. Wave 8 7601 8070 5106 5021 8012 11516 9237 10044 3736 3368 3248
Mean HUI3 0.87 0.84 0.90 0.88 0.89 0.87 0.83 0.87 0.89 0.90 0.91
Mean income 184928 57515 55377 19841 4295866 39169 2339057 2876558 1224194 249015 21579
Mean age 47.55 46.16 47.43 47.31 49.54 46.30 49.11 47.66 47.35 46.86 46.15
Proportion of males 0.47 0.48 0.47 0.47 0.47 0.49 0.48 0.48 0.47 0.49 0.49
Notes: HUI3 refers to the Health Utility Index Mark 3. Income is measured in national currency units.

Chapter 3
Socioeconomic Differences in Health
over the Life Cycle in an Egalitarian
Country
A strong cross-sectional relationship between health and socioeconomic status is firmly
established. This paper adopts a life cycle perspective to investigate whether the
socioeconomically disadvantaged, on top of a lower health level, experience a sharper
deterioration of health over time. Data are drawn from the Dutch Health Interview
Surveys covering the period 1983 - 2000. The analysis focuses on the self-rated health
and disability of persons aged 16 – 80. We show that in the Netherlands, as in the
US, the socioeconomic gradient in health widens until late-middle age and narrows
thereafter. The analysis and the available evidence suggests that the widening gradient
is attributable both to health-related withdrawal from the labor force, resulting in lower
incomes, and the cumulative protective effect of education on health outcomes. The
less educated appear to suffer a double health penalty in that they begin adult life
with a slightly lower health level, which subsequently declines at a faster rate.
—————————————–
This chapter is based upon:
Van Kippersluis, H., O. O’Donnell, E. van Doorslaer, and T. Van Ourti, (2010), “Socioeconomic
Differences in Health over the Life Cycle in an Egalitarian Country”, Social Science and
Medicine, 70(3): 428-438.
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3.1 Introduction
Health differs by socioeconomic status. The socially and economically advantaged enjoy
better health, irrespective of whether it is measured by morbidity, disability or mortality.
This strong socioeconomic gradient in health is firmly established in evidence from both
the developed and the developing world (Marmot, 1999; Smith, 1999; Mackenbach et
al., 2002; CSDH, 2008). Despite an abundance of literature, the causal mechanisms and
pathways responsible for the association are still poorly understood. In part, this stems
from the static nature of much of the analysis. Both health and socioeconomic status
(SES) are multidimensional and dynamic, and the relationship between them may reflect
different effects and feedbacks over the course of life. Does low economic status in early life
lead to the development of health problems in middle and later life? Or, does poor health
interfere with the acquisition of education and, subsequently, the chances of securing, or
holding onto, a well-paid job? The difficulty of answering such questions led Cutler et al.
(2008) in a recent review to remark that “(. . . ) differential patterns of causality make a
single theory of socioeconomic gradients in health difficult to imagine. We suspect, though,
that the right theory will emphasize the life cycle.”
The advantage of bringing a life cycle perspective on the gradient has proved extremely
useful already in the United States, where Smith (1999, 2005a) and Case and Deaton
(2005) have challenged the common view that the socioeconomic gradient in health reflects
the effect of socioeconomic status, in particular income, on health, arguing instead that a
large part of the gradient derives from a feedback effect of health on income through labor
force participation. Banks et al. (2009) made a first attempt to unravel these mechanisms
in the UK and their preliminary conclusion is that the same mechanism is able to explain
an important part of the gradient there as well.
This paper does not aim to present evidence on the causal impact of SES on health,
or vice versa, but rather to motivate such analysis by describing how socioeconomic dif-
ferences in health evolve over the life cycle. More specifically, we investigate whether
the stylized facts emerging from the US literature are also apparent in Dutch data. The
Netherlands differs markedly from the US in relation to social structure, income inequal-
ity, health and disability insurance, social protection and health care organization (see
e.g. Hurd and Kapteyn, 2003). For example, the gross replacement rate for disability
insurance benefits in 1993 was 63 percent in the Netherlands, as opposed to only 30
percent in the US (MacFarlan and Oxley, 1996). Similar large differences exist for unem-
ployment benefits and social assistance, where also the maximum period of entitlement
is much longer in the Netherlands than it is in the US (MacFarlan and Oxley, 1996). No
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doubt as a consequence of these differences, socioeconomic inequality in health is much
lower in the Netherlands than it is in the US (Van Doorslaer et al., 1997). But little
or nothing is currently known about whether and how the countries differ in the way in
which the socioeconomic gradient in health changes over the life course. If there were no
such differences, it would suggest that the observed patterns result from the fundamental
relationships between education, occupation, work and health over the life course, and
are not responsive to the social, health and economic policy environment.
A life cycle perspective additionally provides information on how much more rapidly
health declines for some groups than others. While it is clear that, at any given age,
the socially disadvantaged experience a lower level of health, there is no consensus over
whether they can also expect their health to deteriorate more rapidly. On the one hand,
proponents of the cumulative-advantage hypothesis maintain that differences in health
by SES are established early in life and subsequently widen as the economic and health
disadvantages of the less privileged interact and accumulate (House et al., 1994; Ross
and Wu, 1996; Lynch, 2003; Willson et al., 2007). The competing view — the age-as-
leveler hypothesis — maintains that deterioration in health is an inevitable part of the
process of ageing irrespective of economic means or social position, with the result that
the SES-health gradient narrows at advanced ages (Beckett, 2000; Herd, 2006). If there is
cumulative advantage, then interventions that were effective in breaking this process by
expanding opportunities to socially disadvantaged groups earlier in life would have large
pay-offs in terms of improved health and labor-market prospects over the life cycle.
As in the US, we find that socioeconomic differences in health first diverge, reach a
peak around late middle-age, and then converge in old age. It appears that a large part
of the socioeconomic gradient in health is governed by labor force participation. Once
one restrict attention to working individuals, health differences across income groups are
greatly reduced and do not widen with age up to middle-age. The convergence in old age
may partly stem from selective mortality — only the most robust of the lower income
groups survive — although it appears also to reflect the reduced dependence of income
on health after retirement.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 3.2 summarizes existing evidence on the
SES health gradient over the life cycle. Although we will often refer rather loosely to the
’life cycle’, since we are particularly interested in the interactions between health, work
and income, we restrict attention to the years of adultood. For this reason, we do not
survey either the ever-expanding literature on socioeconomic differences in the evolution
of child health (e.g. Case et al., 2002; Currie and Stabile, 2003; Currie et al., 2007;
Murasko, 2008), or that on the impact of early-life conditions on health in adulthood
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(Barker, 1995; van den Berg et al., 2006; van den Berg and Lindeboom, 2007). In Section
3.3, we introduce the data and methods, and in Section 3.4 evidence on the SES-health
gradient over the adult life course in the Netherlands is presented. In Section 3.5 we
consider the consequences of the evidence presented for health inequalities and policies to
tackle them.
3.2 Related literature
Case and Deaton (2005) report large differences in average self-reported health (SRH) in
the US by income quartile that increase up to age 50-55, before narrowing particularly
after age 60 until they disappear by age 80. A similar life cycle pattern has been observed
for other indicators of SES and health (Smith 2005a; Case and Deaton, 2005) and in one
European (Belgian) study (Deboosere and Neels, 2008).
Interpretations of the observed widening and then narrowing of the SES-health gra-
dient with age differ in the extent to which the observed pattern is presumed to reflect
substantive changes in the relationship between SES and health over the life course, as
opposed to simply being the product of methodological limitations. According to the
cumulative-advantage hypothesis, the SES-health gradient increases over the life course
possibly due to gestation of the effects. For example, the health effects of socioeconomic
differences in smoking become apparent only in middle age (Lynch, 2003). Alternatively,
social advantages in factors that affect health (social capital, networks and information)
may accumulate across the life cycle (Lynch 2003). The latter argument is also a promi-
nent feature of economic theory (Becker, 1964; Grossman, 1972b). Heckman (2000) and
Cunha and Heckman (2007) note that a higher level of health leads to a higher level of
health in the next period (self-productivity), but additionally investments in health at
later ages are more beneficial if an individual has lived a healthy life (dynamic comple-
mentarity). Empirical support for this hypothesis is provided by Ross and Wu (1996),
Lynch (2003), Kim and Durden (2007), and Willson et al. (2007), among others.
The competing view, the age-as-leveler hypothesis, proposes that biological determi-
nants increase relative to socioeconomic determinants at older ages (Herd 2006). A large
literature documents the fact that at young ages much of the variation in health is as-
sociated with SES (see e.g. Case et al., 2002). But biology exerts a stronger influence
as we age, and there is less room for SES to play a role. Generally, the evidence is con-
sistent with a cumulative-advantage process operating until middle age, with age indeed
acting as a leveler over the years of retirement (Kitagawa and Hauser, 1973; Kunst and
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Mackenbach, 1994; House et al., 1994; Elo and Preston, 1996; Deaton and Paxson, 1998;
Beckett, 2000; Case and Deaton, 2005; Smith, 2005a; Herd, 2006).
Smith (2005a, 2005b, 2007) uses various US panel data sets to probe the SES-health
relationship in an effort to unravel the causal mechanisms that may be responsible for it.
His argument is that there is a strong causal impact (mediated through work participation)
of health on financial indicators of SES, and a causal impact only of education, among
the SES indicators, on health. This is founded on the timing of the onset of chronic
conditions (assumed to correspond to a health shock) in relation to measures of SES. A
substantial impact of a health shock on the probability of future work and the income of
older Americans is taken as evidence of a strong causal mechanism running from health
to SES (Smith, 2007). The effects on employment, income and wealth are strongest at
ages 51-61. This offers quite a different interpretation of the quadratic relationship of
the SES-health gradient with age than that of a cumulative-advantage process eventually
being overturned by the leveling effect of age. Smith (2007) consistently finds education
to be a strong predictor of the onset of new chronic conditions, having controlled for
initial health and a multitude of background factors including employment and smoking
behavior, but finds no effect of financial measures of SES on changes in health.
While Case and Deaton (2005) agree that health-related interruptions to work con-
tribute strongly to the income-health gradient and its variation with age, they also empha-
size the impact of work on health. Pooling data from the 1986-2001 US National Health
Interview Surveys (NHIS), they show that the initial divergence followed by convergence
of the age profile in self-reported health is also apparent by labor-force status, even at
the same income percentiles. The association of health with income is swamped by the
association with employment. There is evidence of health selection out of the labor force
among manual but not among non-manual workers, and the manual workers that remain
in employment experience a more rapid deterioration in health. This all suggests a strong
role for the nature of work in explaining adult health trajectories in the US.
3.3 Data and Methodology
We examine socioeconomic differences over the adult life cycle in self-reported health,
disability and mortality.
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3.3.1 Analyses of self-reported health and disability
The self-reported health and disability data are obtained from the Dutch Central Bureau
of Statistics (CBS) Health Interview Surveys covering the period 1983-2000 (Gezondhei-
dsenqueˆte 1983-1996 and Permanent Onderzoek Leef-Situatie (POLS) 1997-2000). These
are annual, nationally representative cross-section surveys of the non-institutionalised
population including children. We restrict attention to adults aged 16 to 80 containing
between 5,500 and 8,500 observations per year and a total of 121,232 observations across
the 18 pooled cross-sections we analyse. In addition to health indicators, the survey pro-
vides data on income, education and employment status. Frequencies of all the variables
used in the analysis for the pooled dataset are given in Table 3.1 in the appendix.
Self-reported health (SRH) is obtained from the question: “How is your health in
general?” Responses are on a five-point scale: “very good”,“good”,“fair”, “sometimes
good / sometimes bad”, and “bad”. We dichotomize and focus on individuals reporting
the last two categories, which we refer to as ”bad health”.
In addition to SRH, we examine disability both because it is a different dimension
of health with a potentially distinct life cycle profile (Crimmins, 2004; Freedman et al.,
2007) and because it is a more objective measure that is less prone to reporting differences
by age or SES that may distort the health profiles (Bound, 1991; Kapteyn et al., 2007).
Disability is measured using the OECD Long-Term Disability Questions on the eight
domains listed in Table 3.1 (McWhinnie, 1982; Gudex and Lafortune, 2000). We create
a binary indicator of whether the individual reports at least one severe disability, defined
as only being able to carry out an activity with great effort or not at all, in any of the
three mobility-related domains since these, rather than loss of eyesight or hearing, better
correspond to work-related disability associated with poor health. While this is still a
self-reported measure, it is more specific than the SRH assessment of health in general,
which will obscure an age effect if individuals report their health relative to others of the
same age.
The CBS Health Interview Surveys measure income as annual net household income,
which for the years 1983-96 is recorded in 11 fixed categories, and for the years 1997-
2000 is available in intervals corresponding to deciles. Since we use only rank in the
income distribution, the inconsistency of categories is not a major limitation, which is
confirmed by a sensitivity analysis excluding the last four waves. Within each income
category living standards will vary partly due to variation in actual incomes and partly
because of variation in needs. We have no information on the former, but we can partially
account for the latter by ranking inversely by household size within each category. The
resulting ranks are then used to identify age-gender-wave specific quartiles in the (per
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capita) income distribution, which are used to compare the health of those at the top and
bottom of the income distribution at each age.
The educational variable used is the highest education degree ever obtained, while for
students we use the current educational level. This is used to distinguish between a low
education group (not completed more than primary school) and a high education group
(university and college graduates).
Employment status is identified up to the age of 70 and for individuals who are re-
tired, their last occupation is coded, but this is not true for the last four cross-sections,
which were excluded from the analysis by occupation. In order to compare the health of
individuals in the most and least physically demanding jobs, we assign those working in
industrial, craft and transport occupations to a “manual” category, and executives and
specialists to a category we label “non-manual”.
Our analysis is graphical, showing how the life cycle profile of bad health (disability)
differs between those at the bottom and at the top of the distribution of each socioeco-
nomic indicator — income, education and occupation — and also by employment status.
We pool the 18 cross-sectional CBS surveys and compute the percentage of individuals
in bad health (disability) in two-year age intervals, separately for females and males. A
kernel-weighted local polynomial is estimated through the age-specific prevalence rates.
Attention is restricted to adults between the ages of 18 and 80, the upper cut-off being
chosen to maintain sufficient cell sizes.
Variation of health by age does not identify the life cycle health profile in the presence
of cohort differences in health. We test for the importance of cohort effects by grouping
observations into five-year birth intervals and then identifying the life cycle health profile
for each SES group from the variation in health as each cohort ages across the repeated
cross-sections (see Van Kippersluis et al. (2009)).
3.3.2 Analysis of Mortality
Differential rates of mortality and institutionalization by SES will bias estimates of SES
differences in the life cycle health profile derived from surveys of the non-institutionalised
(surviving) population. For example, ‘survival of the fittest’ could explain why socioeco-
nomic differences in health appear to narrow at older ages (Lynch, 2003). To gauge the
magnitude of any such effect, we examine mortality rates by income over the life cycle
corrected for cohort effects. This analysis is performed using administrative data that
links tax records with the mortality register for the period 1998-2005.
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From the tax records, we observe incomes of a random sample of around one-third
of the Dutch population, corresponding to about 5 million individuals per year, for the
periods 1998-2000 and 2002-2004. Age-specific income quartiles are calculated for each
year using annual household income calculated after taxes and social benefits and adjusted
for household size and age structure (see Van Doorslaer et al. (2008) for details). These
tax records are linked to the subsequent year’s Municipality Register, which records each
death, its timing, and the gender and date of birth of the deceased. This dataset is
then linked to the Cause-of-Death Register to identify any additional deaths that are not
reported in the Municipality Register. This allows us to compute the age-gender specific
mortality rate for each income quartile.
3.4 Socioeconomic Differences in Health over the Life
Cycle
3.4.1 The life cycle profile of self-reported health by income
Figure 3.1 shows a clear income gradient in reported bad health at all but the youngest
ages. For example, there is a 10% prevalence of morbidity in the bottom income quartile
of females already at age 35; while in the top quartile this prevalence is only reached at 65.
The age profile of the gradient displays striking consistency with the evidence reviewed
in section 3.2. For both genders, but particularly for males, income differences in health
diverge until 55 or so, at which point almost 30% of males in the bottom quartile report
bad health, compared with only 5% in the top quartile, before converging in old age.
The differences between top and bottom quartiles are statistically significant at the 5%
level from age 30 on for both males and females. The increase in the income gradient
until the age of 55 is due to a very sharp increase in reported poor health in the bottom
quartile, which contrasts with the much more steady increase in the top quartile. This is
consistent with the patterns in the US data identified by Smith (2005a). The decline in
reported ill-health in the age range of 55-65 is very marked at the bottom of the income
distribution, but is absent at the top. That health is apparently improving in this age
range at the bottom of the income distribution is rather surprising. We return to possible
explanations of this phenomenon below.
Although not shown here, when all income quartiles are examined, rather than just the
top and bottom as in Figure 3.1, a health gradient emerges between the middle quartiles
and the top one as age increases. Like the difference between the bottom and top, the
gradient between the middle and top peaks in middle-age. But there is always a very
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marked upward jump in the prevalence of bad health at the bottom quartile. Up to the
age of 55, the difference in prevalence between the bottom and second bottom quartile is
greater than that between the latter and the top quartile. It is particularly among the
poorest individuals that health deteriorates rapidly until middle-age.
Figure 3.1: Self-reported health by age, split according to income quartile and gender
Source: Authors’ calculations from CBS Health Interview Surveys, 1983-2000. Sample weights applied.
Figure 3.10 in the Appendix is the counterpart of Figure 3.1 after correction for cohort
effects. Comparing the two figures it would appear that (particularly for males) any cohort
effects are small and that life cycle profiles can be approximated fairly well by raw age
variation. This is consistent with previous findings for a number of northern European
countries (Van Kippersluis et al., 2009).
Figure 3.2 (top panel) shows mortality rates by income quartile corrected for cohort
effects. Beyond the age of 60, one can observe large differences in mortality rates by
income. Cumulative differences are even more pronounced. Below 60, differences are
difficult to discern since the absolute rates are so small. But the graphs in the bottom
panel of figure 3.2 reveal that relative differences in mortality rates are largest between
50 and 60, around the age at which differences in reported health peak. These differences
in mortality suggest that part of the convergence in the income-health gradient at older
ages is due to the higher survival of the most healthy among the lowest income quartile.
Comparison of Figure 3.3 with Figure 3.1 reveals income differences in the life cycle
profile of disability are similar to those in general health, with the income gradient again
peaking, particularly for males, in middle-age. This suggests the pattern is not simply
attributable to differential reporting of health. For low income women and high-income
men, the prevalence of disability continues to rise beyond the age of 60, suggesting that
the flattening-off observed in the respective profiles of bad health (Figure 3.1) is due to
Figure 3.2: Mortality rate over the life cycle, split according to income and gender with
correction for cohort effects
Source: Authors’ calculations from linked Dutch administrative data, 1999-2001 and 2003-05. The vertical
axis in the bottom panel shows the ratio of the mortality rate for the bottom quartile and the top quartile.
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a tendency among these groups to report health relative to others of the same age. As a
result, there is less difference between males and females in the convergence at older ages
in the income gradient in disability than there is in the gradient in bad health.
Figure 3.3: Prevalence of disability by age, split according to income and gender
Source: Authors’ calculations for CBS Health Interview Surveys, 1989-2000. Sample weights applied.
3.4.2 How much does labor-force status matter?
As discussed earlier, Case and Deaton (2005) and Smith (1999, 2005a) suggest that part
of the trend observed in the income-health gradient is due to the increasing impact of
health on income through employment. To gain further insight into the plausibility of
this hypothesis, we now compare directly the evolution of reported health with age across
workers and non-workers (Figure 3.4).
Figure 3.4: Self-reported health by age, split according to work status and gender
Source: Authors’ calculations for CBS Health Interview Surveys, 1983-2000. Sample weights applied.
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The first striking observation is the rather flat profile of reported bad health for those
working at each age. Practically no working males in early adulthood report bad health;
the proportion begins to increase from age 30, but approaches 10% only by age 60. In
contrast, already before the age of 30 around 15% of non-working males report bad health,
and the proportion rises very steeply with age, such that 45% of non-working men report
bad health at the age of 50. Non-working men are always in poorer health, and the
widening differential suggests that health progressively becomes a more important reason
for not working until age 50. The decline after age 50 in the prevalence of reported
ill health amongst non-workers must be due to the growing importance of non-health
reasons for not working — principally, voluntary retirement. The fact that ill health
continues to rise among those that carry on working over this age range is consistent with
this explanation. To the extent that income is determined by labor-force status, these
graphs suggest that the observed widening and then narrowing of the income gradient in
health over the life cycle may be driven by the varying effect of health on employment.
Figure 3.11, presented in the Appendix, confirms that income is strongly correlated with
work status; the non-participation rate is highest in the lowest income quartile, and this
correlation peaks in middle age and falls substantially at older ages.
The pattern in the profile for non-working women is quite different. The prevalence
of ill health among non-working women does not rise steeply with age, and never differs
so markedly from the prevalence among working women. These differences reflect the
lower participation rate of women, and the relatively lower importance of ill health as a
reason for non-participation. This adds further support to the hypothesis that the effect
of health on employment is an important determinant of the life cycle variation in the
income gradient of health, which is more pronounced for males than for females.
We now plot the health profiles by income group separately for workers and non-
workers. Health differences by income are much smaller among workers (Figure 3.5) and
the life cycle profiles much flatter than they are for the whole sample (3.1). Apparently,
labor force participation accounts for a large part of the health-income association and
its variation with age. For non-working females (Figure 3.6), the differences are still
apparent, while for males they are not. Given that there are very few non-working males
in the top income quartile, this figure should be interpreted with caution. While this all
is consistent with some impact of income (or a correlated socioeconomic characteristic)
on health after controlling for employment status, it may also be true that low-income
non-workers are more likely to be inactive for health reasons.
Figure 3.5: Self-reported health among workers by age, split by income and gender
Source: Authors’ calculations for CBS Health Interview Surveys, 1983-2000. Sample weights applied.
Figure 3.6: Self-reported health among non-workers by age, split by income and gender
Source: Authors’ calculations for CBS Health Interview Surveys, 1983-2000. Sample weights applied.
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3.4.3 Is the picture different by education or occupation?
Figure 3.7 presents the prevalence of reported bad health for the low and high education
categories. For males, a widening of the education gradient up to late middle age is
immediately apparent. Compared to the income gradient in Figure 3.1, the magnitude of
the education gradient is larger in early adulthood (probably because education is a better
indicator of SES in this age range) and smaller in late middle age. Hence, the widening
of the education gradient over the years of normal working age is less pronounced than
that for the income gradient. Further, while there is some narrowing of the education
gradient beyond the age of 60, this is much less evident than is the case for the income
gradient. These differences are consistent with the evidence from the US (Smith, 2005a).
A plausible explanation is that, unlike income, education is not responsive to health
changes in adulthood. The income gradient may strengthen with age, as health shocks
increasingly lead to labor market withdrawal and a drop in income. But there is no such
mechanism to drive the dynamics of the education-health relationship. For females, the
picture is quite different. Already at young ages there is a very strong education gradient
in reported health, which remains stable throughout the years of younger adulthood before
increasing moderately in middle age.
Figure 3.7: Self-reported health by age, split according to education and gender
Source: Authors’ calculations for CBS Health Interview Surveys, 1983-2000. Sample weights applied.
To better gauge the relative importance of work status versus socioeconomic status in
determining the life cycle profile of health, Figure 3.8 presents the prevalence of bad health
by education for those currently working. This removes most of the life cycle variation in
health, and about half of the difference across education categories, suggesting that the
increasing gradient observed in Figure 3.7 may be attributable to the less well educated
being more vulnerable to health conditions that interfere with employment as they age.
It could also be that the low educated are more likely to withdraw from the labor force
as they age, and report poor health as justification for this.
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Figure 3.8: Self-reported health among workers by age, split by education and gender
Source: Authors’ calculations for CBS Health Interview Surveys, 1983-2000. Sample weights applied.
Occupation is less predetermined than education, but is more so than income, offering
another opportunity to examine the life cycle pattern of the SES-health gradient with
limited potential for health to impact on SES. We restrict our attention to males, for
whom the manual vs. non-manual distinction is likely to be more crucial in identifying
work of different levels of physical effort. There is a widening of the occupational gradient
in health up to late middle age (Figure 3.9), which is comparable to that observed for
education but, as anticipated, is less stark than that observed for the income gradient. In
early adulthood, differences in health by occupation are evident but not marked. Given
that little time has passed at this stage of the life cycle for occupation to exert an influence
on health, the observed differences presumably derive from earlier childhood experiences
that impact on both occupational choice and health. But the steeper health trajectories
experienced by manual workers mean that, by age 45, 10% of them report bad health-
whereas non-manual workers reached this prevalence of ill health only at the age of 60.
Figure 3.9: Self-reported health by age, split according to occupation
Source: Authors’ calculations for CBS Health Interview Surveys, 1983-2000. Sample weights applied.
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3.5 Discussion
Our analysis demonstrates that in the Netherlands socioeconomic differences in health
widen until late middle-age before narrowing in old-age. This life cycle profile in the
socioeconomic-health gradient is remarkably similar to that observed in the US despite
the stark differences that exist between the countries in characteristics such as health
system finance and organisation, income inequality, social protection and disability insur-
ance, which would be expected to influence socioeconomic inequalities in health and their
life cycle evolution. It seems that countries with very different health and welfare sys-
tems end up displaying not quite identical, but nonetheless remarkably similar dynamic
associations between health and socioeconomic status. This suggests that fundamental
mechanisms linking age, health, income and education that are relatively unresponsive to
policy parameters, at least within the range observed in Western, high-income economies,
may be responsible for these relationships.
On the basis of our analysis and the more robust causal evidence available in the
literature, two mechanisms are beginning to emerge as particularly important in under-
standing socioeconomic differences in health. First, there is a large effect of health on
income that operates through employment and grows with age until voluntary retirement
begins to dominate health as the main reason for labor force withdrawal (Case and Deaton,
2005; Smith, 2005a). This is not to say that all socioeconomic-related health inequality
is a reflection of the impact of health on SES. Far from it. The second mechanism is a
non-negligible life-long effect of education on health. While ill-health can impinge on in-
vestments in education, studies that take account of this and other sources of endogeneity
still find that education exerts a causal impact on health (Lynch, 2003; Lleras-Muney,
2005; Oreopoulos, 2006; Smith, 2007; Silles, 2009). In contrast, although large health
differences across income groups are visible, these do not derive from a causal impact of
income on health (Adams et al., 2003; Contoyannis et al., 2004; Smith, 2005a; Frijters et
al., 2005).
It is hardly surprising that health-related exit from the labor force is an important
causal mechanism linking health and socioeconomic status at middle age in the US, a
country with relatively limited social protection mechanisms. It is perhaps more sur-
prising that the same holds for a country like the Netherlands, known for its generous
social protection, disability insurance and retirement schemes. But this generosity can
itself increase the observed correlation between income and health, if individuals with
chronic health problems are encouraged to withdraw from the labor force, and given that
replacement rates, although generous, are less than 100%. The strong impact of ill-health
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on employment and consequently income in pre-retirement years and the absence of such
an effect post-retirement would seem to be an important explanation for the widening of
observed health differences by income in middle age and their narrowing in old age. It is
not clear that this pattern should provoke any policy response given that a replacement
rate of less than 100% is desirable in the presence of moral hazard.
We should emphasize that we examined differences in health by income quartile and
these tell us nothing of the magnitude of any impact of health on income, which we would
expect to be relatively small in the Netherlands due the generosity of disability insurance.
Kapteyn et al. (2007) demonstrated that more than half of the much higher rate of
reported disability in the Dutch working population compared to that of the US could
be explained by differential reporting of specific health conditions. This suggests that the
generosity of Dutch disability insurance and the readiness for this to be used as a route
out of work into retirement has exerted a considerable bias on the income-health gradient
and its life cycle profile. The apparent improvement in health beyond age 55 among the
poorest individuals (Figure 3.1) may simply reflect the reduced incentive to report poor
health once individuals reach an age at which they can legitimately withdraw from the
labor force for non-health reasons.
The observed decline in health inequalities in old age is partly an inevitable conse-
quence of the ageing process with biological determinants of health dominating socioeco-
nomic ones (House et al., 1994), but it probably also reflects the survival of only the fittest
members of the more disadvantaged socioeconomic groups. The narrowing of observed
health inequalities in old age is partly the result of socioeconomic disparities in mortality
at younger ages. However, the fact that the education disparity in health narrows much
less in old age than that for income suggests that selective mortality is not the most
important explanation of this trend.
While the direction of causality in the education-health relationship appears, on bal-
ance, to be the reverse of that in the income-health gradient, the two relationships can be
integrated into a unified theory of cumulative advantage over the life course. This would
start with early-life conditions and parental background affecting education. We have not
reviewed the literature on the lifetime economic and health consequences of early child-
hood conditions here, but the evidence base to support causal effects is growing (Barker,
1995; Case et al., 2002; 2005; Currie and Stabile, 2003; Currie et al., 2007; van den Berg et
al., 2006; van den Berg and Lindeboom, 2007). Education strongly influences the choice
of occupation, and thereby the extent to which an individual’s physical health determines
his productivity, but also the health consequences of work itself. Someone with little or
no education often has no option but to enter into heavy manual labor, which is likely
56 Chapter 3
to exert a greater toll on his health; that person is also more likely to be laid-off once
health problems begin to impede productivity. So, the health-related earnings losses that
are partly responsible for the income-health gradient are themselves, to some extent, the
result of socioeconomic differences in lifetime opportunities and their impact on health.
It is unlikely that there is a single explanation for the observed life cycle pattern of the
socioeconomic gradient in health. It is not simply the consequence of income reductions
from health-related work loss, nor moral hazard and justification bias responses to social
protection against these losses. Nor is it all a the result of cumulative disadvantage. The
reality is likely to be one of many mechanisms interacting.
Overturning these processes of cumulative advantage represents a major challenge
even to countries as egalitarian as the Netherlands. The potential rewards are, however,
immense. Getting closer to a goal of equality of opportunity could raise national wealth
by breaking the connection between low education, poor health and early labor force exit.
There could also be substantial savings on age-specific health care expenditures to offset
those arising from extended longevity. Of course, breaking the cycle requires identifying
the specific causal mechanisms that link education with later life health outcomes but, at
present, there is very little robust evidence on this. Further, not all educational disparities
in health derive from inequality of opportunity in the sphere of health choices. Some must
reflect ill-health in childhood and adolescence constraining choices over education. Besides
ensuring adequate access to schooling for less healthy children, education policy can do
little to address this source of health disparities.
Policies aimed at improving health conditions at work (particularly for those in low-
skilled occupations) are potentially important in preventing health related labor force
exits, thereby extending working lives and maintaining the financial sustainability of pen-
sion systems. Given the moral hazard effects that are inevitably created by financial
protection against health related loss of employment, which has been a particular prob-
lem in the Netherlands with as much as 10% of the labor force on disability insurance at
the end of the 1980s, it seems crucial to enact policies in the workplace that can both
prevent the development of health problems and reduce the impact of those problems on
work capacity by providing appropriate support to partially disabled workers and those
with a diagnosed condition. But there are obvious limitations on the extent to which
workplace interventions can reduce health inequalities. They can do little to halt health
deterioration that derives from early life experiences. Nor can they do much to correct
differences in health by income that derive from education related differences in life style.
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Table 3.1: Descriptive Statistics
Self-Reported Very Good Good Fair Sometimes good/ Bad
Health Sometimes bad
N=121,232 31,455 64,845 15,230 6,720 2,982
(25.95%) (53.49%) (12.56%) (5.54%) (2.46%)
Disability Hearing (1) Hearing (2) Reading (3) Vision (4) Chewing (5) Carrying (6) Bending (7) Walking (8)
N=82,067 1,953 259 3,111 931 3,776 4,668 2,937 2,922
(2.38%) (0.32%) (3.79%) (1.13%) (4.60%) (5.71%) (3.58%) (3.56%)
Severe Work Disability No Yes
N=85,680 79,244 6,436
(92.49%) (7.51%)
Income <8 8-10 10-12 12-13 13-14 14-16 16-18 18-20 20-25 25-30 >30
In thousands Euro 8,338 7,268 6,630 5,932 5,644 7,470 6,524 5,738 7,663 4,763 7,592
N=73,562 (11.33%) (9.88%) (9.01%) (8.06%) (7.67%) (10.15%) (8.87%) (7.80%) (10.42%) (6.47%) (10.32%)
Labor Force Status Working Not-Working
N=81,534 41,490 40,044
(50.89%) (49.11%)
Education Primary Secondary Higher
N=116,497 24,186 71,699 20,612
(20.76%) (61.55%) (17.69%)
Occupation Manual Executive Other
N=57,805 14,918 15,308 27,579
(25.81%) (26.48%) (47.71%)
Notes: The OECD disability questions that are asked include (1) Hear normal conversation with three or four other persons, (2) Hear normal conversation with another, (3) Read ordinary newsprint, (4)
See the face of someone from four meters, (5) Bite and chew on hard foods, (6) Carry an object of five kilos for ten meters, (7) Bend down (when standing) and pick up shoe, (8) Walk for 400 meters
without resting. The work disability variable we use concerns only the last three OECD disability questions and indicates whether an individual has at least one severe disability in these three domains.
Labor Force Status and Occupation only measured until the 1997 wave and until age 70. The “Other” category among the occupations includes administrative, service, and commercial occupations.
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Figure 3.10: Self-reported health over the life cycle, split according to income and gender
(cohort corrected)
Source: Authors’ calculations for CBS Health Interview Surveys, 1983-2000. Sample weights applied.
Figure 3.11: Prevalence of population working over the life cycle, by gender and income
quartile
Source: Authors’ calculations for CBS Health Interview Surveys, 1983-2000. Sample weights applied.
Part II
Causal Pathways

Chapter 4
Long Run Returns to Education:
Does Schooling Lead to an Extended
Old Age?
While there is no doubt that health is strongly correlated with education, whether
schooling exerts a causal impact on health is not yet firmly established. We exploit
Dutch compulsory schooling laws in a Regression Discontinuity Design applied to linked
data from health surveys, tax files and the mortality register to estimate the causal
effect of education on mortality. The reform provides a powerful instrument, signif-
icantly raising years of schooling, which, in turn, has a large and significant effect
on mortality even in old age. An extra year of schooling is estimated to reduce the
probability of dying between ages of 81 and 88 by 2-3 percentage points relative to a
baseline of 50 percent.
—————————————–
This chapter is based upon:
Van Kippersluis, H., O. O’Donnell, and E. van Doorslaer (2009), “Long Run Returns to Education:
Does Schooling lead to an Extended Old Age?”, Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper 09-037/3.
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4.1 Introduction
Inequalities in health and life expectancy by education are striking. For example, in the
Netherlands individuals with a university or college degree live, on average, 6 to 7 years
longer than those who finished only primary school. The difference in life expectancy
in good health is as much as 16 to 19 years (CBS, 2008). Such disparities in health
and mortality by education have been documented for many countries (Grossman and
Kaestner, 1997; Smith and Kington, 1997; Mackenbach et al., 1997; Cutler and Lleras-
Muney, 2008). Indeed, Michael Grossman has claimed that “years of formal schooling
completed is the most important correlate of good health” (Grossman, 2003, p.32). Yet,
very few studies have found robust evidence of a causal impact of education on health. The
correlation could also stem from childhood ill-health constraining educational attainment
(Perri, 1984; Behrman and Rosenzweig, 2004; Case et al., 2005) and confounding factors
such as ability and time preference (Fuchs, 1982; Auld and Sidhu, 2005; Deary, 2008).
Establishing whether education causally impacts on health is essential to the formation
and evaluation of education and health policies.
The purpose of this paper is to establish whether education has a causal impact on
mortality using exogenous variation in education that comes from a compulsory schooling
law in the Netherlands. This reform, which increased the educational attainment of the
population suddenly and strongly, provides a valuable instrument within a regression
discontinuity design. We observe a very large sample of individuals between the ages of
80 and 88. This makes it possible to investigate whether education has long run effects on
health that result in an extended life. If education effects are present at this age, then it
is highly likely that they exist at younger ages, such that our estimate can be interpreted
as a lower bound on the total impact of education on mortality.
Lleras-Muney (2005), exploiting changes in compulsory schooling laws in more than 30
US states, estimates that an additional year of schooling reduces the 10 year probability
of dying by at least 3.6 percentage points. However, the analysis is based on only an
approximation to mortality derived from the change in cohort size between subsequent
censuses. Further, Mazumder (2008) demonstrates that the magnitude and the signifi-
cance of the effect are not robust to the inclusion of state-specific cohort trends. Clark
and Royer (2007) measure mortality somewhat more directly than Lleras-Muney (2005)
and Mazumder (2008) from the number of deaths divided by the number of births of a
cohort. They find that the 1947 extension to the school leaving age in the UK had a
strong impact on educational attainment, but no significant effect on mortality. Albouy
and Lequien (2008) exploit two compulsory schooling reforms in France in 1923 and 1953.
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They do not find a significant effect of years of schooling on mortality, which is observed
directly from micro data, but neither did the reform have a very strong impact on years
of schooling.
While the weight of existing evidence does not support an effect of education on
mortality (Clark and Royer, 2007; Mazumder, 2008; Albouy and Lequien, 2008), some
studies (but not all) using compulsory schooling laws as a source of exogenous variation in
education find an effect on self reported health outcomes (Spasojevic, 2003; Oreopoulos,
2006; Mazumder, 2008; Silles, 2009) and hospitalizations (Arendt, 2008). An obvious
weakness of evidence based on self-reported health is that reporting thresholds may vary
with education (e.g. Bago d’Uva et al., 2008) and, if this is the case, the resulting bias
would not be corrected by instrumenting education1.
The main weakness of most of the analyses of mortality, with the notable exception
of Albouy and Lequien (2008), is that they rely on approximate measures of mortality at
the cohort level rather than directly observed survival at the individual level. We observe
a very large number of individuals from linked Dutch administrative and survey data for
which a mortality follow-up is available. Given the strong instrument, provided by the
compulsory schooling reform, and tremendous power, generated by the sample size and
micro data, it is quite unlikely that we will fail to detect an effect of education on mortality
should one exist in the population. A potential limitation of the previous literature is
that it is concerned with the health returns to additional years of schooling, ignoring the
nature and quality of education (Feinstein et al., 2006; Cutler et al., 2008). In addition to
estimating the impact of an extra year of schooling on mortality, we estimate the health
returns to completion of (the Dutch equivalent to) high school and investigate whether
this has a discrete beneficial effect beyond that predicted linearly from the equivalent
additional years of schooling.
We find that education significantly lowers mortality. An additional year of schooling
reduces the probability of dying between the ages of 81 and 88 (inclusive) by more than
2 percentage points, relative to a baseline probability of 50 percent The instrumental
variable (IV) estimate is larger than the ordinary least squares (OLS) estimate, indicating
downward bias in estimates that fail to take account of endogeneity. A significant impact
of education on mortality is found only with the larger one of our samples, suggesting
that lack of statistical power is a potential explanation for the failure of most previous
studies to find an effect. Finally, high school graduation reduces the probability of dying
between 81 and 88 by as much as 17 to 26 percentage points but this does not appear to
1If individuals with more schooling tend to understate their health, as some of the evidence suggests
(Bago d’Uva et al., 2008), then impact of education on health will be underestimated.
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due to any sheepskin effects of finishing high school on mortality beyond that predicted
linearly by additional years of schooling.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 4.2 provides background information on
the Dutch reforms that enable us to estimate the causal impact of education on mortality.
The data and methods are discussed in section 4.3. The main results are presented in
section 4.4. Section 4.5 investigates whether there are additional gains in survival from
high school graduation over and above those implied by the years of schooling this entails.
Section 4.6 considers the lessons learnt and the limitations of our study.
4.2 Compulsory Schooling in the Netherlands
The first compulsory schooling law, mandating 6 years of education, was introduced in
the Netherlands in 1900 (Dodde, 2000). In the years before World War I several attempts
were made to increase the compulsory years of schooling to 7, and even 8. Due to the war,
a law raising the minimum school leaving age came into force only from 1st of January
1922. The law required children to be enrolled in school at least from their 7th birthday
until they had completed at least 7 years of schooling, or had reached the age of 14
(Hentzen, 1928, p. 4). However, since some schools did not have the resources to offer the
7th year of schooling, the law was never enforced (Hentzen, 1932). In 1924, the number
of years of compulsory schooling was officially reversed to 6 and the increase postponed
until 1930. But an improvement in the economy prompted parliament to ask for the rise
of the minimum school leaving age to be brought forward. The government agreed in 1927
and 7 years of schooling became compulsory starting from the 1st of July 1928 (Hentzen,
1932; De Graaf, 2000).
Yet, since the law only had an effect at the transition of the school year (Hentzen,
1932, p. 185), only at the start of new school year the new compulsory schooling law
came fully into effect for all schools (CBS, 1931, p. 19; Mandemakers, 1996, p. 55). In
the cities schools usually started in August or September and on the countryside in March
or April, while on the countryside it was more convenient to have children free from duty
already before the summer (CBS, 1931, p. 36).
Despite the fact that the law required children to be enrolled in school only from their
7th birthday on, the large majority of children started school long before that age. After
1920 the age at which children start school became more and more between 51
2
and 6,
because in many cases it was not allowed to enter the class during the year (Sterringa,
1934, p. 88). Children born in 1916 who started school at age 6 will have completed
their duties under the old regime before the new law was enforced (Sterringa, 1934, p.
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113). This cohort was not affected by the reform. In contrast, children born in 1917
were at most 11 on the 1st of July 1928, and could not have met the conditions to leave
school under the pre-1928 legal regime. Therefore, the cohort born in 1917 was the first
to be affected by the 1928 reform and to be forced to complete 7, rather than 6, years
of schooling2. We put the threshold therefore at the 1st of January 19173. Importantly,
since most primary schools had only 6 grades, the 1928 reform induced — as we will show
later — a large proportion of pupils to enter secondary school.
Compulsory schooling was raised further to eight years in 1942 under the German
occupation with the aim of promoting the German language. A lack of competent teachers
and materials, and resistence from the population, meant that both the quality of the extra
education and compliance with the law were very questionable (Meijsen, 1976; HSG4,
1946/1947). After the war, a new law confirmed the increase in the minimum years of
schooling to eight, but deferred its enforcement to January 1st 1950 given high rates of
school absence and the unpopularity of the war-time increase, circumvention of which had
become almost a heroic deed (HTK5, 1946/1947). Later increases in the minimum school
leaving age in 1969, 1975 and 1985 are too recent to investigate their potential mortality
effects.
The introduction of the seventh and the eighth year of compulsory schooling was a
major breakthrough in the Dutch educational system, since it forced pupils to go beyond
primary school and start secondary schooling. However, since between 1938 and 1949 the
percentage that attended an additional level of education after primary school increased
from 50 to 73% (CBS, 1951), the target population for the 1950 reform was much smaller
than for the initial reform in 1928. We have confirmed that the 1950 reform did induce
some individuals to obtain more schooling, but the effect is not large and so does not
provide a strong instrument for education. In the analysis we restrict attention to the 1928
reform, which, as will become apparent, had a strong impact on educational attainment.
2It is possible that some individuals born in 1916 that started school at age 7 were affected by the
reform, and some individuals born in 1917 that started school at age 5 were allowed to drop out, but this
is plausibly a small fraction.
3As noted, some schools started their school years in April and some in September, such that it
is impossible to sharply determine the threshold. Yet, with a Fuzzy Regression Discontinuity Design
(RDD) this is not vital since the only requirement is that the probability of receiving treatment jumps
discontinuously at the threshold, which is obviously the case as we will show later.
4HSG refers to notes of both the Lower House (House of Representatives) and the Upper House
(Senate)
5HTK refers to notes of the Lower House (House of Representatives)
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4.3 Data and Methods
4.3.1 Data
Our data are linked survey and administrative records from Statistics Netherlands. We
use the annual cross-sectional general household survey (POLS) 1997-2005, the tax records
(RIO) for 1998, and the Cause-of-Death register for 1998 until 2005 inclusive. All these
files are linked to the Dutch Municipality Register (GBA), which covers, inter alia, year
of birth, sex, province, and ethnicity.
The POLS samples a representative cross-section of the non-institutionalised Dutch
population ranging from around 10,000 to 80,000 respondents per year6. It collects ex-
tensive information on demographic and socioeconomic characteristics. The respondent’s
education is recorded by two variables: the highest level followed and that finished on the
standard Dutch categorization (Standaard Onderwijs Indeling (SOI) 1998)7. The SOI is
very close to the International Classification of Education (ISCED) and is easily converted
into years of schooling following standard guidelines (SHARE, 2007)8. In the relatively
few cases that individuals reported to have followed a higher level than they finished, we
take the average of the corresponding years9. Through linkage with the Cause-of-Death
register we are able to observe death and its cause for all POLS respondents who died
between 1998 and 2005.
The RIO is a huge administrative tax-register covering one third of the Dutch popula-
tion, i.e. around five million observations per year. Apart from detailed income informa-
tion, it also contains demographics. By linking the RIO to the Cause-of-Death register
we observe, again, mortality for all individuals. Unfortunately, education information is
not available in the RIO, but, as will be explained below, it is still possible to combine
estimates from the linked RIO-death register with those from the POLS to obtain IV
estimates of the impact of education on mortality.
6Specifically 34,439 in 1997, 80,789 in 1998, 42,605 in 1999, 37,482 in 2000, 24,231 in 2001, 22,259 in
2002, 25,163 in 2003, 21,706 in 2004, and 10,378 in 2005.
7SOI is missing in the 2003 wave of the POLS. However, there is a highly similar educational variable
available in that year, which is redefined into SOI and ISCED.
8The Dutch SOI consists of 7 levels of education: toddler school, primary education (6 years), lower
vocational secondary education (10 years), higher general secondary education (13 years, similar to high
school), first phase higher education (15 years, intermediary vocational education), second phase higher
education (16 years, higher vocational education) and third phase higher education (17 years, university
education).
9We drop a very small number of individuals who report to have followed a lower level than the one
they report finishing. Also, a few individuals who claimed to have followed a level to which they do not
have access given their highest level completed are disregarded.
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The CBS Linked Data are unique in the context of data that have been used previously
to estimate the impact of education on health in the sense that they provide a mortality
follow-up of both a sample survey (POLS, 1997-2005) and a very large administrative
database (RIO, 1998). So, individual mortality is observed, and with the POLS we
observe both education and mortality for the same sample observations. The mortality
record provides 8 years of follow-up by cause of death. Given that the cohorts affected
by the reform we study were born around 1917, we observe these individuals in their 80s.
Pre-sample selective mortality might be important, especially if education does reduce
the risk of an early death. But in this case, our estimates will provide a lower bound on
the impact of education on life expectancy. We estimate the effect of years of schooling
on the probability of dying between 80 and 88 (inclusive), conditional on being alive at
age 8010. This allows us to examine whether there are long-term returns to education on
life expectancy.
4.3.2 Identification strategy and estimation
We exploit the 1928 compulsory schooling law as an instrument for education within the
framework of a Regression Discontinuity Design (RDD) (Thistlethwaite and Campbell,
1960; Trochim, 1984; Hahn et al., 2001; Lee and Card, 2008; Imbens and Lemieux, 2008;
Van der Klaauw, 2008; Lee and Lemieux, 2009). All analyses are done separately for
males and females. Year of birth (cohort) determines whether the individual is exposed
to the reform, so sorting around the threshold is absent. Furthermore, not all individuals
exposed to the reform are induced by it to change their education. We therefore have a
discrete running-variable Fuzzy Regression Discontinuity set-up (Lee and Card, 2008) and
the appropriate estimator is parametric Two Stage Least Squares (2SLS), in which years
of education is instrumented by the reform. Under the standard assumptions of RDD
(Hahn et al. 2001; Van der Klaauw, 2002), this provides an estimate of the Local Average
Treatment Effect (LATE) of an additional year of education on mortality for individuals
in the cohort exposed to the reform that were induced to stay at school.
10An estimated 27 percent of Dutch males born in 1917 and 51 percent of females is still alive at age 80
and, for this cohort, life expectancy at birth was around 60 for males and 68 for females (Human Mortality
Database, University of California, Berkeley (USA), and Max Planck Institute for Demographic Research
(Germany) www.mortality.org)
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In the first stage, we regress years of education on a flexible polynomial in cohort11,
the indicator of whether the individual is exposed to the reform, and wave dummies12.
The usual concern about the strength of the instrument applies here. If the instrument
is weakly correlated with the possibly endogenous variable, then the IV estimator will be
biased in the same direction as OLS (Bound et al., 1995; Staiger and Stock, 1997). F-tests
on the strength of the instrument are reported. Moreover, the flexibility and goodness-of-
fit of the polynomials are tested using the G-test suggested by Lee and Card (2008). We
allow for non-random specification error in the polynomial by computing robust standard
errors clustered at the cohort level (Lee and Card, 2008).
A reduced form linear probability model of the binary mortality variable on the same
variables as in the first stage is also estimated. Again a G-test on the flexibility and
goodness-of-fit of the polynomial is performed (Lee and Card, 2008). For the models that
pass the relevant tests, the full 2SLS is estimated.
A drawback of using the POLS in this analysis is the potential lack of power for an
outcome such as mortality. With around five million observations, this is not a problem
with the RIO data but, unfortunately, this dataset does not include education. However,
since in the exactly identified case the coefficient of interest in 2SLS estimation can be
written as the ratio of two reduced form coefficients, it is possible to perform these two
reduced form regressions using separate samples from the same population. This technique
has been labeled Two Sample Two Stage Least Squares (TS2SLS) (Angrist and Krueger,
1992; Arellano and Meghir, 1992; Inoue and Solon, 2009). The standard error of the
TS2SLS coefficient is obtained by the delta method (Devereux and Hart, 2008).
11Following Lee and Lemieux (2009), we allow the polynomials to differ on either side of the threshold
since otherwise the information on one side of the threshold is used in the estimation of the trend on the
other side, which is against the spirit of a RDD. Eight models with different degrees of flexibility of the
polynomial are estimated — linear, quadratic, cubic and quartic in cohort with and without interactions
with the reform dummy. We present results only for the linear and quadratic models (with and without
interactions) as these prove to be sufficiently flexible.
12Wave dummies are entered in the analysis of the POLS data only to correct for potential bias due to
the differential mortality probabilities within the observation period across the cross-sections. That is,
someone observed in the 1997 POLS is more likely to have died by 2005 than someone in the 2004 POLS.
Since the wave dummies are included in the mortality regression, they are also included in the years of
schooling regression.
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4.4 Main Results
4.4.1 OLS estimates
Table 4.1 gives OLS estimates of the impact of an additional year of schooling on the
probability of dying in the 1998-2005 period. For males, the reduction in the probability of
dying is 1.4 percentage points per additional year of schooling, and this falls to 1.1 points,
but still remains strongly significant, when both a cohort trend (quartic polynomial)
and covariates (marital status, ethnicity, province, and city size) are controlled for. For
females, there is also a significant but slightly smaller effect of 0.8-0.9 percentage points.
There is clearly a negative association between education and mortality in this popu-
lation. Our aim in the remainder of the analysis is to establish whether there is a causal
component in this correlation.
4.4.2 First stage results
Figure 4.1 show years of education completed by cohort for males (left) and females
(right), where a non-parametric lowess smoother is estimated on both sides of the reform
threshold. For males, there is a very clear and large discontinuity in educational attain-
ment at the first cohort that is fully affected by the 1928 reform — the 1917 birth-year
cohort. The average years of schooling increases by more than 0.8 at the threshold. For
females, there is no such discontinuity, suggesting that the 1928 reform did not have a
strong impact on the schooling of females and does not provide a useful instrument. This
was already recognized by Statistics Netherlands in 1931 who observed that “For boys ap-
parently secondary education was considered more necessary than for girls” (CBS, 1931,
p. 50). Given this, we do not pursue the estimation of a causal effect for women.
Figure 4.1: Years of education by cohort and gender
Notes: 1912-1922 birth-year cohorts, males (left) and females (right), POLS 1997-2005.
70 Chapter 4
Table 4.2 shows linear regression estimates of variation in years of education in relation
to the reform indicator (1 if 1917 cohort or later), controlling for different specifications of
cohort trends and for wave dummies. In all specifications the magnitude of the coefficient
of the reform indicator lies in the range of 0.60-1, indicating that the 1928 reform raised the
average years of schooling by between seven months and one year. The reform indicator is
strongly statistically significant in all models, which is confirmed by the extremely strong
robust F-tests of the instrument, passing all criteria proposed in the literature (Bound et
al., 1995; Staiger and Stock, 1997; Stock and Yogo, 2002)13. Finally, the G-test indicates
that all polynomials are sufficiently flexible. Given the spirit of RDD (Lee and Lemieux,
2009) and the lower AIC values of the more flexible models 3 and 4, these will be the
focus of our discussion.
We now check robustness of the first-stage results to the choice of bandwidth around
the threshold (see e.g. Lee and Lemieux, 2009). The base case uses five birth-year
cohorts before and after the reform to estimate a reliable polynomial through cohorts.
Identification relies on the cohorts being interchangeable, and this will only hold if the
cohorts are sufficiently close to each other. Yet, focusing attention on just a few cohorts
around the threshold reduces power. Therefore, the estimation is repeated using ten and
three cohorts on either side of the 1917 threshold — see table 4.3. Overall, using ten
cohorts, the coefficient of the reform is very similar to our base case, except for model 4
where the coefficient sharply declines and becomes more consistent with estimates from
the other models. The reform indicator is still highly significant, with the F-tests showing
no evidence of a weak instrument (Bound et al., 1995; Staiger and Stock, 1997; Stock and
Yogo, 2002). G-tests are not presented but they give no indication that the polynomials
are insufficiently flexible. The reform dummy remains strongly significant when using
only three cohorts on either side of the threshold, and although the magnitude of the
coefficient increases somewhat, it remains in the same range. With only three cohorts
the G-tests (not shown) are less satisfactory, but this is to be expected given the limited
number of observations from which to fit the polynomial.
Overall, changing the bandwidth does not affect the significance of the instrument and
the magnitude of its effect is quite robust. This supports our use of observations further
away from the threshold, but as an additional check on whether this introduces bias,
13The Stock and Yogo critical values (Stock and Yogo, 2002) can only give approximate confirmation
of the strength of the instruments since they are computed for an iid error model and here we have made
the F-tests robust to heterokesdasticity and clustering at the cohort level. Baum et al. (2007) suggest
relying on the Staiger and Stock (1997) rule of thumb that the (robust) F-statistic should exceed 10 for
weak instruments not to be considered a problem. This is satisfied for all models.
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we examine robustness to controlling for covariates (marital status, ethnicity, province
and city size) that may possibly differ across the five-year span on either side of the
reform threshold. While covariates can safely be excluded with a valid RDD, when using
observations further away from the threshold covariates might be used to correct for
possible differences in underlying characteristics (Lee, 2006). The results given in the
third panel of Table 4.3 confirm that the coefficient of the reform dummy hardly changes
relative to the baseline for each specification, and statistical significance remains strong.
A final robustness check examines whether potential always-takers bias the estimated
effect of the reform on educational attainment. The reform affected the individuals who
would have dropped out at the age of 12 prior to the 1928 law but became legally re-
quired to stay in school until at least their 13th birthday. Individuals who would have
continued school irrespective of the reform, the so-called ‘always-takers’, are of no use in
our analysis, and only cause downward bias in the estimated effects. Since it might be
argued that individuals who finished university or higher vocational education are likely
to have continued school anyway, irrespective of the law change, we check robustness to
the exclusion of these individuals. Comparison of the estimates in the fourth panel of
table 4.3 with those in table 4.2 reveals that the magnitude and statistical significance of
the coefficients hardly changes, so that potential always-takers do not appear to bias the
results14.
We conclude that the 1928 reform had a sudden and strong positive impact on years
of schooling for males and so provides a strong instrument for education. The magnitude
and statistical significance of the effect is robust to several checks, so that we can safely
move on to the second stage.
4.4.3 Two Stage Least Squares (2SLS) estimates
Figure 4.2, showing the probability of dying between 1998 and 2005 for male cohorts born
between 1912 and 1922, reveals a small downward discontinuity at the 1917 threshold.
The reduced form estimate is negative in three of the four models presented in table 4.4,
but the effect is never significant. The G-tests indicate that the models are sufficiently
flexible. Controlling for covariates, changing the bandwidth, and excluding potential
14A necessary condition for the validity of excluding these individuals as always-takers is that the
reform did not have an impact on the probability of attaining a university degree or higher vocational
qualification. It turns out that indeed we cannot reject a zero effect of the reform on these levels of
educational (results available upon request).
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always-takers changes the magnitude of the coefficient on the reform dummy marginally
in the models, but it always remains insignificant15.
Figure 4.2: Mortality rate, percentage that died in the period 1998-2005, by cohort
(POLS)
Notes: Cohorts 1912-1922, Males, POLS 1997-2005.
Since the first stage results for education support the strength of the instrument, and
the reduced form results for mortality confirm that the polynomials provide a sufficiently
flexible specification, we proceed to Two- Stage Least Squares estimates, which are given
in table 4.5. The point estimates of the effect of years of education on mortality are all
negative and in the order of magnitude of 0.02-0.03, except for model 1. However, the
effect is never close to statistical significance and, on the basis of these estimates, we
cannot reject the hypothesis that education has no impact on mortality.
4.4.4 Two Sample Two Stage Least Squares (TS2SLS) estimates
Despite the large discontinuity in educational attainment produced by the 1928 reform, the
POLS data provide no evidence that years of schooling has a significant causal impact on
mortality. However, this could simply be due to a lack of power if there are an insufficient
number of observations in the relevant cohorts. Using the much larger RIO sample to
estimate the mortality effect allows investigation of this possibility.
TS2SLS is consistent under the assumption that the two samples are drawn from the
same underlying population (Angrist and Krueger, 1992; Arellano and Meghir, 1992). A
potential concern in our case is that the first stage is estimated using the POLS cross-
sections for 1997-2005, while the second stage is estimated using the RIO 1998 with a
15Results available upon request.
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mortality follow-up, so that, strictly speaking, the underlying populations are not iden-
tical. More specifically, the RIO linked mortality register data provides information on
mortality between 1998 and 2005 for a sample of individuals alive in 1998, while indi-
viduals who have died or been institutionalized subsequent to 1998 are not available for
the POLS cross-section samples in the period 1999-2005. The first stage estimate may
therefore be biased if survivors are affected differently by the reform than decedents. To
investigate this, the first stage is estimated separately for survivors and decedents in the
period 1998-2005. Moreover, an additional check is performed by estimating the first
stage using only the POLS 1998 observations. Results are shown in table 4.3, where we
also present estimates using all 1997-2005 POLS observations (as in table 4.2) without
wave dummies since these are not necessary in the reduced form for mortality using the
follow-up to the 1998 RIO (see footnote 10). Excluding the wave dummies (panel 5) has
little or no impact on the estimates. Although significance is greater for decedents, the
point estimates of the effect of the reform are of the same order of magnitude for survivors
(panel 6) and decedents (panel 7), except for model 4. Furthermore, point estimates of
the effect of the reform obtained using just the 1998 POLS (panel 8) are in the same range
as using all waves. We conclude that the point estimates obtained using POLS data from
1997-2005 show little or no bias and can safely be used to produce the first stage estimate
for TS2SLS.
Figure 4.3 shows the probability of dying in the period 1998-2005 for cohorts born
between 1912 and 1922 using the 1998 RIO. The trend is smoother than in the corre-
sponding graph produced from the POLS data16 (figure 4.2) because of the larger sample
size. Although the discontinuity at the reform threshold seems small, there does appear
to be a small downward shift in the trend at that point. The corresponding reduced form
estimates presented in the second panel of table 4.4 confirm that the 1928 reform induced
changes that reduced the probability of dying between the ages of 81 and 88 (inclusive)
by 1 to 3 percentage points, an effect that is significant in all specifications except model
1. Controlling for covariates does not change the results, while widening the bandwidth
slightly increases the magnitude of the effect17.
The TS2SLS estimates presented in table 4.5 indicate that, except for the linear model,
an additional year of schooling reduces the probability of dying between the ages of 81
and 88 by between 2 and 3 percentage points. The estimates are statistically significant
16Note that the average mortality rate in the 1998 RIO is higher than in the POLS data, which is due
to the fact that the POLS data samples a new cross-section of survivors every year between 1998 and
2005.
17Results available upon request.
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at the 10 percent level or less. Given that around 50 percent of males who completed 6
years of schooling, corresponding to primary school completion, died between the ages of
81 and 88, our estimates suggest that one extra year of schooling reduced the probability
of dying by 4-6 percent compared to the baseline.
Figure 4.3: Mortality rate, percentage that died in the period 1998-2005, by cohort (RIO)
Cohorts 1912-1922, males, RIO 1998.
4.5 Are there additional returns to high school grad-
uation?
While it is conventional to study the health (and other) returns to additional years of
education, one might question whether health-related knowledge is acquired linearly ir-
respective of the stage of education completed. An additional year in lower vocational
education is likely to constitute quite a different learning experience from an additional
year in high school, such that the impact of each on health outcomes may be expected
to differ (Feinstein et al., 2006). Moreover, linearity imposes the potentially restrictive
assumption that the health gains obtained from moving from lower vocational school (10
years) to high school (13 years) are only 3/4 of the gains following graduation from high
school (13 years) to university (17 years). While the evidence for ‘sheepskin effects’ of edu-
cation certificates on health is mixed (Cowell, 2006; Chevalier and Feinstein, 2007; Cutler
and Lleras-Muney, 2008), and a priori it is difficult to imagine why a certificate should
bring health returns over and above those of the years of schooling necessary to obtain
the certificate, estimates of the health impact of years of schooling overlooks potentially
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useful information on how the returns vary with the nature of schooling, as represented
by the level of education completed.
In order to establish whether there is evidence of non-linearity and heterogeneity in
the impact of education on health, in this section we estimate the effect of high school
completion on mortality and compare this with the effect predicted from the linear speci-
fication. The 1928 reform increased the compulsory years of schooling from 6 to 7. Since
primary school in the Netherlands consists of 6 years, this reform induced many individu-
als to enter secondary school. Indeed, as shown in figure 4.4, the percentage that finished
high school appears to have increased dramatically due to the reform.
Figure 4.4: Percentage finishing high school by cohort
Notes: Cohorts 1912-1922, Males, POLS 1997-2005.
If, after controlling for the level of education, years of schooling have no additional
impact, then the causal effect of the level of schooling on mortality can be identified.
Yet, clearly with just one instrument we cannot identify the causal effect of all levels of
schooling. It turns out, however, that the reform only had a significant impact on the
propensity to complete (i) high school, and (ii) higher vocational education18. The causal
effect of high school completion on mortality can then be identified if higher vocational
education does not have any additional health benefits on top of those acquired by com-
pleting high school. Alternatively, if the reform induced pupils to complete high school
but not higher vocational school conditional on finishing high school then we can identify
the average effect of high school and higher vocational education completion on mortal-
ity. While debatable, these assumptions are not necessarily more restrictive than those
necessary to identify the effect of years of schooling.
18Results available upon request.
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The first stage results are presented in table 4.6. It can be seen that the 1928 reform
strongly and significantly impacted on the propensity to finish high school. Around 10
percent of the individuals born in these cohorts were induced to complete high school by
the reform. Combining these estimates with the reduced form mortality estimates from
table 4.4, gives the TS2SLS estimate of the effect of high school graduation on mortality
presented in table 4.7, which is between 17 and 26 percentage points in our preferred,
more flexible models. Coupling this result with the fact that around 50 percent of males
who did not complete high school died between the ages of 81 and 88, the probability of
dying in this age range is reduced by a remarkable 34-52 percent for those that finished
high school.
Given that high school graduation amounts to seven additional years of schooling for
the compliers who, before the reform, would have ended their education after primary
school, estimates from the models linear in years of education imply that high school
graduation reduces the probability of dying between the ages of 81 and 88 by 14-19
percentage points (i.e. 7 × 2 to 7 × 2.7). This is below the estimate of a 17-26 point
decrease generated by the binary model of high school completion, but not substantially
so. Moreover, as explained above, it might be that the 17-26 percent partly stems from the
completion of higher vocational education if this level had any additional health benefits
on top of those provided by high school completion. Consequently, while there may be
some ‘sheepskin effects’ of high school graduation, beyond what is predicted by the years
of schooling it entails, there magnitude would appear to be rather modest.
4.6 Discussion
Education significantly and substantially reduces mortality even in old age. Our analysis
reveals that, for Dutch males surviving to the age of 81, an additional year of schooling
reduces the probability that they will die before reaching 89 by 2-3 percentage points,
or 4-6% relative to the baseline probability. This suggests that the well-documented
large correlation between education and health outcomes (Grossman and Kaestner, 1997;
Smith and Kington, 1997; Mackenbach et al., 1997; Cutler and Lleras-Muney, 2008) is
not spurious but stems (at least partly) from a causal effect of education on health, and
consequently mortality.
Our study exploits a compulsory schooling reform introduced in the Netherlands in
1928 which provides a strong and exogenous instrument for the educational attainment
of Dutch males. The average years of schooling increased by 0.6-1.0 due to the reform,
a result that is robust to several specification checks. In spite of the strong instrument,
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the treatment effect estimated from a smaller sample (n=3650) is not significant. But by
exploiting mortality data in a larger sample (n=66891), and combining this with education
information from the smaller sample, we do find a significant impact of education on
mortality. Our analysis is based on mortality observed at the individual level, rather
than that approximated from changes in cohort sizes, or from a comparison of birth and
death rates. The power provided by our sample size and individual level data is a great
advantage over previous studies (Lleras-Muney, 2005; Clark and Royer, 2007; Mazumder,
2008), while compared to Albouy and Lequien (2008) the strength of the instrument and
the age at which our affected cohort is observed might explain why we find a significant
impact whereas they do not.
A distinguishing feature of our study is that we estimate the impact of schooling on
mortality for individuals aged above 80. There is obviously pre-sample selective mortality
and our estimates cannot be taken as indicative of the mortality effect of education at
all ages. However, provided that education has a non-positive effect on mortality at all
ages, then our estimates constitute a lower bound on the total effect of education on life
expectancy.
Our IV estimates of the impact of schooling on mortality are larger than those obtained
from OLS. This is consistent with measurement error exerting a greater downward bias
on the OLS estimate than any upward bias arising from unobservables, such as ability
and time preference that increase investments in both education and health. Indeed, IV
estimates of the impact of education on earnings are often greater than those obtained
from OLS (e.g. Card, 1999) and this has also been observed in estimates of the health
returns to education (Arkes, 2003; Arendt, 2005; Lleras-Muney, 2005; Oreopoulos, 2006;
Silles, 2009). But one should be cautious in comparing the IV and OLS estimates since
they estimate different parameters. OLS seeks to estimate the average treatment effect
(ATE) across the population, while the RDD IV identifies the LATE among compliers
at the threshold of the 1928 reform (Hahn et al., 2001; Van der Klaauw, 2002; Imbens
and Lemieux, 2008). It is quite plausible that the treatment effect is larger at a lower
level of education (Auld and Sidhu, 2005) such as those forced to stay on at school by the
reform. From a policy perspective, this is clearly an interesting group. We wish to know
the impact of education reforms on individuals whose behaviour is changed by them.
The fact that we find an effect implies that there are very long run returns to education.
Not only does education raise earnings over the life cycle, it also extends the horizon of
the lifetime. This is an important finding in the context of rising education levels and
the ageing of populations worldwide. As more and better educated individuals reach
old age, we can anticipate that mortality rates among the elderly will fall further and
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populations will become even more ‘grey’. Of course, this need not mean that health and
social care needs rise since falling mortality rates will reflect improving levels of health,
but it does mean that pensions will be stretched further to meet the consumption needs
of an extended old age. The labour market returns to education need to be invested to
provide for the health returns in the form of extended life.
The other side of the coin is that poorly educated individuals die earlier, enjoying
a less extended period of retirement. There is a double injustice here. Not only does
a lack of education lead to a deprivation of life itself, but it implies a lower return on
investments in pensions made over the working life. On equity grounds, a case could be
made for varying the retirement age with education19, although the moral hazard effects
induced by such a policy would probably render it undesirable.
Our results imply that education policies can be important instruments for tackling
health inequalities. Design of effective policies requires knowledge of the causal mecha-
nisms responsible for the impact of education on mortality in old age that we find. Two
broad hypotheses have been advanced to explain an impact of education on health. Gross-
man (1972b) argues that, through information acquisition and processing skills, education
raises the productivity of investments in health. This hypothesis is consistent with US
evidence on educational disparities in the adoption of new medical technology (Goldman
and Lakdawalla, 2001; Lleras-Muney and Lichtenberg, 2002; Glied and Lleras-Muney,
2003; Cutler et al., 2008) and the management of illness (Goldman and Smith, 2002).
In the context of the Dutch universal system of health insurance, inequality in access
to medical care is a less plausible reason for education to impact on health, although
differences in the management of disease could not be so easily dismissed.
A second hypothesis is that education operates through health behaviour — diet,
exercise, smoking, drinking etc. (Muurinen, 1982). Empirical work has confirmed that
the lower educated do indeed indulge in less healthy behaviour (Feinstein et al., 2006;
Cutler and Lleras-Muney, 2008) and that lifestyle acts as a mediator between education
and health (Contoyannis and Jones, 2004; Balia and Jones, 2008). The cohorts studied in
this paper were 42-52 when the US Surgeon General’s Report on Smoking and Health was
published in 1964. US studies report that the better educated were more likely to quit
smoking, or not take it up, after the publication of evidence on its risks (De Walque, 2007;
Grimard and Parent, 2007). Although most smoking-related deaths occur before the age
of 80, Peto et al. (1992) estimate that 39% of deaths of Dutch males in 1995 above the age
19In the Netherlands this argument was made earlier by Bovenberg et al. (2006), who proposed to let
the legal retirement age vary with life expectancy in order to make the pension system fairer and more
robust to ageing and intergenerational tensions.
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of 70 are smoking related. We investigated whether there was any evidence of a mechanism
through smoking behaviour by comparing the estimated treatment effects of education on
different causes of death. While we did find a significant effect on deaths from respiratory
diseases and on all deaths categorised as smoking attributable mortality (US Department
of Health and Social Service, 1989; Peto et al., 1992), there was no consistent evidence
of a larger effect on these than on other causes of death (results available upon request).
Further research seeking to unravel the pathways responsible for the causal impact of
education on mortality is clearly warranted.
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Table 4.1: OLS estimates of the effect of years of education on the probability of dying
between 1998 and 2005
Males
Years of Education −0.015∗∗∗ −0.013∗∗∗ −0.011∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Cohort NO YES YES
Covariates NO NO YES
Females
Years of Education −0.009∗∗∗ −0.008∗∗∗ −0.008∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Cohort NO YES YES
Covariates NO NO YES
* p-value < 0.1, ** p-value < 0.05, *** p-value < 0.01
Notes: Estimates based on cohorts born between 1912 and 1922. Data are from the 1997-2005 POLS.
Cohort refers to a quartic polynomial in cohort. Covariates include wave dummies, marital status,
province, city size and ethnicity. Standard errors are given in parenthesis.
Table 4.2: First Stage OLS estimates of impact of 1928 Compulsory Schooling Law on
years of education
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Reform 0.685∗∗∗ 0.669∗∗∗ 0.636∗∗∗ 1.039∗∗∗
(0.099) (0.109) (0.112) (0.050)
Cohort 0.013 0.016 0.039 −0.241∗∗∗
Cohort2 −0.001 −0.049∗∗∗
Reform*Cohort −0.032 0.121∗∗
Reform*Cohort2 0.073∗∗∗
Wave98 −0.243 −0.243 −0.242 −0.244
Wave99 −0.189 −0.189 −0.19 −0.194
Wave00 −0.660∗∗ −0.660∗∗ −0.661∗∗ −0.661∗∗
Wave01 0.128 0.128 0.128 0.125
Wave02 −0.098 −0.099 −0.099 −0.106
Wave03 −0.322 −0.322 −0.323 −0.328
Wave04 0.738∗∗ 0.737∗∗ 0.737∗∗ 0.734∗∗
Wave05 −0.165 −0.166 −0.167 −0.165
Constant 9.676∗∗∗ 9.695∗∗∗ 9.743∗∗∗ 9.443∗∗∗
AIC 19566.78 19566.76 19566.66 19565.42
F-statistic 47.55 37.94 32.21 436.08
G-statistic 0.17 0.17 0.16 0.02
* p-value < 0.1, ** p-value < 0.05, *** p-value < 0.01
Notes: The estimates are on male cohorts born between 1912 and 1922, controlling for cohort and wave
dummies. Data are from the 1997-2005 POLS (N=3650). Models 1-4 refer to linear and quadratic
polynomials (models 1 and 2, respectively) which are allowed to differ on either side of the threshold
(models 3 and 4, respectively). “Reform” is 1 if 1917 cohort or later. The “Cohort” variable is centered
on the 1917 cohort. AIC is the Akaike Information Criterion. F-statistic is for test of significance of
‘reform’, and is robust to clustering at cohort level and heteroskedasticity. G-statistic is the test statistic
of the flexibility of the cohort polynomial, which follows a F(J-K,N-J) distribution, where J is the number
of cohorts used in the estimation, K is the number of parameters, and N is the number of observations
(Lee and Card, 2008). Standard errors (in parenthesis for “Reform”) are robust to heteroskedasticity and
clustering at the cohort level.
Table 4.3: Robustness checks on the impact of the 1928 Compulsory Schooling Law on
years of education, males.
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
10 birth year cohorts (1907-1927), N=7845.
Reform 0.690∗∗∗ 0.751∗∗∗ 0.787∗∗∗ 0.619∗∗∗
(0.078) (0.080) (0.075) (0.139)
F-statistic 77.65 88.68 110.90 19.76
3 birth year cohorts (1914-1920), N=2218.
Reform 0.800∗∗∗ 0.825∗∗∗ 0.819∗∗∗ 1.197∗∗∗
(0.058) (0.055) (0.058) (0.053)
F-statistic 192.58 228.68 197.9 512.77
5 birth year cohorts with control for covariates, N=3650.
Reform 0.629∗∗∗ 0.665∗∗∗ 0.642∗∗∗ 0.926∗∗∗
(0.099) (0.092) (0.084) (0.038)
F-statistic 40.45 52.75 58.38 590.30
5 birth year cohorts excluding always-takers, N=3448.
Reform 0.659∗∗∗ 0.572∗∗∗ 0.522∗∗ 1.029∗∗∗
(0.139) (0.175) (0.204) (0.203)
F-statistic 22.59 10.74 6.54 25.79
5 birth year cohorts without wave dummies, N=3650.
Reform 0.692∗∗∗ 0.681∗∗∗ 0.651∗∗∗ 1.082∗∗∗
(0.105) (0.117) (0.124) (0.053)
F-statistic 43.40 33.80 27.44 423.00
5 birth year cohorts among Survivors, N=1991.
Reform 0.681∗ 0.864∗∗ 0.757∗∗ 1.384∗∗∗
5 birth year cohorts among Decedents, N=1659.
Reform 0.698∗∗∗ 0.575∗∗∗ 0.567∗∗∗ 0.689∗∗∗
5 birth year cohorts, just 1998 sample, N=833.
Reform 0.911∗∗ 0.806∗∗ 0.760∗∗ 0.917∗
* p-value < 0.1, ** p-value < 0.05, *** p-value < 0.01
Notes: Data are from the 1997-2005 POLS. “Reform” is 1 if 1917 cohort or later. Always-takers refer to
those that finished university/college or PhD. Models 1-4 and F-statistic as in Table 4.2. Standard errors
(in parenthesis for “Reform”) are robust to heteroskedasticity and clustering at the cohort level.
Table 4.4: Reduced Form OLS estimates of the impact of the 1928 Compulsory Schooling
Law on the probability of dying between 1998 and 2005 inclusive
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Reduced Form estimates, POLS 1997-2005, N=3650.
Reform 0.000 −0.013 −0.020 −0.029
(0.023) (0.021) (0.020) (0.027)
Cohort −0.031∗∗∗ −0.028∗∗∗ −0.020∗∗∗ −0.005
Cohort2 −0.001 0.003
Reform*Cohort −0.013∗∗ −0.036
Reform*Cohort2 −0.001
Wave98 −0.055∗∗ −0.055∗∗ −0.055∗∗ −0.055∗∗
Wave99 −0.092∗∗∗ −0.092∗∗∗ −0.092∗∗∗ −0.092∗∗∗
Wave00 −0.148∗∗∗ −0.148∗∗∗ −0.148∗∗∗ −0.148∗∗∗
Wave01 −0.224∗∗∗ −0.224∗∗∗ −0.224∗∗∗ −0.224∗∗∗
Wave02 −0.306∗∗∗ −0.307∗∗∗ −0.307∗∗∗ −0.307∗∗∗
Wave03 −0.403∗∗∗ −0.403∗∗∗ −0.403∗∗∗ −0.404∗∗∗
Wave04 −0.453∗∗∗ −0.453∗∗∗ −0.453∗∗∗ −0.453∗∗∗
Wave05 −0.562∗∗∗ −0.563∗∗∗ −0.563∗∗∗ −0.563∗∗∗
Constant 0.649∗∗∗ 0.663∗∗∗ 0.675∗∗∗ 0.692∗∗∗
AIC 4830.1 4829.5 4829.1 4828.8
G-Statistic 0.47 0.40 0.36 0.33
Reduced Form estimates, RIO 1998 follow-up, N=66891.
Reform −0.008 −0.014∗ −0.018∗∗∗ −0.029∗∗∗
(0.009) (0.007) (0.005) (0.004)
Cohort −0.037∗∗∗ −0.036∗∗∗ −0.032∗∗∗ −0.018∗∗∗
Cohort2 −0.000∗ −0.002∗∗
Reform*Cohort −0.007∗∗∗ −0.027∗∗∗
Reform*Cohort2 −0.001∗
Constant 0.625∗∗∗ 0.633∗∗∗ 0.640∗∗∗ 0.655∗∗∗
AIC 92278.0 92277.0 92274.5 92275.6
G-statistic 1.21 0.95 0.60 0.25
* p-value < 0.1, ** p-value < 0.05, *** p-value < 0.01
Notes: Estimates based on cohorts 1912-1922, males. “Reform” is 1 if 1917 cohort or later. AIC and
G-test as in table 4.2. Standard errors (in parenthesis for “Reform”) are robust to heteroskedasticity and
clustering at the cohort level.
Table 4.5: RDD estimates of the impact of years of education on the probability of dying
between the ages of 80-88 (2SLS) or 81-88 (TS2SLS)
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
2SLS estimates
Years of Education 0.000 −0.019 −0.031 −0.028
(0.034) (0.030) (0.027) (0.025)
TS2SLS estimates
Years of Education −0.011 −0.020∗ −0.027∗∗∗ −0.026∗∗∗
(0.013) (0.011) (0.009) (0.004)
* p-value < 0.1, ** p-value < 0.05, *** p-value < 0.01
Notes: Estimates based on cohorts 1912-1922, males. Both the POLS and RIO data are linked to the
Cause-of-Death Register (DO). Years of Education is instrumented by the 1928 compulsory schooling
reform. 2SLS estimates based upon POLS 1997-2005, N=3650. TS2SLS estimates based upon POLS
1997-2005, N=3650 & RIO 1998 follow-up, N=66891. Models 1-4 as in table 4.2 for 2SLS and as this
without wave dummies for TS2SLS. Standard errors (in parenthesis) are robust to heteroskedasticity and
clustering at the cohort level and are obtained by the Delta method for the TS2SLS estimation.
Table 4.6: First Stage OLS estimates of impact of 1928 Compulsory Schooling Law on
the probability of completing high school.
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Reform 0.096∗∗∗ 0.108∗∗∗ 0.105∗∗∗ 0.105∗∗∗
(0.016) (0.015) (0.013) (0.010)
Cohort 0.000 −0.002 −0.005∗∗∗ 0.007
Cohort2 0.001∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗∗
Reform*Cohort 0.006 −0.021∗∗
Reform*Cohort2 0.001
Wave98 −0.030 −0.030 −0.030 −0.030
Wave99 −0.027 −0.027 −0.027 −0.027
Wave00 −0.081∗∗ −0.081∗∗ −0.081∗∗ −0.081∗∗
Wave01 −0.002 −0.002 −0.002 −0.002
Wave02 −0.034 −0.034 −0.034 −0.035
Wave03 −0.030 −0.031 −0.030 −0.031
Wave04 0.077∗ 0.077∗ 0.077∗ 0.078∗
Wave05 −0.065 −0.064 −0.064 −0.064
Constant 0.347∗∗∗ 0.334∗∗∗ 0.334∗∗∗ 0.347∗∗∗
AIC 5102.6 5102.1 5102.4 5101.8
F-statistic 36.51 54.86 65.97 111.40
G-statistic 0.18 0.13 0.16 0.09
* p-value < 0.1, ** p-value < 0.05, *** p-value < 0.01
Notes: Estimates based on cohorts 1912-1922, males. Data are from the 1997-2005 POLS (N=3650).
“Reform” is 1 if 1917 cohort or later. AIC, F-test and G-test as in table 4.2. Standard errors (in
parenthesis for “Reform”) are robust to heteroskedasticity and clustering at the cohort level.
Table 4.7: RDD estimates of the impact of high school completion on the probability of
dying between the ages of 81 and 88.
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
High school completion −0.078 −0.128∗ −0.168∗∗∗ −0.264∗∗∗
(0.096) (0.067) (0.049) (0.044)
* p-value < 0.1, ** p-value < 0.05, *** p-value < 0.01
Notes: Estimates based on cohorts 1912-1922, males. Data are from the 1997-2005 POLS linked to the
Cause-of-Death Register (DO) (N=3650) and the RIO 1998 linked to DO (N=66891). Models 1-4 as in
table 4.2. Standard errors (in parenthesis) are robust to heteroskedasticity and clustering at the cohort
level, and are obtained by the Delta method.
Chapter 5
Whose Income is Least Protected
against Ill-Health?
We estimate the causal effects of health shocks on labour force participation and per-
sonal and household disposable income in the Netherlands using exogenous variation
in health provided by acute hospitalizations. An acute hospital admission significantly
and substantially lowers the probability of remaining at work and, on average, reduces
annual personal disposable income by about 1,600 Euro three years after a health
shock, and the loss does not diminish over time. The impact on household income is
much larger, around 3,500 Euro, which indicates that disability insurance mechanisms
insure against most of the loss in personal income, but cannot fully smooth the income
of the household. The most vulnerable groups are the lower socioeconomic groups —
those in the lowest income quartile, and the lower educated. Individuals working in
the public sector are best protected against income losses.
—————————————–
This chapter is based upon:
Garc´ıa-Go´mez, P., H. van Kippersluis, O. O’Donnell, and E. van Doorslaer (2010), “Whose Income
is Least Protected against Ill-Health?”, Mimeo Erasmus University Rotterdam.
88 Chapter 5
5.1 Introduction
On average, OECD countries spend two percent of their GDP on disability and sickness
benefits — almost 2.5 times what they spend on unemployment benefits. Prompted
by such large, and increasing, expenditures, research has concentrated on quantifying
the extent to which they are attributable to moral hazard, while policy reforms have
attempted to constrain the inflow to disability rolls. Less attention has been given to
the intended benefit of disability and sickness insurance in the form of income protection.
The magnitude of this benefit is likely to vary across individuals with their demographics,
severity of disability, socioeconomic status, occupation and employment sector.
Charles (2003) argues that the earnings losses from disability are likely to be greater for
individuals who are older at the onset of disability, both because more of their accumulated
human capital is destroyed and because they have less incentive to invest in acquiring
disability specific human capital. He finds empirical support for this proposition and
both mechanisms. This implies that older individuals benefit more from having insurance
against disability-related income losses. The benefit may also differ by education since
highly educated professionals have more human capital that is not contingent on physical
health. Lower educated unskilled workers rely more on their physical health. Should
they lose this, their relative earnings capacity will fall by more. More highly educated
individuals may also be better at managing their disease, for example, through adherence
to medication (Goldman and Smith, 2002), such that it impinges less on their earning
capacity. Differences by employment sector may also be anticipated. In the public sector,
where there is less exposure to competition and consequently salaries are more regulated
and less tied to productivity, employment and earnings should be less responsive to ill-
health. The employer, rather than the disability insurance scheme, protects against the
economic consequences of ill-health.
Motivated by these hypotheses, this paper identifies the causal effects of ill-health
on employment, disability benefit receipt and income, and examines the extent to which
these effects vary with demographic, socioeconomic and job characteristics. It identifies
the population groups whose employment is least protected against health deterioration
and those most vulnerable to a large fall in income as a result of ill-health. We identify
these effects by tracing the tax records of Dutch individuals for up to seven years after they
experience an acute admission to hospital. This provides exogenous variation in health
that allows its causal effects on employment, benefit receipt and income to be identified.
This circumvents an endogeneity problem that has plagued attempts to identify the em-
ployment impact of ill-health from reported data on health that is potentially subject to
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a ‘justification bias’ (Bound, 1991). That is, ill-health is reported as a justification for
not working and, possibly, claiming disability benefits. The seven-year follow-up provides
a rare opportunity to observe how employment and income evolve both in the period
immediately following the health shock and over the longer term. This makes it possible
to examine the extent to which an individual is able to recover, at least in terms of labour
market performance, from a significant deterioration in health, perhaps by investing in
human capital that is more consistent with a reduced health status. Any permanent re-
duction in disposable income will require a downward adjustment of consumption and so
welfare (Deaton, 2002b; Attanasio and Davis, 1996; Blundell et al., 2008).
After moral hazard, concern about the efficiency of public insurance against disability,
health or unemployment risks tends to focus on the crowd-out of private and informal
insurance. In relation to disability, an example of the latter is substitution of the earnings
of the disabled person with those of the spouse. Formal insurance is more efficient and
should therefore be preferable to such an arrangement, not least because the need of the
disabled person for care may constrain the extent to which the spouse can replace the
lost earnings. Depending upon the severity and nature of the disability, the need for care
may be so great that the spouse, and not only the disabled person, is forced to reduce
his, or her, earnings. There is little evidence on this issue. Some studies look at the
effect on wives’ labour supply when husbands turn ill. Typically the effects are a very
small increase in hours worked or no effect at all (Parsons, 1997; Berger, 1983; Berger
and Fleisher, 1984; Haurin, 1989). Charles (1999) presents US evidence using the Health
and Retirement Study (HRS) which indicates that men are more likely to reduce their
labour supply if their wives fall ill, while women more often try to compensate the lost
household income by increasing their labour supply. He attempts to explain this finding
by noting that there is a significant degree of specialisation within the household, where
husbands are often the principal breadwinners, while wives the principal home and care-
takers. When one of the two falls ill, the spouse has to compensate. This implies that
when a spouse falls ill, women begin to work, or work more hours, while husbands cut
back on work to help around the home (Charles, 1999). The finding of a modest increase
in the wife’s labour supply when the husband falls ill has been partly replicated using US
and European data, yet only if the husband is out of work (Blau, 1998; Jime´nez-Mart´ın
et al., 1999). But one study finds a modest increase in wife’s labour force participation
if the husband remains at work (Blau and Riphahn, 1999). Hence, the literature is
inconclusive regarding the spillover effect of illness to the earnings of other household
members (Suhrcke et al., 2006). We add to this evidence by identifying the impact of a
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health shock, in the form of an acute hospitalisation, not only on personal income, but
also on household income, separately for males and females.
Studies of the 50+ population that rely on self-reported indicators of health generally
find a strong negative impact of ill-health, or disability, on earnings and income that
operates through employment and work hours rather than wages (e.g. Bound et al., 1999;
Smith, 1999; Riphahn, 1999; Charles, 2003; Wu, 2003; Au et al., 2005; Disney et al.,
2006; Hagan et al., 2006; Jime´nez-Martin et al., 2006). Fewer studies include individuals
below the age of 50 but those that do generally find similar effects on employment and
income (Lechner and Vazquez-Alvarez, 2004; Garc´ıa-Go´mez and Lo´pez-Nicola´s, 2006;
Garc´ıa-Go´mez, 2008). While the consistency of this evidence is persuasive, its validity
is weakened by the possibility that ill-health is reported, perhaps subconsciously, as a
justification for labour force withdrawal and benefit receipt. Moller Dano (2005) avoids
this problem by using road accidents to provide exogenous variation in health. The
study, which uses administrative data on 10 percent of the Danish population, finds
negative effects on disposable income only for older individuals and for those with lower
initial incomes. There is a significant effect on employment only for males, for whom the
employment rate decreases by around 10% after the accident and does not recover in the
following six years. Lindeboom et al. (2009) also exploit data on accidents, albeit self-
reported, recorded in a British cohort study. They find that an accident raises the risk of
disability at age 25 by 170% and, in turn, this reduces the probability of employment at
age 40 by 0.14.
Evidence on the causal effects of ill-health on employment and income presented in
this paper is strengthened by particularly rich data that link demographic, health and
socioeconomic information from a survey with hospital admission records and income tax
files in the Netherlands for the period 1998 to 2005. Employment and income effects on an
initially healthy group of working individuals between the ages of 17 and 64 are identified
from exogenous variation in health in the form of acute hospitalisations. An acute hospi-
talisation is defined as an unscheduled hospitalisation, which cannot be postponed since
immediate treatment is deemed necessary. These hospitalisations cover a far wider range
of conditions than those caused by road accidents on which Moller Dano (2005) relies for
identification. Our results should therefore have greater external validity. In comparison
with Lindeboom et al. (2007), our health measure is clearly more objective and our data
cover the full working aged population, rather than the sub-population below the age of 40
that has a much higher rate of employment. Use of tax files also minimises measurement
error in income.
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While we argue that acute hospitalisations are exogenously determined, they are
clearly not randomly distributed across the population. We take account of observ-
able differences by matching individuals who experience acute hospitalisations with non-
hospitalised individuals using propensity scores and combine this with difference-in-differences
to correct for time invariant unobservable differences between the two groups.
The Netherlands provides an interesting context in which to examine the employment
and income effects of disability. One study finds it to be among the European countries
in which the effect of ill-health on employment is largest (Garc´ıa-Go´mez, 2008). This
has been attributed to the generosity of its Disability Insurance system (Aarts et al.
1996; Bound and Burkhauser, 1999), which has become more stringent in recent years
(OECD, 2009). The focus of policy has recently shifted from income protection toward
protection of employment (De Jong, 2008). We examine the extent to which maintenance
of employment following a health shock is sufficient to protect income and how this varies
systematically across the population. We also compare actual replacement rates for those
that move onto disability benefits with the reduction in income of those that remain at
work. These replacement rates are calculated on the basis of income, and not earnings, and
so need not correspond to the legally defined rates. Divergence between actual and defined
replacement rates will depend on the extent to which non-earnings sources of income are
affected by the onset of disability. Additional sources of income, and their sensitivity to
disability, are likely to vary across population groups. Consequently, actual replacement
rates may vary in quite a different way from those defined in the DI system. In addition
to examining the rate of replacement of personal income for individuals moving onto
disability benefits, or into retirement, we also compute and compare replacement rates
for total household income, which depend upon whether disability leads to an increase or
decrease in the earnings of a spouse.
In section 5.2 we describe features of the Dutch Disability Insurance system and labour
market that can be expected to influence the extent to which ill-health impacts on labour
force status and income. Section 5.3 describes the data and explains the empirical strategy.
Section 5.4 presents the results after which a discussion follows in section 5.5.
5.2 Work and disability in the Netherlands: institu-
tional background
In the Netherlands, as in most other developed countries, there are three major cash
transfer programs for individuals of working age that do not work — Disability Insurance
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(DI), Unemployment Insurance (UI), and social assistance (welfare). Despite a dramatic
decrease in the share of GDP spent on DI and sickness benefits from 7.6% in 1990 to
4.6% in 2005, it still accounts for 22% of public social spending — three times the amount
spent on UI (OECD, 2009). Individuals are entitled to DI benefits if they have a degree
of disability based on residual earning capacity beyond 15 percent. Entitlement does
not depend on whether illness or injury is contracted through work and, more peculiarly,
is independent of contributions history. DI benefits are paid after a waiting-period of
one year1. Until then, the employer is responsible for financing the sick pay, which is
equal to 70 percent of the gross wage. However, collective bargaining agreements usually
ensure that sick employees receive up to 100 percent of their net salary2. The replacement
rates are defined in terms of previous net salary excluding overtime or bonuses, so actual
replacement rates on disposable income might be below 100%.
DI pays benefits in two phases. In the first phase, which lasts for 0 to 6 years depending
on age at onset of disability3, the recipient receives a percentage of the previous wage.
The percentage is based on the severity of the illness or injury up to a maximum of 75
percent if the individual is assessed as 80% disabled or more. The partially disabled,
who represent around 20% of recipients (OECD, 2009), receive pro rata benefits and are
allowed to work to close the earnings gap. Two thirds of those awarded partial benefits
work. For them the benefit acts as a wage subsidy (Garc´ıa-Go´mez et al., 2009).
After this first phase, the benefit is no longer set only in relation to previous wage and
the severity of disability but is equal to the minimum wage plus an addition increasing
in age and previous wage4. In all cases this follow-up benefit is constrained to be lower
than that paid in the first phase, but it can be paid until the individual reaches the age
of 65. Individuals can choose whether to insure against the difference between initial and
follow-up benefits, and in most cases this is part of the collective bargaining agreement
(De Jong, 2008).
In the period we consider (1998-2005) there was a separate disability insurance pro-
gram for the self-employed. It awarded minimum benefits at a lower replacement rate
than DI for employees, and the contribution rate was uniform.
1After 2004 the waiting period was extended to two years, but this is outside our observation period
as individuals in our sample are expected to enter into sickness benefits because of a health shock in 2002
at the latest.
2Civil servants always receive 100 percent of their net salary, and regular employees get this in 90%
of cases (Burkhauser et al., 2008).
3More specifically, the entitlement period ranges from 0 years for those under 33 to 6 years for those
over 58 years of age.
4The exact formula is: the minimum wage + (age - 15)*(previous wage - minimum wage)
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Individuals who are not awarded partial disability status, but who become unemployed
are entitled to UI. During our observation period, the UI replacement rate was 70 percent
and the benefit period ranged from a minimum of 6 months to a maximum period of 5
years depending on employment history and age. Individuals awarded partial disability
status who cannot find gainful employment are entitled to a partial UI benefit of up to
70 percent of lost earnings (De Jong, 2008). If the individual cannot qualify for either DI
or UI, then s/he can resort to social assistance, which pays lower benefits unrelated to
previous earnings.
The labor market institutions in the Netherlands are considered intermediate in terms
of strictness in an international perspective (Freeman, 2007). The regulations for hiring
and firing are quite strict, and a high minimum wage applies. The Netherlands has
intermediate levels of taxation and generous social benefits, which could reduce labor
force participation, hours worked, and employment (see Heckman and Jacobs, 2010 and
references therein). Also, in the years considered, generous early retirement and pension
schemes were present which made older people retire at young ages.
5.3 Data and Empirical Strategy
5.3.1 Data
Our data are linked survey and administrative records from Statistics Netherlands. We
use the annual cross-sectional general household survey (POLS) 1998-2001, the tax records
(RIO), the hospital discharge register (LMR), the Cause-of-Death register (DO), and the
Municipality Register (GBA) all in the years 1998 until 2005 inclusive. The LMR provides
exogenous variation in health in the form of acute hospitalisations. The RIO provides the
outcome measures - employment, DI/UI/pension receipt and disposable incomes. POLS
provides baseline health and socioeconomic information used for matching. Demographics
(year of birth, sex, marital status and nationality), province of residence and size of the
city are obtained from the GBA. The death register is used to identify individuals that
drop out during the follow up period due to death.
The POLS samples a representative cross-section of the non-institutionalised Dutch
population ranging from around 25,000 to 80,000 respondents per year5. It collects exten-
sive information on health and socioeconomic characteristics. We retrieve information at
baseline on level of education, number of hours worked, job characteristics and home own-
ership. Health and health-related behaviour are represented by self-assessed health (very
5Specifically 80,789 in 1998, 42,605 in 1999, 37,482 in 2000, and 24,231 in 2001.
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good – poor), a binary indicator of whether ill-health hampers daily activities, number of
general practitioner (GP) visits, smoker status (yes/no), and frequency of engagement in
sports.
The RIO is a longitudinal administrative tax-register covering one third of the Dutch
population, i.e. around five million observations per year from 1998 to 2005. It consists
of a personal file and a household file. The personal file provides personal disposable
income, which is gross income from wage, profit and wealth earnings plus transfers less
taxes and premiums. Income by source is not available but the main source of income is
used to identify labour market status. This can be income from work (subdivided into
civil servants, regular employees, executives, and self-employed), income from DI, income
from UI, income from old-age pensions, income from other social transfers or no income6.
As mentioned above, during the one-year waiting period for DI, sickness benefits are
paid by the employer. In the tax files, this will appear as income from an employer and
individuals receiving sickness benefits will therefore be classified as being employed. This
is an unavoidable limitation of using the tax files, which impedes our ability to identify
the impact of a health shock on employment in the first year after hospitalisation. The
household level tax file provides total household disposable income and the number of
household members.
The hospital discharge register contains data on both inpatient and day care pa-
tients of all general and university hospitals and most of the specialised hospitals7 in the
Netherlands from 1998 to 2005. Each year there are around two million hospitalisations
of around 1.6 million distinct individuals. For the entire Dutch population we observe (i)
whether the individual entered the hospital, (ii) whether it was an acute admission, (iii)
the admission and discharge date, and (iv) the main diagnosis based on the International
Classification of Diseases ICD-9CM. We compute the number of nights in the hospital
using the admission and discharge dates.
5.3.2 Empirical Strategy
We compare the labour market status, benefit receipt and income of individuals who have
experienced an acute hospitalisation with those that have not. By identifying from varia-
tion provided by hospitalisations, our results are not subject to the justification bias that
is suspected when variation in self-reported health is relied on. The comparison of out-
comes is conducted within a propensity score matching approach (Rosenbaum and Rubin,
6The category ‘no income’ includes individuals with solely income from capital, and those with only
bounded transfers such as allowances for renting and children.
7The average coverage of the specialised hospitals is 97% (de Bruin et al., 2004).
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1983). In addition to matching on a detailed set of health, demographic, socioeconomic
and job characteristics, we control for fixed unobservable determinants by conditioning on
pre-treatment outcomes, either by including them in the propensity score or by restricting
the sample of controls to individuals identical to the treated in terms of pre-treatment
outcomes.
The Average Treatment Effect on the Treated (ATET ) is identified under the assump-
tion that the observable controls and the pre-treatment outcomes include all the factors
that determine both whether an individual experiences an acute hospitalisation and his
potential outcome in the absence of this event. By combining matching with differences-
in-differences (MDID) we weaken this identifying assumption to the requirement that,
conditional on observables, in the absence of hospitalisation the evolution of outcomes
between the pre-treatment to post-treatment period would have been the same for the
group that was hospitalised and the controls who were not (Heckman et al., 1997; Blundell
and Costa-Dias, 2009). Essentially, matching ensures that on average treatment and con-
trols are similar in their pre-treatment outcomes, while at an individual basis there still
might be (large) differences between a treated individual and his/her matched control. If
matching is combined with differences-in-differences this possibility is controlled for un-
der the assumption that the trend in outcomes would have been the same had treatment
not happened. In general, this method performs better than matching alone (Smith and
Todd, 2005).
We pool the POLS, RIO and LMR data from 1998 to 2001. For each year 1999-2001 we
split the sample according to whether or not the individual has an acute hospitalisation8
(excluding those related to pregnancy and child birth). Treatment and control groups are
formed from these two samples by selecting in each case individuals who in the previous
year were: i) aged 17-64, ii) working9 and, iii) not admitted to hospital. Both groups
are followed for up to three years after the hospitalisation of the treatment group10. This
approach provides a sufficient number of treatment observations to examine systematic
heterogeneity in effects, but it limits the follow-up period to three years. To examine
longer run effects, up to six years after hospitalisation, we link the 1998 POLS, RIO and
8Individuals in the control group are allowed to experience non-acute hospitalisations.
9Note that since we restrict our sample to individuals working the period before the health shock
takes place, matching is technically identical to matching combined with differences-in-differences for
employment status. Note however that in the case of income it is impossible to restrict the sample
to individuals with the same level of income, such that we decided to apply matching combined with
differences-in-differences in that case.
10Note that individuals in the treatment group are allowed to have multiple acute hospitalisations over
the follow-up period.
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LMR and again restrict the sample to individuals aged 17-64, working, and not admitted
to the hospital in this year. Treatment and control groups are formed from this sample
according to whether or not there is an acute hospitalisation in 1999. Outcomes are
observed in the 1999-2005 RIO.
Table 5.1 shows that the percentage of both treatment and control groups that remains
at work decreases over time but, particularly two years after hospitalisation, the rate of
decrease is greater for the treatment group such that after three years the raw difference
in the proportion at work is more than 8 percentage points11. As expected, the percentage
entering DI is higher in the treatment group — the difference reaching five percentage
points three years after hospitalisation. At this time the proportion of the treatment group
that has retired is 2.7 points greater than that of the control group. The proportion on
UI and on social assistance is much lower but in both cases it is more than twice as
high in the treatment group three years after hospitalisation. Personal disposable income
increases gradually in the control group but stagnates two years after hospitalisation in
the treatment group and decreases after three years. At baseline, household disposable
income is very similar in the two groups but while it falls slightly in the treatment group,
it is more than 3,000 Euro higher in the control group after three years.
The propensity score for hospitalisation is estimated by a probit including: (1) de-
mographics — age, gender, marital status, province, city size, nationality, and household
size, (2) health indicators — self-assessed health, hampered in daily activities, GP visits,
smoker status, and frequency of exercise, (3) socioeconomic indicators — home owner-
ship, education, equivalent household income and ratio of personal to household income,
and (4) job characteristics — hours worked, occupation and sector of employment (pub-
lic/private).
Table 5.2 lists the variables included in the propensity score, their mean values for
treated and control individuals, and from which dataset they were obtained. There are no
substantial differences between the two groups, and none of the small differences is statisti-
cally significant at any conventional level. In the sample, the percentage of (middle-aged)
men, self-employed, lower educated, and divorced individuals is higher in the treatment
group, while this group has worse initial health and exercises less. The probit coefficients
from estimation of the propensity score given in the third column of the table confirm
male, divorced and individuals hampered in daily activities are significantly more likely
to be hospitalised, while the higher educated and those working in the private sector are
less likely to enter hospital for an urgent reason.
11As acknowledged above, we identify employment status from main source of income. We use ‘in
work’ as short-hand for employee or self-employed earnings being the main source of income.
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We restrict the sample to observations within the common support, which results in
only very slight reductions in the sizes of the treatment and control groups (from 398
to 395 and 32,085 to 31,487 respectively). The procedure recommended by Dehejia and
Wahba (1999, 2002) is followed to ensure satisfaction of the balancing hypothesis.
We employ a kernel matching approach to estimate the ATETMDID on the outcomes
of interest — employment status and personal and household disposable incomes — as
follows:
ATETMDIDt =
1
NT
∑
i∈T
{[
Y ti − Y 0i
]−∑
j∈C
wi,j
[
Y tj − Y 0j
]}
(5.1)
where wi,j denotes the weight attributed to control individual j when comparing with
treated individual i. T refers to the treatment group, and C to the control group. We
employ an Epanechnikov kernel with bandwidth of 0.06, and use only individuals under
the common support of the propensity score.
The ATETMDID measures the effect in absolute values. Relative effects can be more
meaningful for comparison across groups. To obtain the Relative ATET (RATET ),
we divide the ATETMDID in year t by the counterfactual outcome obtained using the
common trends assumption for the matched controls12.
RATETMDIDt =
ATETMDIDt
E(Y0|T ) + [E(Yt|C)− E(Y0|C)] =
[E(Yt|T )− E(Y0|T )]− [E(Yt|C)− E(Y0|C)]
E(Y0|T ) + [E(Yt|C)− E(Y0|C)]
(5.2)
5.4 Results
5.4.1 What is the effect of a health shock on employment and
income?
The ATET of acute hospitalisation on employment is negative but small and insignificant
in the year of hospitalisation and the following year (Table 5.3, column 1). Since individ-
uals received sickness benefits paid by the employer during the first year of sickness and
we are defining labour force status according to the main source of income, we are not
able to identify any effect on work status during this first year. Two years after hospitali-
sation, the probability of remaining at work is significantly lower for the treatment group,
12Note that for employment outcomes, initial conditions are the same and so the relative treatment
effect is simply the ATET divided by the mean for the control group in the relevant time period.
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and is almost eight percentage points lower after three years, which represents a relative
decrease of more than 10% (Table 5.9, row 1). The vast majority of individuals leaving
employment enter DI. An acute hospitalisation raises the probability of being in receipt
of DI by 3.5 percentage points after one year and by 5.2 points after three years. The
latter represents a relative increase of over 300%. Hospitalisation raises the probability of
being retired three years later by 2.6 percentage points and of receiving social assistance
by 1 point, which represent relative increases of almost 100% and 250% respectively on
the probability for the control group.
Personal disposable income falls by around 800 Euro in the first year after hospital-
isation, and this drop doubles after three years (Table 5.3), which is an average relative
decrease of 7% (Table 5.9). The absolute effect on household income is more than twice as
large. On average, three years after the event, a household with a member than has been
admitted to hospital has an income 3,600 Euro lower than it would otherwise have had.
A relative drop of more than 8%. This indicates substantial negative spillover effects on
the incomes of other household members. The most likely mechanism seems to be a fall
in the earnings of the spouse as a result of meeting the care needs of the disabled person.
If we stratify the effects by gender, it turns out that the results are quite different
across males and females. While the effects on remaining at work are very similar to the
population average, the probability of entering DI increases much more for males than
it does for females — 6 versus 3.6 percentage points (see Table 5.4). The absolute drop
in personal disposable income is again quite similar in absolute terms across males and
females at around 1,600 to 1,800 Euro. However in relative terms females lose double the
amount of men given their lower average incomes (12 versus 6 percent, see Table 5.9).
The most striking finding is that our results indicate that if a male falls ill, the drop in
household income is three times the size of the drop in personal income, whereas if a
female falls ill, the drop in household income is statistically indistinguishable from zero.
This suggests that when the husband falls ill, the wife is more likely to reduce her working
hours, or stop working completely, to take care of her husband, while if the wife becomes
disabled, the husband is ready to compensate for the earnings loss if necessary. This
finding challenges existing evidence by Blau (1998), Blau and Riphahn (1999), Charles
(1999), and Jime´nez-Mart´ın et al. (1999) who claim that females are more likely to
compensate for the earnings loss if their husbands fall ill, while husbands are more likely
to stop working in case their wives become disabled.
We partly confirm the evidence by Charles (2003) that the earnings losses from dis-
ability are greater for individuals who are older at the onset of disability. Table 5.4
shows that older individuals are far more likely to stop working after a health shock, a
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15 percentage points decrease in the probability of remaining at work, which constitutes
a relative decrease of almost 24 percent (Table 5.9). In contrast, younger individual are
not more likely to stop working, possibly because few accumulated human capital is de-
stroyed and because they have a strong incentive in acquiring disability specific human
capital. The labour market institutions in the Netherlands probably also contribute to
a high permanent dropout rate among older employees. It has to be taken into account
that older individuals receive far more severe health shocks, such that definitely not all
results are entirely driven by behavioural choices. The results on personal and household
income do not unambiguously support the theory of Charles (2003). Younger individuals
on average lose an amount of 1,400 Euro three years after the shock, while older indi-
viduals do not lose anything. This might be explained by the forgone career prospects
of younger individuals and the strong contingency of replacement rates on age. Yet, the
effects on household income are again larger for older individuals, either reflecting the
stronger need for a caring spouse because of a more severe health shock on average for
older individuals incurring a shock to their health, or joint retirement (e.g. Hurd, 1990;
Jime´nez-Mart´ın et al., 1999).
The drop in annual personal income of 1,600 Euro three years after hospitalisation is
an average of a much smaller effect on those that remain in work and a large effect on
those leaving work. There is no significant fall in income for those that remain in work
up to two years after hospitalisation and a fall of 1,000 Euro after three years that is
significant at only 10% (Table 5.5) and represents a 4% relative decline (Table 5.9). This
is consistent with the repeated finding in the literature that ill-health reduces earnings
by constraining employment rather than by depressing wages. While the point estimates
are mostly negative and larger than those for personal income, there is no significant
effect on household income for individuals who remain in work (Table 5.5). Since these
individuals will have minimal or no caring needs, this is consistent with our hypothesis
that the negative spillover effect on the income of other household members observed in
the full sample is due to meeting caring needs of the hospitalised person.
The effects on the personal incomes of individuals who leave work and enter DI (in
any of the follow-up years) are much larger. In the year of hospitalisation, income already
falls by almost 1,500 Euro. Since, for the vast majority, the replacement rate of basic
earnings is 100% during this period, this fall may be due to the loss of overtime pay and
bonuses. Alternatively, individuals might have been on sickness pay already at baseline13
(i.e. the year before hospitalisation), which means that in the year of hospitalisation they
13Recall that we identify labour force status from main source of income such that those on sickness
pay are classified as employed.
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could be receiving DI benefits if the waiting-period has elapsed. Over the next three
years, the loss of income gradually increases and reaches 6,500 Euro, on average, in the
third year. This corresponds to a 30% fall in relative terms (Table 5.9) coinciding exactly
with the 70% replacement rate offered by DI after the first phase. The smaller losses
in years t + 1 and t + 2 are probably due to higher benefits in the first phase, or may
reflect individuals claiming partial disability benefits supplemented by part-time work.
It is very interesting that among those that move onto DI following hospitalisation, the
loss of household income is much greater than that of personal income. In the year of
hospitalisation, other household members lose as much income as the hospitalised person.
This indicates that sudden ill-health has a substantial disruptive on household finances.
Time must be taken off work to visit the hospitalised person, to care for them after
discharge and, perhaps, to replace child care the sick person can no longer provide. The
loss of household income increases by almost 2,000 Euro in each year reaching 8,700 Euro
after three years, which is 2,000 Euro more than the loss of personal income (Table 5.5).
So, while DI succeeds, on average, in preserving personal income at 70% of what it would
have been without illness, there is an additional, not insubstantial, loss of income of other
household members to consider when weighing the impact on household finances.
An acute hospitalisation is not necessarily severe as people with minor health problems
(like twisted ankles) also enter the emergency room. In order to identify an exogenous
and more severe health shock we redefined treatment in two different ways. A first new
definition is an acute hospitalisation with a length of stay of at least 3 nights. The
arbitrary cut-off at 3 nights derives from a trade-off between severity of shock and sufficient
power: we test for the effect of a smaller number of probably more severe shocks. For a
second alternative definition of a health shock we exploit the disease information in the
same spirit as Smith (1999) with the onset of chronic conditions. We define the treatment
group as individuals hospitalised with a primary diagnosis of a cancer, a circulatory disease
or a respiratory disease. Since individuals that were admitted to the hospital in the year
before the health shock are excluded, this definition of a health shock is to be interpreted
as the onset of a new chronic condition.
The results show that moving from any acute hospitalisation to a more restricted
measure with a minimal length of stay of 3 nights clearly suggests an increasing degree
of severity of the health problem as the probability of remaining at work declines while
the probability of entering disability insurance benefits and retirement rises (Table 5.3,
column 2). Interestingly, the drop in personal and household income is not necessarily
larger among more severe health shocks and in some cases even smaller, although the
differences are not statistically different here. The fact that the difference between the
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drop in personal and household income is larger for those experiencing more severe shocks
is consistent with the story that other household members have to reduce their labour
supply to care for the disabled individual. The results for the onset of a severe disease like
cancer, circulatory or respiratory disease show that the effects on employment outcomes
are very similar to our baseline measure, yet surprisingly the effects on personal and
household disposable income are not significant (Table 5.3, column 3).
5.4.2 Are employment and income permanently affected by a
health shock?
A permanent drop in income obviously has more serious consequences for household wel-
fare than a transitory impact, necessitating downward revision of life time consumption
plans (Deaton, 2002b). It is therefore important to establish to what extent employment
and earnings can recover from the effect of a health shock. Using the restricted sample
of individuals hospitalised in 1999, we see a significant 10 percentage point fall in the
probability of being at work three years later and the probability remains at this lower
level until for a further three years (Table 5.6 and Figure 5.1). This provides no evidence
of a recovery of employment. The probability of being on DI peaks three years after hos-
pitalisation at almost seven percentage points but the fall from this peak seems to be due
to people moving onto social assistance or into retirement rather than returning to work.
The loss of personal income also peaks after three years. There is evidence of a recovery in
incomes after this point although by the sixth year post hospitalisation the point estimate
of the loss of income is almost as large as that in the third year. The effects on household
income show no evidence of a recovery. Rather, there is a significant permanent reduction
in household income of more than 5,000 Euro six years after hospitalisation. This is much
larger than the effect on personal income, again indicating substantial negative spillover
effects.
These results are quite different from those presented by Charles (2003) for the US.
He found that earnings (not income) fall sharply at the onset of (self-reported) disability
and subsequently partially recover. He argues that the recovery can be due to adaptation
— investment in human capital that is productive despite the limitations imposed by the
health condition. An alternative explanation is that there is recovery of health status
itself. In the Netherlands there is little evidence of recovery that might be driven by
either mechanism. The most likely explanation for this is the generosity of DI notwith-
standing the rationalisation of recent years. Once on DI it is possible to remain there
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Figure 5.1: Long Run Average Treatment Effects on the Treated on Labour Force Status
and Income
Notes: Authors’ calculations on basis of POLS 1998-2001 and RIO 1998-2005. Treatment effects for
employment status (top left), disability status (top right), personal income (bottom left), and household
income (bottom right)
until retirement and high replacement ratios, which we confirm at 70% of what income
would otherwise have been, give little reason to retrain for a new occupation.
5.4.3 Whose income and employment are least protected against
health shocks?
The magnitude of the effect of a health shock on employment and income is likely to be
heterogeneous across individuals. Most notably, the magnitude of the effect will reflect
the severity of the shock, yet in this paper the interest lies more in how the effect differs
with socioeconomic status, occupation and employment sector. Still, for a reasonable
comparison among these subgroups, severity of the shock needs to be accounted for. We
do so by exploiting the Cause-of-Death Register (DO) to discern subsequent mortality
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after the shock, and the hospital discharge register (LMR) to observe subsequent hospi-
talisations, and the primary diagnosis pertaining to the health shock. In case the effect
of the health shock on subsequent mortality and hospitalisations, and the primary diag-
noses, are similar across subgroups we can be more secure that the effects on employment,
benefit receipt, and income are due to genuine differences in preferences and constraints
rather than simply reflecting differences in the severity of the health shock.
The poor appear to be affected most by a health shock. Two and three years after
hospitalisation, the probability of remaining at work is smaller for those in the bottom
quartile of the personal income distribution than it is for those in the top quartile (Table
5.7). The effects are generally not significant, which is probably attributable to the limited
sample sizes. Despite being more likely to exit from work, the poor are not more likely to
enter DI. In fact, two and three years after hospitalisation, the point estimate of the effect
on the transition to DI is larger for those at the top of the income distribution and it is
only significant for this group. As a consequence of being less likely to remain in work,
yet also less likely to move onto DI, the loss of income, even in absolute terms, is larger
for the poor. Three years after hospitalisation their loss of personal income is 2,500 Euro,
on average, which is a 21% relative decline in comparison with a 4% decline for those
at the top of the distribution (Table 5.9). The relative loss of household income is also
larger for the poor at around 10% compared with 4% for the richest members of society,
although the average treatment effect is not significant.
Effects of hospitalisation on employment and DI receipt are larger and more significant
for the lower educated (no more than lower vocational secondary school) than the higher
educated. After three years, hospitalisation reduces the probability of remaining at work
by 11 percentage points for those with the lowest education, while there is no significant
effect for the higher educated (Table 5.7). A low educated person is eight points more
likely to enter DI three years after hospitalisation while the probability is raised by less
than four points among the better educated. The absolute drop in personal income shows
no consistent difference by education, reflecting the extent to which DI helps cushion the
consequences of the greater loss of employment in the low educated group, although in the
third year after hospitalisation it is 300 Euro larger for the lower educated and the relative
loss of income is 3% higher for this group. The point estimates of the absolute effect on
household income tend to be larger for the higher educated and they are only significant
for this group. In relative terms, the effects are comparable. From the effects on mortality,
future hospitalisations and an inspection of diagnoses (not shown), we conclude that the
severity of the shock does not differ much across educational groups.
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Both the employment and the incomes of public sector workers are more protected
against health shocks than those of their private sector counterparts and the self-employed.
Effects on employment are generally not significant, a reflection of the small sample sizes,
but three years after hospitalisation the point estimate for public sector workers is half
that of private sector employees and a quarter of that of the self-employed (Table 5.8).
Hospitalisation does not significantly raise the likelihood of claiming DI for public sector
workers, but it clearly does so in the private sector, where the probability rises by 5.6
percentage points after three years. Private sector workers are also significantly more
likely to enter retirement as a result of a health shock, whereas this is not true in the
public sector. These differences feed through into the effects on incomes. The point
estimates suggest that the self-employed incur the largest losses in both personal and
household incomes. After three years, the loss of personal income is 2,000 Euro for the
average self-employed person with an acute admission to hospital — a relative decrease
of 10% (Table 5.9). The loss in household income for this group is 5,000 Euro. Losses
are next highest for private sector workers, who, on average, lose 1,600 Euro of personal
income and 3,400 Euro of household income (Table 5.8). For public sector workers the
point estimates indicate a negligible loss of personal income and even a gain in household
income. No effect seems a safe conclusion.
These differential effects do appear to be driven, in part but not wholly, by differences
in the severity of the health condition. Public sector workers have lower subsequent
hospitalisation rates, yet slightly higher mortality rates. The diagnoses of public and
private sector workers are quite different, but one is not necessarily more severe than the
other.
5.4.4 Robustness checks
Adjusting the kernel bandwidth from 0.06 to a higher (0.1) and lower bandwidth (0.01)
and using a higher number of bootstrap replications (200) gives qualitatively similar
results for employment outcomes, but somewhat smaller effects for the treatment effects
on both personal and household income (Table 5.10 in the Appendix). Second, we checked
sensitivity to the specification of the propensity score, since the effects might be highly
sensitive to the set of variables included in the propensity score (Smith and Todd, 2005).
Three different specifications of the propensity score were estimated without (sets of)
insignificant variables (without occupational characteristics, without income information,
and without information on exercising), and the results we obtained were extremely close
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to the baseline specification14. Finally, average treatment effects on the treated for income
were also obtained without the additional differences-in-differences technique. Results
were qualitatively the same, and are available upon request.
5.5 Conclusion and discussion
We find that a health shock — measured by an acute hospitalization — significantly
and permanently reduces the probability of continued employment. For working-age in-
dividuals in the Netherlands the probability of remaining in work falls by more than 7
percentage points 3 years after admission, or 10 percent in relative terms, and the effect
remains stable up to 6 years after the health shock. The vast majority of the individuals
leaving employment are observed to be claiming disability benefits. In addition, and de-
spite the relative generosity of the Dutch Disability Benefits scheme (OECD, 2003), the
concomitant effects on personal and household income are non-negligible. The drop in
personal disposable income is around 1,600 Euro on a yearly basis three years after the
initial shock. The effects on household disposable income are more than twice as large,
reaching an amount of 3,600 Euro three years after the health shock, or around 8 percent
in relative terms. The 6 year results indicate that these effects are non-vanishing in the
long-run, such that the drop in disposable income can be considered permanent, implying
a reduction in household consumption and welfare (Deaton, 2002b; Attanasio and Davis,
1996; Blundell et al., 2008).
We find that, on average, there are important spillover effects to other household
members, possibly reflecting a fall in the earnings of the spouse as a result of meeting
the care needs of the disabled person. This explanation is supported by the fact that the
drop in household income is larger for those experiencing a more severe shock to health.
Also, the hypothesis is corroborated by the larger drop in household income for those that
move onto DI compared to those that are able to remain at work, for which there are no
spillover effects at all. DI is designed to insure personal earnings and it does not offer
protection against the impact of disability on the earnings of other household members.
While Charles (1999) finds that wives are likely to increase their labour supply in case
their husbands fall ill, and husbands are more likely to reduce their labour supply if their
wives receive a health shock, we find exactly the opposite. Spillover effects are found only
in the case of illness of a male, which seems to indicate that wives meet the care needs
of their husbands and reduce their labour supply to do so. In contrast, when a woman
experiences a health shock her personal income falls, but, on average, household income
14Results available upon request.
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remains constant. It appears that males are able to compensate for the earnings loss of
their wives. These findings challenge Charles’ (1999) claim that illness induces the spouse
to substitute for the previous main activity of the disabled partner.
A second feature of the findings is that the effects are not homogeneous. We find that
those who remain at work do not experience a large drop in income — 4 percent in relative
terms — while those that transit into disability face a 30 percent relative income loss.
Remaining at work thus provides the best protection against income loss after a health
shock. This means that recent policy changes focusing on job protection, provided they
are successful, are likely to protect incomes as well. However, not all individuals who incur
a health shock are capable of continuing to work. Our analysis reveals that individuals
experiencing the most severe health shocks are least likely to remain in employment and
most likely to move onto DI.
An extremely important finding is that the drop in disposable income following illness
varies substantially. We confirm evidence by Charles (2003) that earnings losses are
larger for older individuals, possibly since more human capital is destroyed and because
they have less incentive to invest in disability specific human capital. But the incentives
provided by the Dutch DI system, which favour the elderly, are likely to play a role, as is
the fact that older individuals are more likely to experience a more severe health shock.
Next, and most importantly, the lowest socio-economic classes — those in the bottom
quartile of personal income, and the lower educated — are both the most vulnerable to
the health-induced risk of job loss, and their job loss translates into higher relative drops
in personal and household disposable income. The lower socioeconomic groups suffer from
double jeopardy: they are most likely to suffer a shock to their health (e.g. Smith, 2005c)
and they are least protected against the employment and income losses following such
a shock. From the fact that, on average, individuals in the lowest income quartile lose
around 20% of personal income following a health shock, while those in the top quartile
lose only 4%, it follows that ill-health not only raises income inequality, but also places a
non-negligible proportion of low-income individuals at risk of poverty.
Differential effects are also found by education. The higher educated are more likely
to remain at work following an acute hospital admission than their lower educated peers.
However, there are no differences by education in the absolute loss of income following
a health shock, although the relative loss is larger among lower educated. This suggests
that while the higher educated are better able to remain in employment, they may have
to change to a lower paying job, to cut back on hours of work hours, or to miss out on
promotion. The lower educated are more likely to exit from working altogether and obtain
compensation from Disability Insurance.
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Although the small numbers do not allow us to obtain conclusive results regarding
the effects on the self-employed, the analysis points out that this group likely faces less
protection from formal mechanisms, as their probability of loosing their job due to a health
shock is as high as 13 percent, and the income effects are larger, although non-significant.
However, one would expect larger negative effects in the later years as the special DI
scheme for the self-employed was abolished in 2004, and only voluntary insurance is
currently available. This is a particular worrisome result as this group was also found
not to save enough for their retirement in the Netherlands (van der Lecq and Oerlemans,
2009), which enhances their vulnerability to a health shock.
Last, but not least, we find public sector workers are most protected. Since the
employer is less exposed to competition, and the salary is more regulated and less tied to
productivity, individuals working in the public sector are far less likely to lose their jobs
after a health shock, nor do they face a decrease of disposable income.
The fact that the lower socioeconomic groups suffer double jeopardy is clearly a major
concern. Those most susceptible to receiving a health shock, are least protected against a
fall in income in case one arrives. To tackle this problem, it would be more efficient, but
not easy, to reduce health shocks in this vulnerable group rather than trying to mitigate
the effects of a health shock by increasing replacement rates, given the moral hazard
this would induce. Whether the average actual replacement rates are below or above the
desired level, and should provoke any concern for policy-makers, is arguable. At 70% of
personal income for those that move onto DI, it seems unlikely that many would consider
the Dutch system ungenerous. But the spillover effects on the incomes of other household
members warrant further investigation. If these reflect a voluntary increase in joint leisure
(see e.g. Hurd, 1990), then there is less concern for household welfare, although the moral
hazard effect of DI on the labour supply of partners should be considered. On the other
hand, if spouses are forced to decrease their labour participation in order to meet care
giving responsibilities, then the impact on household welfare is greater and a reassessment
of current policy is warranted.
The most important limitation of our study is limited power due to small sample sizes.
Given our datasets and empirical strategy, there is trade-off between controlling for a rich
set of observable characteristics to satisfy the conditional independence assumption by
matching on the greatest possible number of variables, while at the same time ensuring
that there are sufficient observations left in our treatment group. In this study we err on
the side of caution by including as many characteristics as possible, at the expense of a
smaller treatment group. An important advantage is that given this rich set of control
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variables the results are extremely robust to all specification checks. Still, replication on
a larger dataset would be informative.
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Table 5.1: Descriptive statistics of the evolution of percentages in employment outcomes
and average disposable income by treatment status
Treated Control Treated Control
Working Retired
t− 1 1.000 1.000 t− 1 0.000 0.000
t 0.877 0.893 t 0.008 0.005
t+ 1 0.816 0.830 t+ 1 0.021 0.012
t+ 2 0.738 0.782 t+ 2 0.037 0.021
t+ 3 0.660 0.742 t+ 3 0.056 0.029
Unemployed No Income
t− 1 0.000 0.000 t− 1 0.000 0.000
t 0.003 0.004 t 0.038 0.034
t+ 1 0.010 0.006 t+ 1 0.031 0.048
t+ 2 0.016 0.009 t+ 2 0.047 0.048
t+ 3 0.024 0.011 t+ 3 0.042 0.047
Disabled Personal Income
t− 1 0.000 0.000 t− 1 19,297 18,348
t 0.013 0.005 t 19,990 19,514
t+ 1 0.044 0.009 t+ 1 20,710 20,564
t+ 2 0.052 0.014 t+ 2 21,384 21,532
t+ 3 0.069 0.016 t+ 3 20,594 21,605
Social Security Household Income
t− 1 0.000 0.000 t− 1 40,845 40,415
t 0.005 0.002 t 41,176 41,883
t+ 1 0.000 0.003 t+ 1 42,310 43,193
t+ 2 0.005 0.003 t+ 2 42,394 44,643
t+ 3 0.013 0.004 t+ 3 40,387 43,622
Notes: Average percentages in the listed states for treatment (N=398) and control group (N=32,085).
Year t− 1 is the base year, at which all individuals were working. In year t the shock found place.
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Table 5.2: Descriptive statistics and coefficients of the vari-
ables included in the propensity score
Variable Treated Control Coefficient Dataset
Demographics
Age 18-24 – Males 0.09 0.10 −0.12 RIO
Age 25-34 – Males 0.12 0.13 −0.11 RIO
Age 35-44 - Males 0.18 0.15 RIO
Age 45-54 - Males 0.18 0.15 0.00 RIO
Age 55-64 - Males 0.10 0.05 0.15 RIO
Age 18-24 - Females 0.05 0.08 −0.07 RIO
Age 25-34 - Females 0.07 0.10 −0.04 RIO
Age 35-44 - Females 0.09 0.12 RIO
Age 45-54 - Females 0.09 0.10 0.04 RIO
Age 55-64 – Females 0.03 0.02 0.19 RIO
Men 0.67 0.58 0.37∗∗ GBA
Married 0.66 0.65 GBA
Never married 0.20 0.25 −0.04 GBA
Widow 0.01 0.01 −0.10 GBA
Divorced 0.10 0.06 0.17∗∗ GBA
Household members 3.32 3.38 0.00 RIO
House owner 0.66 0.72 −0.10 POLS
Ethnicity
Native 0.87 0.85 GBA
Non-native Non-Western 0.04 0.04 −0.14 GBA
Non-native Western 0.07 0.07 −0.05 GBA
Wave
Wave 1998 0.42 0.44 −0.08 POLS
Wave 1999 0.25 0.23 POLS
Wave 2000 0.21 0.21 −0.04 POLS
Wave 2001 0.13 0.12 −0.05 POLS
City Size
< 10,000 0.05 0.07 GBA
10-50,000 0.54 0.54 0.05 GBA
50-100,000 0.15 0.15 0.10 GBA
> 100,000 0.25 0.25 0.09 GBA
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Table 5.2: (continued)
Variable Treated Control Coefficient Dataset
Province
Groningen 0.05 0.04 0.03 GBA
Friesland 0.07 0.08 GBA
Drenthe 0.05 0.04 0.01 GBA
Overijssel 0.06 0.08 −0.21∗∗ GBA
Flevoland 0.03 0.02 0.02 GBA
Gelderland 0.13 0.12 −0.06 GBA
Utrecht 0.05 0.06 −0.21∗ GBA
Noord-Holland 0.10 0.13 −0.17∗ GBA
Zuid-Holland 0.14 0.17 −0.18∗∗ GBA
Zeeland 0.05 0.03 0.15 GBA
Noord-Brabant 0.17 0.15 −0.03 GBA
Limburg 0.10 0.08 −0.02 GBA
Occupation
Regular employee 0.77 0.8 −0.10 RIO
Civil Servant 0.08 0.09 0.10 RIO
CEO/Executive 0.01 0.01 −0.20 RIO
Self-Employed 0.14 0.10 RIO
Hours work/week 33.30 31.79 0.00 POLS
Public sector 0.19 0.20 −0.02 POLS
Private sector 0.40 0.39 −0.11∗ POLS
Unknown sector 0.41 0.40 POLS
Blue collar 0.24 0.19 0.09 POLS
White collar 0.35 0.38 0.00 POLS
Unknown collar 0.40 0.43 POLS
Education
Primary school 0.12 0.08 0.03 POLS
Lower Secondary school 0.26 0.21 POLS
Higher Secondary school 0.33 0.33 0.02 POLS
Higher education 0.11 0.17 −0.19∗∗ POLS
Income
Income ratio (personal / household income) 0.54 0.50 −0.01 RIO
Equivalent household income 23, 641.30 23, 331.56 0.00 RIO
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Table 5.2: (continued)
Variable Treated Control Coefficient Dataset
Self-Reported Health
Good Self-Assessed Health 0.79 0.89 −0.07 POLS
Fair Self-Assessed Health 0.13 0.08 POLS
Poor Self-Assessed Health 0.08 0.03 0.19 POLS
Hampered in daily actvs 0.17 0.09 0.17∗∗∗ POLS
GP visit 0.22 0.22 −0.01 POLS
Life-style variables
Smoking 0.41 0.35 0.04 POLS
Sports Frequently 0.14 0.12 0.09 POLS
Sports Modestly 0.34 0.41 −0.01 POLS
Sports Infrequently 0.04 0.04 POLS
Sports Never 0.49 0.43 0.03 POLS
* p-value < 0.1, ** p-value < 0.05, *** p-value < 0.01
Notes: Column 1 and 2 present the means of the different variables separately for treatment (N=398) and
control group (N=32,085), respectively. Column 3 presents the coefficients of the probit estimation of the
propensity score. In addition to the variables listed, we included interactions between gender and civil-
servants (coefficient -0.39∗∗), being a house owner (coefficient -0.03), and self-assessed health (coefficient
-0.15 for good self-assessed health, and -0.11 for poor self-assessed health). Column 4 indicates from
which data set the variables were retrieved.
Table 5.3: Average Treatment Effects on the Treated of an Acute Hospitalization on
Employment status and Disposable Income
Health Shock Acute Acute + # Nights > 3 Diagnosis
Probability of working
t −0.014 −0.019 −0.024
t+ 1 −0.009 −0.026 −0.048∗∗∗
t+ 2 −0.037∗∗ −0.055∗ −0.059∗∗∗
t+ 3 −0.076∗∗∗ −0.096∗∗∗ −0.075∗∗∗
Probability of being unemployed
t −0.002 −0.004 −0.002
t+ 1 0.004 0.007 0.011
t+ 2 0.007 0.009 0.006
t+ 3 0.012 0.020∗ 0.014∗
Probability of being on disability benefits
t 0.006 0.012 0.017∗∗
t+ 1 0.035∗∗∗ 0.058∗∗∗ 0.028∗∗∗
t+ 2 0.038∗∗∗ 0.063∗∗∗ 0.041∗∗∗
t+ 3 0.052∗∗∗ 0.085∗∗∗ 0.047∗∗∗
Probability of being on Social Security benefits
t 0.003 0.007 0.001
t+ 1 −0.003 −0.003∗∗∗ 0.002
t+ 2 0.002 0.006 −0.001
t+ 3 0.010∗ 0.010 0.004
Probability of being retired
t 0.002 −0.001 0.002
t+ 1 0.009 0.015 0.008
t+ 2 0.015 0.033∗∗ 0.021∗∗
t+ 3 0.026∗ 0.044∗∗∗ 0.034∗∗∗
Probability of having no income
t 0.004 0.002 0.011
t+ 1 −0.018∗ −0.028∗∗∗ −0.004
t+ 2 −0.002 −0.014 −0.006
t+ 3 −0.006 −0.022∗∗∗ −0.013
Personal income (in 1000 Euro)
t −0.458 −0.987 0.373
t+ 1 −0.796∗ 0.006 −0.283
t+ 2 −0.903∗∗ −0.468 −0.558
t+ 3 −1.631∗∗∗ −1.247∗∗ −0.074
Household income (in 1000 Euro)
t −1.229 0.124 −0.326
t+ 1 −1.882∗∗∗ −0.067 −0.982
t+ 2 −2.863∗∗∗ −1.623 −2.291
t+ 3 −3.634∗∗∗ −3.327∗∗ −1.308
* p-value < 0.1, ** p-value < 0.05, *** p-value < 0.01
Notes: Estimates based on POLS 1998-2001 sample with follow-up of RIO 1998-2005, N=31,882 of which
395 are in the treatment group. Column 1 gives the base case using acute hospitalizations (NT = 395),
Column 2 uses the combination of acute and number of nights more than three (NT = 231) and Column
3 uses diagnoses based on cancer, respiratory, or circulatory diseases as indicator (NT = 415).
Table 5.4: Average Treatment Effects on the Treated by Sex and Age.
Males Females Age < 50 Age ≥ 50
Probability of working
t 0.000 −0.050 −0.007 −0.019
t+ 1 −0.001 −0.036 0.001 −0.026
t+ 2 −0.051∗ −0.020 −0.016 −0.082
t+ 3 −0.079∗∗∗ −0.082∗ −0.042 −0.148∗∗∗
Probability of being unemployed
t 0.000 −0.005 0.000 −0.009∗∗∗
t+ 1 0.006 0.000 0.006 −0.004
t+ 2 0.011 −0.002 0.007 0.002
t+ 3 0.008 0.020 0.015∗ −0.001
Probability of being on disability benefits
t 0.015 −0.007∗∗∗ 0.006 0.011
t+ 1 0.032∗∗ 0.044∗ 0.027∗∗∗ 0.054∗∗
t+ 2 0.044∗∗∗ 0.030∗ 0.017∗ 0.098∗∗∗
t+ 3 0.062∗∗∗ 0.036∗ 0.029∗∗∗ 0.117∗∗∗
Probability of being on Social Security benefits
t 0.007 −0.003∗∗∗ 0.005 −0.001∗∗
t+ 1 −0.002∗∗∗ −0.003∗∗∗ −0.003∗∗∗ −0.002∗∗∗
t+ 2 0.001 0.004 0.000 0.008
t+ 3 0.005 0.02 0.007 0.019
Probability of being retired
t 0.004 −0.003∗∗∗ −0.000∗∗∗ 0.002
t+ 1 0.015 −0.007∗∗∗ −0.001∗∗∗ 0.023
t+ 2 0.026∗ −0.014∗∗∗ 0.003 0.028
t+ 3 0.033∗∗ 0.006 0.002 0.063
Probability of having no income
t −0.006 0.032 0.003 0.005
t+ 1 −0.020∗∗∗ 0.001 −0.015 −0.012
t+ 2 0.004 −0.007 0.003 −0.012
t+ 3 −0.001 −0.008 −0.002 −0.017
Personal income (in 1000 Euro)
t −0.133 −1.238∗∗∗ −0.549 0.230
t+ 1 −0.714 −1.112∗∗ −0.778∗ −0.307
t+ 2 −0.898∗ −1.170∗∗ −0.876∗ −0.367
t+ 3 −1.650∗∗∗ −1.807∗∗∗ −1.435∗∗∗ −1.192
Household income (in 1000 Euro)
t −0.842 −2.120∗∗∗ −1.256∗ −0.734
t+ 1 −1.877∗∗ −1.961 −1.895 −0.909
t+ 2 −3.123∗∗ −2.437 −2.604∗∗ −2.408
t+ 3 −4.787∗∗∗ −1.442 −2.722∗∗ −4.677∗∗
* p-value < 0.1, ** p-value < 0.05, *** p-value < 0.01
Notes: Number of treated individuals (NT) for males is 267, for females NT=131, for those under 50
NT=292, while for those over 50 NT=106. Data as in Table 5.3.
Table 5.5: Average Treatment Effects on Disposable Income (in 1000 Euro) for those that
stay at work, and for those that enter Disability Insurance schemes.
Remain at Work Disability Recipients
Disposable Personal Income
t −0.113 −1.487∗
t+ 1 0.151 −3.385∗∗∗
t+ 2 −0.112 −4.420∗∗∗
t+ 3 −1.031∗ −6.565∗∗∗
Disposable Household Income
t −0.601 −2.825∗
t+ 1 0.499 −4.476∗
t+ 2 −0.534 −6.414∗
t+ 3 −1.819 −8.756∗∗∗
* p-value < 0.1, ** p-value < 0.05, *** p-value < 0.01
Notes: Column 1 presents the results for those that remain at work (NT=235), while column 2 presents
the results for those that rely on disability insurance in any of the years (NT=108). Data as in Table 5.3.
Table 5.6: Long-Run Average Treatment Effects on the Treated of an Acute Hospitaliza-
tion on Employment status and Disposable Income
Probability of working Probability of being retired
1999 −0.005 1999 −0.005∗∗∗
2000 −0.023 2000 0.008
2001 −0.047 2001 0.015
2002 −0.104∗∗∗ 2002 0.009
2003 −0.111∗∗∗ 2003 0.027
2004 −0.095∗∗∗ 2004 0.009
2005 −0.114∗∗∗ 2005 0.006
Probability of being unemployed Probability of having no income
1999 −0.004 1999 0.010
2000 0.001 2000 −0.006
2001 0.001 2001 0.009
2002 0.010 2002 0.007
2003 0.014 2003 −0.007
2004 0.009 2004 0.008
2005 0.027∗ 2005 0.001
Prob being on disability benefits Personal income (in 1000 Euro)
1999 −0.005 1999 −0.116
2000 0.035∗∗ 2000 −0.309
2001 0.033∗∗ 2001 −0.282
2002 0.069∗∗∗ 2002 −1.749∗∗
2003 0.044∗∗ 2003 −0.820
2004 0.051∗∗∗ 2004 −1.478∗
2005 0.058∗∗∗ 2005 −1.706
Prob being on Social Security benefits Household income (in 1000 Euro)
1999 0.004 1999 −0.575
2000 −0.002 2000 −0.721
2001 0.010 2001 −2.599∗
2002 0.015 2002 −4.840∗∗∗
2003 0.028∗∗ 2003 −4.322∗∗∗
2004 0.015 2004 −5.012∗∗
2005 0.008 2005 −5.328∗∗∗
* p-value < 0.1, ** p-value < 0.05, *** p-value < 0.01
Notes: Estimates based on POLS 1998 sample with follow-up of RIO 1998-2005, N=14,380 of which 235
are in the treatment group.
Table 5.7: Average Treatment Effects on the Treated by Personal Income and Education
Bottom Quartile Top Quartile Lower Educated Higher Educated
Probability of working
t −0.028 −0.012 −0.038 0.020
t+ 1 0.017 0.002 −0.021 0.031
t+ 2 −0.059 −0.036 −0.064 0.012
t+ 3 −0.079 −0.055∗ −0.113∗∗ −0.018
Probability of being unemployed
t −0.004∗∗∗ 0.004 −0.008 0.003
t+ 1 0.008 0.002 −0.003 0.007
t+ 2 0.020 −0.010∗∗∗ 0.015 −0.002
t+ 3 0.004 −0.012∗∗∗ 0.010 0.014
Probability of being on disability benefits
t −0.005 0.006 0.024 −0.005
t+ 1 0.041∗ 0.012 0.065∗∗∗ 0.017
t+ 2 0.038 0.046∗∗ 0.068∗∗∗ 0.026∗
t+ 3 0.035 0.053∗∗∗ 0.082∗∗∗ 0.036∗∗
Probability of being on Social Security benefits
t 0.021 0.000 0.004 0.005
t+ 1 −0.005∗∗∗ 0.000 −0.004∗∗∗ −0.001∗∗∗
t+ 2 0.019 0.000 0.002 −0.002∗∗∗
t+ 3 0.032 0.000 0.016 −0.002∗∗∗
Probability of being retired
t −0.002∗∗∗ 0.004 −0.001 0.007
t+ 1 −0.004∗∗∗ 0.027 0.004 0.013
t+ 2 −0.011∗∗∗ 0.030 0.026 0.010
t+ 3 0.011 0.033 0.060∗∗∗ 0.010
Probability of having no income
t −0.015 0.013 0.007 −0.005
t+ 1 −0.045 −0.008∗∗∗ −0.029∗ −0.012
t+ 2 0.015 −0.005∗∗∗ 0.018 0.006
t+ 3 0.011 −0.005∗∗∗ −0.033∗∗ 0.013
Personal income (in 1000 Euro)
t −0.318 −0.304 −0.308 −0.589
t+ 1 −1.113∗∗ −0.288 −0.859 −1.083
t+ 2 −1.195 −0.834 −0.725 −1.490∗∗
t+ 3 −2.436∗∗∗ −1.244 −1.899∗∗∗ −1.579∗∗
Household income (in 1000 Euro)
t 1.030 −0.884 −0.786 −1.620
t+ 1 −3.587 0.019 −1.710 −2.965∗∗
t+ 2 −3.737 −1.348 −1.464 −4.601∗∗∗
t+ 3 −4.534 −1.893 −3.390 −3.460∗∗
* p-value < 0.1, ** p-value < 0.05, *** p-value < 0.01
Notes: Bottom and Top Quartile are based upon Personal Disposable Income. Number of treated (NT)
individuals (NT) for the bottom quartile of personal income is 83, while for the top quartile it is 116. For
the lower educated (primary school and lower vocational education) NT=150, for the higher educated
(higher secondary + higher vocational + university education) NT=174. Data as in Table 5.3.
Table 5.8: Average Treatment Effects on the Treated by Occupational Sector
Public Sector Private Sector Self-Employed
Probability of working
t −0.010 0.007 −0.042
t+ 1 0.004 0.003 −0.007
t+ 2 0.001 −0.022 −0.034
t+ 3 −0.025 −0.052 −0.105∗
Probability of being unemployed
t −0.003∗∗∗ 0.003 −0.001
t+ 1 −0.004∗∗∗ 0.006 0.019
t+ 2 −0.005∗∗∗ 0.008 −0.001
t+ 3 −0.009∗∗∗ 0.030∗ −0.002∗
Probability of being on disability benefits
t −0.002∗∗∗ 0.007 −0.004∗∗∗
t+ 1 −0.008∗∗∗ 0.043∗∗∗ 0.004
t+ 2 0.001 0.039∗∗ 0.037
t+ 3 0.029 0.056∗∗∗ 0.051
Probability of being on Social Security benefits
t 0.000 0.006 0.017
t+ 1 −0.001∗∗ −0.002∗∗∗ −0.006∗∗∗
t+ 2 −0.001∗∗ −0.002∗∗∗ 0.017
t+ 3 −0.002∗∗ 0.003 0.038
Probability of being retired
t −0.003∗∗∗ −0.004∗∗∗ −0.005∗∗
t+ 1 −0.008∗∗∗ 0.009 0.030
t+ 2 −0.003 0.034∗∗ 0.012
t+ 3 0.018 0.026∗ 0.002
Probability of having no income
t −0.007∗∗∗ 0.007 0.060
t+ 1 −0.010∗∗∗ −0.010 0.014
t+ 2 −0.012∗∗∗ −0.008 0.010
t+ 3 −0.014∗∗∗ −0.015∗∗∗ −0.016
Personal income (in 1000 Euro)
t 0.056 0.275 −2.378
t+ 1 0.388 −1.003 −1.692
t+ 2 −0.293 −1.054 −1.227
t+ 3 −0.076 −1.595∗ −2.034
Household income (in 1000 Euro)
t −0.429 −0.366 −6.466∗
t+ 1 2.304 −2.077∗ −5.129∗
t+ 2 0.613 −2.423 −5.343
t+ 3 0.410 −3.402∗ −4.950
* p-value < 0.1, ** p-value < 0.05, *** p-value < 0.01
Notes: Number of treated individuals (NT) for public sector workers (governmental institutions, educa-
tion, health services, environmental services, culture, recreation, defense) is 76, for private sector workers
(all other sectors) is 158, and for the self-employed NT = 55. Data as in Table 5.3.
Table 5.9: Relative Average Treatment Effects on the Treated in year t+ 3
Working Disability Personal Income Household Income
All −10.26% 309.48% −7.25% −8.36%
Males −10.39% 474.19% −6.24% −10.89%
Females −11.37% 168.50% −12.41% (−3.37%)
Age <50 (−5.47%) 229.85% −6.47% −6.19%
Age ≥50 −23.83% 315.30% (−5.44%) −11.60%
Stay at work −4.32% −4.06%
Disabled −30.58% −18.55%
Bottom Quartile −13.49% 199.79% −21.44% −10.32%
Top Quartile −6.85% 441.44% (−3.85%) (−3.93%)
Lower Educated −16.61% 329.12% −9.48% (−8.37%)
Higher Educated (−2.38%) 280.47% −6.63% −7.70%
Public sector (−3.01%) (190.64%) (−0.04%) (0.01%)
Private sector (−6.66%) 334.42% −6.60% −8.20%
Self-employed −13.21% 144.22% (−9.77%) (−12.18%)
Notes: The Relative Treatment Effects are calculated on basis of equation (5.2). Relative Treatment
effects between parenthesis represent those of which the ATET is non-significant. Strictly speaking,
since the numerator of the RATET is statistically indistinguishable (at 10%) from zero, the ratio is zero
too.
Table 5.10: Robustness Checks
Default Bandwidth Small Bandwidth Large Bandwidth More bootstrap reps
Probability of working
t −0.014 −0.008 −0.014 −0.014
t+ 1 −0.009 0.001 −0.010 −0.009
t+ 2 −0.037∗∗ −0.024 −0.037∗ −0.037∗∗
t+ 3 −0.076∗∗∗ −0.060∗∗∗ −0.077∗∗∗ −0.076∗∗∗
Probability of being unemployed
t −0.002 −0.003 −0.002 −0.002
t+ 1 0.004 0.003 0.004 0.004
t+ 2 0.007 0.005 0.007 0.007
t+ 3 0.012 0.010 0.012 0.012
Probability of being on disability benefits
t 0.006 0.004 0.007 0.006
t+ 1 0.035∗∗∗ 0.028∗∗∗ 0.035∗∗∗ 0.035∗∗∗
t+ 2 0.038∗∗∗ 0.032∗∗∗ 0.039∗∗∗ 0.038∗∗∗
t+ 3 0.052∗∗∗ 0.046∗∗∗ 0.053∗∗∗ 0.052∗∗∗
Probability of being on Social Security benefits
t 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003
t+ 1 −0.003 −0.004 −0.003 −0.003
t+ 2 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002
t+ 3 0.010∗ 0.009∗ 0.010∗ 0.010∗
Probability of being retired
t 0.002 0.000 0.002 0.002
t+ 1 0.009 0.004 0.009 0.009
t+ 2 0.015 0.005 0.015∗ 0.015
t+ 3 0.026∗ 0.014 0.027∗∗∗ 0.026∗
Probability of having no income
t 0.004 0.007 0.005 0.004
t+ 1 −0.018∗ −0.012 −0.016∗ −0.018∗
t+ 2 −0.002 0.002 −0.002 −0.002
t+ 3 −0.006 −0.001 −0.007 −0.006
Personal income (in 1000 Euro)
t −0.458 −0.133 0.438 −0.458
t+ 1 −0.796∗ −0.235 0.110 −0.796∗
t+ 2 −0.903∗∗ −0.421 −0.158 −0.903∗∗
t+ 3 −1.631∗∗∗ −1.135∗ −1.034∗ −1.631∗∗∗
Household income (in 1000 Euro)
t −1.229 −0.271 −0.864 −1.229
t+ 1 −1.882∗∗∗ −0.188 −1.012 −1.882∗∗∗
t+ 2 −2.863∗∗∗ −1.195 −2.163∗∗ −2.863∗∗∗
t+ 3 −3.634∗∗∗ −1.785 −3.183∗∗∗ −3.634∗∗∗
* p-value < 0.1, ** p-value < 0.05, *** p-value < 0.01
Notes: Column 1 gives the base case using acute hospitalizations, and an Epanechnikov kernel with
bandwidth 0.06. Column 2 uses a smaller bandwidth of only 0.01. Column 3 uses a larger bandwidth of
0.10, while column 4 is similar to the base case but uses more bootstrap replications (200 instead of 50).
Data as in Table 5.3.
Part III
Underlying Mechanisms

Chapter 6
Healthy, Wealthy and Wise: a Life
Cycle Model of Socioeconomic
Disparities in Health
Understanding of the substantial disparity in health between low and high socioe-
conomic status (SES) groups is hampered by the lack of a comprehensive theoreti-
cal framework to interpret empirical facts and to predict yet untested relations. We
present a life-cycle model that incorporates multiple mechanisms that explain (jointly)
a large part of the observed disparities in health by SES. In our model, lifestyle factors
(preventive care, healthy and unhealthy consumption), working conditions (physical
and psychosocial health stresses), living conditions (housing, neighborhood social en-
vironment) and curative care are mechanisms through which SES (education, income,
wealth) and health are related. Our model predicts that greater initial wealth, per-
manently higher income (over the life cycle) and a higher level of education induce
individuals to invest more in curative and in preventive care, shift consumption to-
ward healthy consumption and enable individuals to afford healthier working and liv-
ing environments. Jointly these gradually lead to cumulative health advantage with
age.
—————————————–
This chapter is based upon:
Galama, T.J. and H. van Kippersluis (2010), “Healthy, Wealthy and Wise: a Life Cycle Model of
Socioeconomic Disparities in Health”, Mimeo RAND Corporation, Santa Monica.
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6.1 Introduction
Disparities in health across socioeconomic status (SES) groups — often called the SES
health gradient — are substantial. For example, Case and Deaton (2005) show how in the
United States, a 60 year old high-income (top quartile of family income) male, on average,
reports to be in similar health to a 20 year old low-income male (bottom quartile). Not
only do low SES individuals start adulthood with a lower level of health but their health
also deteriorates faster with age than their high SES peers. Similar patterns hold for
other measures of SES, such as education and wealth and other indicators of health, such
as onset of chronic diseases, disability and mortality (e.g., Adler et al., 1994; Smith, 1999;
Marmot, 1999; Van Doorslaer et al., 2008). Low SES individuals are more likely to suffer
from disability and have a significantly shorter life expectancy. In cross sectional data
the disparity in health between low and high SES groups appears to increase over the life
cycle until ages 50-60, after which it narrows. This pattern is strikingly consistent across
countries with relatively low levels of protection from loss of work and health risks, such
as the US, and those with stronger welfare systems, such as the Netherlands (House et
al., 1994; Kunst and Mackenbach, 1994; Preston and Elo, 1995; Smith, 1999; 2005a; 2007;
Case and Deaton, 2005; Van Kippersluis et al., 2010).
The significant social and economic patterning of disease suggests that social interven-
tions have great potential for improving the health of, in particular, disadvantaged groups
(CSDH, 2008). Addressing health inequalities requires a detailed understanding of the
complex interaction between dimensions of SES and those of health. Recent significant
contributions to the understanding of socioeconomic disparities in health have concen-
trated on the identification of causal effects, but have stopped short of uncovering the
underlying mechanisms that produce the causal relationships. For example, education
is found to have a causal protective effect on health (Lleras-Muney, 2005; Oreopoulos,
2006; Silles, 2009) but it is not known exactly how the more educated achieve their health
advantage.
Understanding of the relative importance of underlying mechanisms responsible for
the observed relationships is hampered by the lack of a sufficiently comprehensive theory.
Case and Deaton (2005) argue that it is extremely difficult to understand the relationships
between health, education, income, wealth and labor-force status without some guiding
theoretical framework. A good theoretical framework ought to guide empirical research
not only in testing causal effects but also in revealing the underlying mechanisms. Without
such knowledge it is difficult to design policies that are effective in reducing disparities
(Deaton, 2002a). Integrating the roles of proposed mechanisms and their long-term effect
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into a comprehensive framework allows researchers to assess the relative importance of
each proposed mechanism, the interaction between mechanisms, and to disentangle the
differential patterns of causality. It is no surprise then that several authors (e.g., Case
and Deaton, 2005; Cutler et al., 2008) have pointed to the absence of a unifying theory
of SES and health over the life cycle and have emphasized the importance of developing
one.
A suitable framework in which multiple mechanisms and their cumulative long-term
effects can be studied is a structural model of SES and health over the life cycle. Health
disparities, as well as SES differences (e.g., wealth) accumulate over the life course, and
are considerably larger at later ages. Case and Deaton (2005) have attempted to develop
a model for the role of work and consumption behavior in explaining the SES and health
gradient. Their starting point is the canonical life cycle model of the demand for health
and medical care, due to Grossman (1972a, 1972b). Case and Deaton (2005) present
a simplified Grossman model and extend the model to include the detrimental effect of
hard/risky labor and of unhealthy consumption behavior on health. However, the authors
find that the Grossman model is not able to explain a number of the most salient features
of the SES health gradient. For example, Case and Deaton (2005) claim that while the
Grossman model can explain differences in the level of health between low and high SES
groups it cannot explain differences in the rate of health deterioration. In other words,
it cannot account for the widening of the SES health gradient with age through late
middle age or early late life. Other problems with the predictions and properties of the
Grossman model have been pointed out in the literature (see Grossman, 2000, for a review
and rebuttal of these).
The aim of this paper is to develop a conceptual framework for health and socioeco-
nomic status over the life cycle. Our starting point is the Grossman model (Grossman
1972a, 1972b) and the extended version presented by Case and Deaton (2005). Our
contribution is as follows. First, we address three significant problems identified in the
literature with the Grossman model by introducing decreasing-returns-to-scale (DRTS)
in the health production function (as in Ehrlich and Chuma, 1990). This addresses (i)
the indeterminacy problem (“bang-bang” solution) for investment in medical care, (ii) the
relative inability of the model to reproduce the observed negative relation between health
and the demand for medical care (e.g., Zweifel and Breyer, 1997)1, and (iii) the model’s
1It is not entirely correct to assert that the Grossman model always produces the incorrect sign for
the relationship between health and investment in curative care. As Grossman (2000; p. 369) shows,
for the pure investment model and assuming that the “natural” deterioration rate increases with age (a
necessary assumption for the health stock to decline with age in Grossman’s formulation [not so for a
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lack of capacity to explain differences in the health deterioration rate (not just the level
of health) between different socioeconomic groups (Case and Deaton, 2005). Addressing
these problems has been essential: a DRTS health production function can account for
a greater number of observed empirical patterns and suggests that the Grossman model
provides a suitable foundation for the development of a life-cycle model of the SES-health
gradient.
Yet, utilization of medical services and access to care explain only part of the associa-
tion between SES and health (e.g., Adler et al., 1993). Our second contribution is therefore
to incorporate many potential mechanisms in the model that could explain disparities in
health by SES and to include a multitude of potential bi-directional pathways between
health and dimensions of SES. One important concept in our work is “job-related health
stress”, which can be interpreted broadly and can range from physical working conditions
(e.g., hard labor) to the psychosocial aspects of work (e.g., low status, limited control,
repetitive work, etc). The notion here is that job-related health stress can include any as-
pect of work that is detrimental to health and as such is associated with a wage premium
(a compensating wage differential). Other important features of the model are lifestyle
factors (preventive care, healthy and unhealthy consumption), and curative (medical)
care. The model integrates a life cycle approach, and the concepts of financial, human
and health capital (Muurinen and Le Grand, 1985). The focus is on understanding the
SES-health gradient as the outcome of rational (constrained) individual behaviour, and
the framework applies to individuals who have completed their education and participate
(or have participated) in the labor-force.
We find that greater initial wealth, permanently higher income (over the life cycle)
and a higher level of education induce individuals to invest more in curative and in
preventive care, shift consumption toward healthy consumption, and enable individuals
to afford healthier working environments (associated with lower levels of physical and
psychosocial health stresses) and living environments. The mechanism through which
initial wealth, permanent income and education operate is by increasing the marginal
cost of, and demand for, curative care. The greater marginal cost of curative care in
turn increases the health benefit of (and hence demand for) preventive care and healthy
consumption, and the health cost of (and hence reduced demand for) unhealthy working
DRTS formulation]), investment in curative care increases with age while the health stock falls if the
elasticity of the marginal production benefit of health with respect to health is less than one (Grossman
refers to this as the MEC schedule). This produces a negative correlation between health and medical
care. In a DRTS formulation however the relation between health and investment in curative care is more
intuitive and follows directly from the first-order condition for health.
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and living environments, and unhealthy consumption. Jointly these gradually lead to
cumulative health advantage with age. Our model thus holds considerable promise in
explaining empirical health patterns. Such a model has not been available before and
economists have highlighted the significance of its development (e.g., Case and Deaton,
2005; Cutler et al., 2008).
The paper is organized as follows. Section 6.2 briefly reviews the literature on health
disparities by SES to determine the essential components required in a comprehensive
framework. The relation between SES and health is complex and developing a theory
requires simplification and a focus on the essential mechanisms relating SES and health.
We highlight potential explanations for the SES health gradient that a) explain a large
part of the gradient and b) are relatively straightforward to include in our theoretical
framework. Based on these findings we develop our theoretical formulation. Section 6.3
presents and discusses first-order conditions and the characteristics of the model solutions.
The section also highlights potential mechanisms through which SES and health influence
each other, how the socioeconomic gradient in health emerges, and discusses the role
of institutions. In section 6.4 we discuss the importance of mechanisms that were not
included, potential ways of including additional mechanisms and provide direction for
future research and theoretical development. In section 6.5 we conclude.
6.2 Components of a model capturing the SES-health
gradient
In this section we review the literature on health disparities by SES to determine the
essential components required in a comprehensive framework (section 6.2.2). Based on
these findings we extend and refine prior theoretical work and present our theoretical
formulation (section 6.2.3).
6.2.1 Background
A significant body of research across multiple disciplines (including epidemiology, soci-
ology, demography, psychology, evolutionary biology and economics) has been devoted
to documenting and explaining the substantial disparity in health between low and high
socioeconomic status (SES) groups. Progress has been made in recent years in charac-
terizing the relationships between the various dimensions of SES and health over the life
cycle and in understanding the relative importance and directions of causal pathways.
Epidemiological research has used longitudinal studies to examine the role of behavioral,
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material, psychosocial and healthcare related pathways in explaining SES-health associa-
tions (Avendano et al., 2006a; 2006b; House et al., 1990; 1994; Huisman et al., 2008; Lantz
et al., 1998; Lynch et al., 1997; Marmot et al., 1997a; Skalicka et al., 2009; Van Lenthe
et al., 2002; van Oort et al., 2005; Yen and Kaplan, 1999). Economists have recently
re-emphasized the importance of the reverse impact of health on SES through ability to
work (Smith, 1999; 2005a; 2007; Case and Deaton, 2005). These studies suggest that
education is the key dimension of SES for which there appears to be robust evidence of
a substantial causal protective effect on health and that an important part of the health
differences by financial indicators of SES can be explained by the fact that bad health
impinges on the ability to work, thereby reducing income. Further, these studies highlight
the importance of health behaviors (such as smoking, drinking and exercise), curative and
preventive care, psychosocial and environmental risk factors, neighborhood social envi-
ronment, acute and chronic psychosocial stress, social relationships and supports, sense
of control, fetal and early childhood conditions, and physical, chemical, biological and
psychosocial hazards and stressors at work.
6.2.2 Key components of a conceptual framework
The life cycle:
Health is modelled as a stock that deteriorates over the life cycle and its deterioration
can be counteracted by health investments. A natural starting point for a theory of the
relation between health and SES is a model of life cycle utility maximization. Since we
are interested in explaining health and SES over the life cycle, the model should include
health, education, income, assets (wealth), and health investment as a function of age.
Financial capital, human capital and health capital:
Muurinen and Le Grand (1985) emphasize that there are three types of capital: financial
capital (assets), human capital (education, knowledge, experience) and health capital (our
bodies). The Grossman model contains financial capital and provides a framework for the
concept of health capital. We include human capital by assuming a Mincer-type wage
equation in which the more educated and more experienced earn higher wages (Mincer,
1974). We also allow the more educated to be more efficient consumers and producers
of curative (medical) and preventive care (based on the interpretation, as in Grossman,
of education as a productivity factor in own time inputs and in identifying and seeking
effective care).
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Working environment and lifestyle factors:
Low SES individuals more often perform risky, manual labor than high SES individuals,
and their health deteriorates faster as a consequence (Marmot et al., 1997b; Schrijvers et
al., 1998; Borg and Kristensen, 2000). Case and Deaton (2005) find that those who are
employed in manual occupations have worse health than those who work in professional
occupations and that the health effect of occupation operates at least in part indepen-
dently of the personal characteristics of the workers. Cutler et al. (2008) present similar
results using mortality as an indicator of health. Schrijvers et al. (1998) use Dutch
cross-sectional data to study the impact of working conditions on the association between
occupational class and self-reported health. Hazardous physical working conditions are
more prevalent in lower occupational classes, and this explains a substantial part (for
males up to 83 percent) of the association between health and occupational (social) class.
Extensive research further suggests an important role of lifestyle factors, particularly
smoking, in explaining SES disparities in health (Khang et al., 2009; Mackenbach et al.,
2004). Using three different data sets from the UK and the US, Marmot et al. (1997a)
find that features of the psycho-social working environment, social circumstances outside
work, and health behavior account for much of the social gradient in health (see also House
et al., 1994). Fuchs (1986) argues that in developed countries, it is personal lifestyles that
cause the greatest variation in health. Some epidemiological studies estimate that around
two thirds of the social gradient in health deterioration could be explained by working
environment and life style factors alone (Borg and Kristensen, 2000).
The evidence presented above highlights the potential role of both the physical and
psychosocial aspects of the working environment in explaining the SES gradient in health.
We introduce the choice of working environment and other health-related behavior in our
theoretical framework by allowing an individual’s health decline to be partly endogenous,
involving individual decisions concerning life style factors and working environment.
First, individuals choose their level of undesirable job characteristics which potentially
have health consequences, denoted as “job-related health stress”. The concept of job-
related health stress can be interpreted broadly and can range from physical working
conditions (e.g., hard or risky labor) to psychosocial aspects of work (e.g., low social
status, lack of control, repetitive work, etc). The decision to engage in unhealthy labor
is governed by the relative benefit of a possible wage premium — a compensating wage
differential (Smith, 1776; Thaler and Rosen, 1975; Viscusi, 1978; 1979) — versus the
cost in terms of a higher health deterioration rate. Evidence is strong that there is a
wage premium for jobs with higher mortality risk (Smith, 1978), and also for less serious,
non-fatal, health risks (e.g. Viscusi, 1978; Olson, 1981; Duncan and Holmlund, 1983).
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Second, individuals engage in preventive care (such as check up doctor visits), healthy
consumption (such as the consumption of healthy foods, sports and exercise, but also
living in a “healthy” neighborhood with low levels of pollution and crime and with a
high quality service infrastructure), and unhealthy consumption (such as smoking, exces-
sive alcohol consumption). Preventive care and healthy consumption are associated with
health benefits in that they lower the health deterioration rate, either instantaneously or
after a substantial period of exposure. Healthy consumption also provides direct utility
whereas preventive care is assumed to solely provide health benefits (similar to curative
care, individuals demand preventive care solely for the health benefits it provides). The
distinction between healthy consumption and preventive care could in practice be diffi-
cult for some activities and could differ across individuals (e.g., some individuals exercise
because they derive utility from it, whereas others solely exercise because it is healthy).
Unhealthy consumption provides consumption benefits (utility) but increases the health
deterioration rate.
A multitude of potential pathways between health and SES and vice versa:
As Cutler et al. (2008) note, the mechanisms linking the various dimensions of SES to
health are diverse. Some cause health, some are caused by health and some are jointly
determined with health.
• Education on health: Education is found to have a causal effect on health and mor-
tality (Lleras-Muney, 2005; Oreopoulos, 2006; Smith, 2007; Silles, 2009). However,
Cutler et al. (2008) note that the mechanisms by which education affects health
are not well understood. While consumption behavior and curative and preventive
care can partly explain the effect of education on health, it remains largely un-
clear why more educated individuals behave in a healthier manner (Cutler et al.,
2008). Education increases earnings (e.g., Mincer, 1974), and in turn wealth, and
thereby enables purchases of health investment (though this may also increase the
opportunity cost of time). Education potentially increases the efficiency of curative
and preventive care usage and time inputs into the production of health investment
(Grossman 1972a; 1972b). It appears that the higher educated are better able at
managing their diseases (Goldman and Smith, 2002), and high SES individuals ap-
pear to benefit more from new knowledge and new technology (Lleras-Muney and
Lichtenberg, 2002; Glied and Lleras-Muney, 2003).
• Health on education: In our formulation we take as our starting point the age by
which the majority of individuals have completed their education and joined the
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labor force (e.g., around age 25 or so), and treat the level of education obtained by
young adults as well as their initial level of health as initial conditions. In other
words, we do not include the potential influence of childhood health on education
and treat education as being predetermined by the time individuals join the labor-
force2.
• Income or wealth on health: Smith (2007) finds no effect of financial measures of SES
(income, wealth and change in wealth) on changes in health in the US. Financial
indicators of SES do not seem to cause the onset of health problems at any age
(Smith, 2007). Cutler et al. (2008) provide an overview of empirical findings and
conclude that the evidence points to no or a very limited impact of income or wealth
on health. Yet, this view is not unequivocally accepted. Replication is still needed
and controversy remains on the extent to which these findings apply uniformly
to different population segments. For example, Lynch et al. (1997) suggest that
accumulated exposure to economic hardship causes bad health, and Herd et al.
(2008) argue that there might be causal effects of financial resources on health at
the bottom of the income or wealth distribution.
Regardless of this debate we include a number of plausible pathways by which income
and wealth could causally impact health. For example, income and wealth enable
purchases of curative and preventive care and thereby potentially allow for better
health maintenance. The impact of financial resources on health is likely to depend
on the manner of health care provision in a country. In the case of market provision,
income, wealth and employment may determine access to health care, whereas in the
case of universal health care provision these factors may be less important. On the
other hand, higher wages are associated with greater opportunity costs, which would
reduce the amount of time devoted to health maintenance. Further, more affluent
workers may choose safer working (associated with lower level of job-related health
stress) and living environments since safety is a normal good (Viscusi 1978, 1993).
• Health on income and wealth: Healthy individuals are more productive, earn higher
wages and are able to accrue greater wealth (Currie and Madrian, 1999; Contoyan-
nis and Rice, 2001).
Labor-force participation:
Studies have shown that perhaps the most dominant causal relation between health and
2Our model is therefore limited to explaining the formation of disparities in health from early adult-
hood till old age but not during childhood or the fetal period.
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dimensions of SES is the causal impact that health has on one’s ability to work and
hence produce income and wealth (e.g., Smith, 2005a; 2007; Case and Deaton, 2005; Van
Doorslaer et al., 2008). Our formulation allows for endogenous retirement but in this
paper we treat the decision as exogenous to facilitate derivations.
Mortality:
An essential component of the disparity in health by SES is the observed difference in
mortality between SES groups. Further, length of life might be an important determinant
of the age of retirement and the level of consumption and health investment over the life-
course. Ehrlich and Chuma (1990) argue that the demand for health must be derived
in conjunction with that for longevity and consumption. Our formulation allows for
endogenous length of life but in this paper we treat the decision as exogenous to facilitate
derivations.
6.2.3 Theoretical formulation
In this section we formalize the above discussion on the features of a theoretical framework
for the SES health gradient over the life cycle. The aim is to understand the SES-health
gradient as the outcome of rational constrained individual behavior.
We present the Grossman model for the demand for health (Grossman 1972a, 1972b,
2000) in continuous time (see also Wagstaff, 1986; Wolfe, 1985; Ehrlich and Chuma,
1990; Zweifel and Breyer, 1997) with seven essential additional features. First, we as-
sume decreasing-returns-to-scale (DRTS) to investments in curative care. This solves the
indeterminacy problem (“bang-bang” solution) for investment in curative care (Ehrlich
and Chuma, 1990), ensures that investment in curative (medical) care is non-negative
(for the usual assumptions of functional forms), reproduces the observed negative relation
between health and the demand for medical care, and explains differences in the level of
health as well as the rate of health deterioration between low and high SES groups (for a
detailed discussion of the properties of a Grossman model with a DRTS health production
function, see Galama, 2010). With these essential issues addressed, the model provides a
foundation for a framework of the SES health gradient.
Second, we introduce the notion that individuals may accept risky and/or unhealthy
work environments, in exchange for higher pay (Muurinen, 1982; Case and Deaton, 2005).
In other words, we will explore solutions in which the decision to rapidly “wear one’s body
down” (i.e., to perform “hard” labor or engage in work with psychosocial health risks)
is endogenous. Third, we include the possibility that consumption affects the “natural”
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health deterioration rate, and fourth that individuals engage in preventive care to slow the
natural rate of deterioration. This will allow us to include consumption behavior, which
we interpret broadly to include decisions regarding housing and neighborhood, and our
new concept of endogenous preventive care3. Fifth, we include the decision to withdraw
from the labor force (Galama et al., 2009). Sixth, we include endogenous length of life
(Ehrlich and Chuma, 1990)4. Lastly, the causal effect of education on income is included
in a straightforward manner by assuming a Mincer-type wage relation, in which earnings
are increasing in the level of education and the level of experience of workers (e.g., Mincer,
1974).
With the exception of the above seven additional features the discussion below fol-
lows the usual formulation of the Grossman model (e.g., Grossman, 1972a; 1972b; 2000;
Wagstaff, 1986; Zweifel and Breyer, 1997). Health is treated as a form of human capi-
tal (health capital) and individuals derive both consumption (health provides utility) and
production benefits (health increases earnings) from it. The demand for health investment
(broadly interpreted as curative and/or preventive care) is a derived demand: individuals
demand “good health”, not the consumption of curative or preventive care. Consumption
and health investment constitute both own-time inputs and goods or services purchased
in the market.
Individuals maximize the life-time utility function∫ T
0
U(t)e−βtdt, (6.1)
where T denotes total (endogenous) life time, β is a subjective discount factor and indi-
viduals derive utility U(t) ≡ U [Ch(t), Cu(t), H(t)] from healthy consumption Ch(t), un-
healthy consumption Cu(t) and from health H(t). Time t is measured from the time the
majority of individuals have completed their education and joined the labor force (e.g.,
around age 25 or so). Utility increases with healthy consumption ∂U(t)/∂Ch(t) ≥ 0,
unhealthy consumption ∂U(t)/∂Cu(t) ≥ 0 and with health ∂U(t)/∂H(t) ≥ 0. Further,
we assume diminishing marginal benefits: ∂2U(t)/∂2Ch(t) ≤ 0, ∂2U(t)/∂2Cu(t) ≤ 0 and
∂2U(t)/∂2H(t) ≤ 0.
The objective function (6.1) is maximized subject to the following dynamic equations,
H˙(t) = Im(t)
α − d(t)H(t), (6.2)
A˙(t) = δA(t) + Y (t)− pXh(t)Xh(t)− pXu(t)Xu(t)− pm(t)mm(t)− pp(t)mp(t),(6.3)
3It is useful to interpret the endogenous variables as bundles of goods and services (e.g., various
consumption goods/services) or composite environmental factors (e.g., various physical and psychosocial
health stresses).
4However, to facilitate derivations we treat mortality and retirement as exogenous in this work.
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the total time budget Ω,
Ω = τw(t) + τIm(t) + τIp(t) + τCh(t) + τCu(t) + s[H(t)], (6.4)
and we have initial and end conditions: H(0), H(T ), A(0) and A(T ) are given5.
H˙(t) and A˙(t) in equations (6.2) and (6.3) denote time derivatives of health H(t)
and assets A(t). Health (equation 6.2) can be improved through investment in curative
(medical) care Im(t) and deteriorates at the “natural” health deterioration rate d(t) ≡
d[t, Ch(t), Cu(t), z(t), Ip(t); ξ(t)]. The health production function Im(t)
α is assumed to
exhibit decreasing-returns-to-scale (0 < α < 1; see Ehrlich and Chuma, 1990). The “nat-
ural” deterioration rate depends endogenously on healthy consumption Ch(t), unhealthy
consumption Cu(t), job-related health stress z(t), and investment in preventive care Ip(t)
and on a vector of exogenous variables ξ(t). Consumption can be healthy (∂d(t)/∂Ch(t) ≤
0; e.g., healthy foods, healthy neighborhood) or unhealthy (∂d(t)/∂Cu(t) > 0; e.g., smok-
ing). Preventive care is modelled analogous to curative care as an activity that provides
no utility (∂U(t)/∂Ip(t) = 0) but is demanded for its health benefits (∂d(t)/∂Ip(t) < 0).
Greater job-related health stress z(t) accelerates the “aging” process (∂d(t)/∂z(t) > 0).
Assets A(t) (equation 6.3) provide a return δ (the interest rate), increase with income
Y (t) and decrease with purchases in the market of healthy consumption goods Xh(t),
unhealthy consumption goods Xu(t), curative care mm(t) and preventive care mp(t) at
prices pXh(t), pXu(t), pm(t) and pp(t), respectively. Income Y (t) ≡ Y [H(t), z(t);E, x(t)] is
assumed to be an increasing function of health H(t) (∂Y (t)/∂H(t) > 0) and an increasing
function in job-related health stress z(t) (∂Y (t)/∂z(t) > 0; Case and Deaton, 2005). Fur-
ther, income depends exogenously on the consumer’s stock of knowledge (an individual’s
human capital exclusive of health capital), usually assumed to be a function of years of
schooling E and years of working experience x(t) (e.g., Mincer, 1974).
Goods and services mm(t) and mp(t) as well as own time inputs τIm(t) and τIp(t)
are used in the production of curative care Im(t) and preventive care Ip(t), respectively.
Similarly, goods Xh(t) and Xu(t) purchased in the market and own time inputs τCh(t)
and τCu(t) are used in the production of healthy and unhealthy consumption, Ch(t) and
Cu(t), respectively. The efficiencies of production are assumed to be a function of the
consumer’s stock of knowledge E as it is generally believed that the more educated are
5In Grossman’s original formulation (Grossman 1972a, 1972b) length of life T is determined by a
minimum health level Hmin. If health falls below this level H(t) ≤ Hmin an individual dies, hence
H(T ) ≡ Hmin.
6.2 Components of a model capturing the SES-health gradient 135
more efficient at investing in health (see, e.g., Grossman, 2000),
Im(t) ≡ Im[mm(t), τIm(t);E], (6.5)
Ip(t) ≡ Ip[mp(t), τIp(t);E], (6.6)
Ch(t) ≡ Ch[Xh(t), τCh(t);E], (6.7)
Cu(t) ≡ Cu[Xu(t), τCu(t);E]. (6.8)
Further, we implicitly assume that curative care Im(t), preventive care Ip(t) and job-
related health stress z(t) are non-negative. We do so by assuming DRTS of the health
production function in investment in curative care (see equation 6.2) and diminishing
marginal benefits for job-related health stress and for investment in preventive care. The
notion here is that one cannot “sell” one’s health through negative curative care (see
Galama and Kapteyn, 2009) or negative preventive care nor can one “buy” health through
negative job-related health stress6.
The total time available in any period Ω is the sum of all possible uses τw(t) (work),
τIm(t) (curative care), τIp(t) (preventive care), τCh(t) (healthy consumption), τCu(t) (un-
healthy consumption) and s[H(t)] (sick time). The resulting time budget constraint is
shown in equation (6.4).
We follow Grossman (1972a, 1972b, 2000) and assume that income Y (t) is a function
of the wage rate w(t) times the amount of time spent working τw(t),
Y (t) = w(t)
{
Ω− τIm(t)− τIp(t)− τCh(t)− τCu(t)− s[H(t)]
}
. (6.9)
The wage rate w(t) ≡ w[t, z(t);E, x(t)] is a function of job-related health stress z(t)
w(t) = w∗(t)[1 + z(t)]γw , (6.10)
where γw ≥ 0 and w∗(t) ≡ w∗[E, x(t)] represents the “effortless” wage rate, i.e., the wage
rate associated with the least job-related health stress z(t) = 07. The effortless wage rate
6In earlier versions of the model we explicitly assumed non negativity by introducing multipliers qIm(t),
qIp(t) and qz(t) associated with the condition that, respectively, curative care is non negative, Im(t) ≥ 0,
preventive care is non negative, Ip(t) ≥ 0, and job-related health stress is non negative, z(t) ≥ 0. This is
not necessary for DRTS technologies, for diminishing marginal benefits and choice of suitable functional
forms which ensure that optimal solutions for curative care Im(t), preventive care Ip(t) and job-related
health stress z(t) are non negative.
7Our model concerns individuals who participate in the labor force. Given that our frame of reference
is the labor force we associate z(t) = 0 with the least amount of job-related health stress possible
in employment, and since there is no obvious scale to job-related health stress we employ the simple
relationship shown in equation (6.10).
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w∗(t) is a function of the consumer’s education E and experience x(t) (e.g., Mincer, 1974),
w∗(t) = wEeρEE+βxx(t)−βx2x(t)
2
, (6.11)
where education E is expressed in years of schooling, x(t) is years of working experience,
and ρE, βx and βx2 are constants, assumed to be positive.
Thus, we have the following optimal control problem: the objective function (6.1) is
maximized with respect to the control functions Xh(t), τCh(t), Xu(t), τCu(t), mm(t), τIm(t),
mp(t), τIp(t) and z(t) and subject to the constraints (6.2, 6.3 and 6.4). The Hamiltonian
(see, e.g., Seierstad and Sydsaeter, 1977; 1987) of this problem is:
= = U(t)e−βt + qH(t)H˙(t) + qA(t)A˙(t), (6.12)
where qH(t) is the adjoint variable associated with the differential equation (6.2) for health
H(t) and qA(t) is the adjoint variable associated with the differential equation (6.3) for
assets A(t).
The conditions for the optimal retirement age R and the optimal length of life T are
=(R) = 0, (6.13)
=(T ) = 0. (6.14)
We have thus arrived at a life cycle model that incorporates labor force participa-
tion, healthy and unhealthy consumption (including housing, neighborhood, and social
environment), health, curative (medical) and preventive care, job-related physical and
psychosocial health stresses, wealth and mortality (all as endogenous variables).
6.3 Solutions
In this section we solve the optimal control problem conditional on retirement age R
and length of life T (i.e., for fixed exogenous R and T ). We first present the first-order
conditions for optimization (section 6.3.1). Next we discuss the characteristics of the
solutions (section 6.3.2) and the predictions for the relations between health and SES
(section 6.3.3).
6.3.1 First-order conditions
The first-order condition for maximization of (6.1) with respect to health is
∂U(t)
∂H(t)
= qA(0) [σH(t)− ϕH(t)] e(β−δ)t, (6.15)
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where the Lagrange multiplier qA(0) is the shadow price of life-time wealth (see, e.g, Case
and Deaton, 2005), σH(t) ≡ σH [t, Im(t), Ch(t), Cu(t), z(t), Ip(t);E, x(t), ξ(t)] is the user
cost of health capital at the margin
σH(t) ≡ piIm(t) [d(t) + δ − piIm(t)] , (6.16)
piIm(t) ≡ piIm [t, Im(t), z(t);E, x(t)] is the marginal cost of curative care Im(t)
piIm(t) ≡
pm(t)Im(t)
1−α
α[∂Im(t)/∂mm(t)]
=
w(t)Im(t)
1−α
α[∂Im(t)/∂τIm(t)]
, (6.17)
and ϕH(t) ≡ ϕH [t,H(t), z(t);E, x(t)] is the marginal production benefit of health
ϕH(t) ≡ ∂Y (t)
∂H(t)
. (6.18)
The symbol ∼ is used to denote the relative time derivative of a function: f˜(t) ≡
∂f(t)
∂t
f(t)−1. Note that the marginal cost of investment in curative care piIm(t) (equa-
tion 6.17) increases with the level of investment in curative care Im(t) (contrast this with
equation 10 in Grossman, 2000) due to decreasing-returns-to-scale of the health produc-
tion function Im(t)
α (0 < α < 1; see equation 6.2).
The first-order condition for maximization of (6.1) with respect to healthy consumption
is
∂U(t)
∂Ch(t)
= qA(0) [piCh(t)− ϕdCh(t)] e(β−δ)t, (6.19)
where piCh(t) ≡ piCh [t, Ch(t), z(t);E, x(t)] is the marginal cost of healthy consumption
Ch(t)
piCh(t) ≡
pXh(t)
∂Ch(t)/∂Xh(t)
=
w(t)
∂Ch(t)/∂τCh(t)
, (6.20)
and ϕdCh(t) ≡ ϕdCh [t,H(t), Im(t), Ch(t), Cu(t), z(t), Ip(t);E, x(t), ξ(t)] is the additional
health benefit associated with healthy consumption
ϕdCh(t) ≡ −piIm(t)
∂d(t)
∂Ch(t)
H(t). (6.21)
Similarly, the first-order condition for maximization of (6.1) with respect to unhealthy
consumption is
∂U(t)
∂Cu(t)
= qA(0) [piCu(t) + pidCu(t)] e
(β−δ)t, (6.22)
where piCu(t) ≡ piCu [t, Cu(t), z(t);E, x(t)] is the marginal cost of unhealthy consumption
Cu(t)
piCu(t) ≡
pXu(t)
∂Cu(t)/∂Xu(t)
=
w(t)
∂Cu(t)/∂τCu(t)
, (6.23)
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and pidCu(t) ≡ pidCu [t,H(t), Im(t), Ch(t), Cu(t), z(t), Ip(t);E, x(t), ξ(t)] is the additional
health cost associated with unhealthy consumption
pidCu(t) ≡ piIm(t)
∂d(t)
∂Cu(t)
H(t). (6.24)
The first-order condition for maximization of (6.1) with respect to job-related health
stress is
pidz(t) = ϕz(t), (6.25)
where pidz(t) ≡ pidz[t,H(t), Im(t), Ch(t), Cu(t), z(t), Ip(t);E, x(t), ξ(t)] is the marginal cost
of job-related health stress
pidz(t) ≡ piIm(t)
∂d(t)
∂z(t)
H(t), (6.26)
and ϕz(t) ≡ ϕz[t,H(t), z(t);E, x(t)] is the marginal production benefit of job-related
health stress
ϕz(t) ≡ ∂Y (t)
∂z(t)
. (6.27)
Lastly, the first-order condition for maximization of (6.1) with respect to preventive
care is
piIp(t) = ϕdp(t), (6.28)
where piIp(t) ≡ piIp [t, z(t), Ip(t);E, x(t)] is the marginal cost of preventive care Ip(t)
piIp(t) ≡
pp(t)
∂Ip(t)/∂mp(t)
=
w(t)
∂Ip(t)/∂τIp(t)
, (6.29)
and ϕdp(t) ≡ ϕdp[t,H(t), Im(t), Ch(t), Cu(t), z(t), Ip(t);E, x(t), ξ(t)] is the marginal benefit
of preventive care
ϕdp(t) ≡ −piIm(t)
∂d(t)
∂Ip(t)
H(t). (6.30)
The five first-order equations (6.15, 6.19, 6.22, 6.25 and 6.28) define the dynamics of
the problem we are interested in. The “traditional” Grossman model is a special case of
our model and is defined by the first-order equations (6.15) and (6.19) for an exogenous
“natural” deterioration rate d(t) (consumption does not improve or worsen the health
deterioration rate). The first-order conditions (6.19), (6.22) and (6.25) are similar (but
not identical) to those presented by Case and Deaton (2005).
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6.3.2 Characteristics of the solutions
In this section we provide a qualitative and intuitive description of the nature of the
solutions for health H(t), investment in curative care Im(t), investment in preventive care
Ip(t), healthy consumption Ch(t) and unhealthy consumption Cu(t) and job-related health
stress z(t).
In the remainder, we assume8:
• diminishing marginal utilities of healthy Ch(t) and unhealthy consumption Cu(t)
and of health H(t),
• diminishing marginal benefits of health ϕH(t), of job-related health stress ϕz(t) and
of investment in preventive care ϕdp(t),
• diminishing returns to scale (DRTS) in the health production function Im(t)α, and
• constant (CRTS) or diminishing (DRTS) returns to scale in the inputs (goods/services
purchased in the market and own-time) for investment in curative care Im(t), pre-
ventive care Ip(t), healthy consumption Ch(t) and unhealthy consumption Cu(t).
The assumption of DRTS of the health production function (equation 6.2) in invest-
ment in curative care Im(t) is critical and a distinguishing feature of this work with respect
to prior formulations based on the Grossman model (with the exception of the work by
Ehrlich and Chuma, 1990; see also Dustmann and Windmeijer, 2000, and Liljas, 2000).
As Ehrlich and Chuma (1990) have shown, this assumption firstly addresses the inde-
terminacy problem (“bang-bang” solution) for investment in curative care. Second, as
discussed in Galama (2010), it reproduces the observed negative relation between health
and investment in curative care (see the critique by Zweifel and Breyer, 1997), and finally
it allows for differences in the health deterioration rate (not just the level) between SES
groups (see the critique by Case and Deaton, 2005). This latter point is crucial: unlike
alternative life-cycle models of health, medical care, and SES, our formulation can explain
the formation of disparities in health by SES with age.
8Optimal solutions for the state functions A(t), H(t) and the control functions Xh(t), τCh(t), Xu(t),
τCu(t), mm(t), τIm(t), mp(t), τIp(t) and z(t) exist if the Hamiltonian = (see equations 6.2, 6.3 and 6.12) is
concave in each of the state and control functions and differentiable w.r.t. the state and control functions
(see, e.g., Seierstad and Sydsaeter, 1977; 1987). These conditions are met for the usual assumptions of
differentiability of functions and for the usual assumptions of constant or diminishing returns to scale.
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To aid interpretation of the first-order conditions we provide specific functional forms
in the Appendix for the utility function U(t), and the relation between income Y (t)
on the one hand and health, years of schooling and years of working experience on the
other. Further, we make the dependence of the “natural” deterioration rate d(t) on job-
related health stress, healthy and unhealthy consumption, and preventive care explicit.
Finally, we specify the relations between the outputs consumption Ch(t), Cu(t), and health
investments Im(t) and Ip(t) and the inputs of own-time and goods/services purchased in
the market.
The solutions for health and curative care
The solutions for health and for investment in curative care are both determined by the
first-order condition (6.15) which equates the consumption benefit of health ∂U(t)/∂H(t)
with the cost of maintaining the health stock qA(0)[σH(t)− ϕH(t)]e(β−δ)t. Because of the
diminishing marginal utility of health, the optimal level of the health stock is high for
wealthy individuals9, low user cost of health capital σH(t) and a high production benefit
of health ϕH(t).
Figure 6.1: Marginal benefit versus marginal cost of health
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Notes: In labelling the curves we have omitted the term e(β−δ)t.
Consider the relation between health H(t) and investment in curative care Im(t) for
an individual. Figure 6.1 shows a simple stylized graph of the marginal benefit and
marginal cost of health as a function of health H(t) (left-hand side) and as a function of
investment in curative care Im(t) (right-hand side). Consider the left-hand figure first.
The marginal consumption benefit of health (labelled ∂Ua/∂H) is downward sloping in
9qA(0) is decreasing in life-time wealth. See, e.g. Wagstaff (1986).
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health to represent the diminishing marginal utility of greater health. The user cost of
health capital σH(t) (see equation 6.16) is assumed to be independent of the level of health
H(t) and the production benefit of health ϕH(t) (see equation 6.18) is assumed to exhibit
diminishing returns in health. The resulting curve (labelled qA(0)(σ
a
H − ϕaH)) is upward
sloping in health. The level of health for which the two curves intersect determines the
health stock Ha.
Now consider the right-hand side of Figure 6.1. The first-order condition for health
(equation 6.15) also determines the level of investment in curative care Iam. The optimal
level of investment in curative care Im(t) is higher for greater life-time wealth (lower
qA(0)), higher marginal consumption benefit of health ∂U(t)/∂H(t), and higher marginal
production benefit of health ϕH(t). The marginal cost of curative care piIm(t) and hence
the user cost of health capital σH(t) is increasing in the level of curative care (see equations
6.16, 6.17 and 6.48)10. The marginal production benefit of health ϕH(t) (see equations
6.9, 6.18 and 6.45) is independent of the level of investment in curative care Im(t). The
resulting curve is upward sloping (labelled qA(0)(σH−ϕH)). Further, the marginal utility
of health ∂U(t)/∂H(t) is independent of the level of investment in curative care Im(t):
this is shown as the horizontal line (labelled ∂Ua/∂H). The intersection of the two curves
determines the optimal level of investment in curative care Iam.
Now consider an optimal solution with a lower level of investment in curative care
(Ibm < I
a
m) while holding all exogenous variables and functions constant. Since the first-
order condition for investment in curative care (equation 6.15) also determines the level of
health, we expect an associated change in the level of the health stock. As discussed before,
the marginal cost of curative care piIm(t) is increasing in the level of curative investment
Im(t). Thus a lower level of investment in curative care I
b
m < I
a
m is, ceteris paribus,
associated with a lower user cost of health capital at the margin σH(t) = piIm(t)[d(t) +
δ − piIm(t)]. This is shown as a shift downward in the curve of the net marginal cost of
health capital (labelled qA(0)[σ
b
H −ϕbH ])11 and the stock of health is higher12. However, a
10As noted before, we assume DRTS in curative care of the health production function (equation 6.2;
0 < α < 1) and CRTS or DRTS in curative care for the production of investment in curative care
(equation 6.47; 0 < αIm + βIm ≤ 1).
11Note that the marginal benefit of health ϕH(t) is not a function of the level of investment in curative
care Im(t) (see equation 6.45). It is a function of the health stock H(t) and that relation is unchanged
and shown in Figure 6.1.
12Implicitly this amounts to assuming that the indirect effect of a change in the level of investment in
preventive care Im(t) on health H(t), through changes in the resulting optimal levels of investment in
preventive care Ip(t), healthy consumption Ch(t), unhealthy consumption Cu(t) and job-related health
stress z(t), is small and dominated by the direct effect of change in investment in preventive care Im(t)
on health H(t), through the first-order condition for health and investment in curative care (equation
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higher stock of health potentially shifts the marginal utility of health ∂U(t)/∂H(t) as well
(curve labelled ∂U b/∂H). It seems plausible that such a shift would be neutral (no shift)
or in the upward direction as there are no a priori reasons to expect that improved health
would diminish the marginal utility of consumption. The level of health Hb associated
with lower investment in curative care (Ibm < I
a
m) is higher (H
b > Ha). In other words,
we find that healthy individuals invest less in curative care. This finding is supported
by casual observation (the healthy do not go to the doctor) and by numerous empirical
studies that find a strong negative correlation between measures of health and measures
of curative (medical) care usage (see Galama and Kapteyn, 2009, for an overview of the
empirical literature).
In contrast, for a CRTS health production function as employed in the Grossman liter-
ature (except Ehrlich and Chuma, 1990; Dustmann and Windmeijer, 2000) the marginal
cost of investment in curative care piIm(t) is independent of the level of investment (see
equation 6.48 for α = 1 and αIm + βIm = 1). This leads to the problematic (i.e., uncon-
firmed) prediction that healthy individuals invest more (not less) in curative care (see,
e.g., Zweifel and Breyer, 1997; Wagstaff 1986). It also produces an indeterminacy problem
(“bang-bang” solution; e.g., Ehrlich and Chuma, 1990) as in this case both the marginal
benefit (labelled ∂Ua/∂H) and the marginal net cost (labelled qA(0)(σH −ϕH)) are inde-
pendent of the level of investment in curative care Im(t). Thus, both would be horizontal
lines in the right-hand side of Figure 6.1 and without intersecting there would not be an
optimal solution for investment in curative care. Only in the peculiar case where both
lines exactly overlap a solution exists, allowing any (undetermined) level of investment in
curative care. Further, in this case the marginal cost of curative care piIm(t) is exogenously
determined by the price of medical care pm(t), the wage rate w(t) and the efficiency of
curative care µIm(t) (see equation 6.48). Hence there is often a mismatch between the
actual and “desired” health stock. As a result one has to assume that individuals can
instantaneously adjust their health to a “desired” level (Grossman, 2000). However, in a
DRTS formulation the marginal cost of curative care piIm(t) is endogenous: for any level
6.15). This would be true for small transitory endogenous variation in the “natural” deterioration rate
d(t) through choices made in working environment and in life style (operating through Ch(t), Cu(t), z(t)
and Ip(t)). In other words, if ∂d(t)/∂Ch(t), ∂d(t)/∂Cu(t), ∂d(t)/∂z(t) and ∂d(t)/∂Ip(t) are small. It
also requires that changes in the optimal level of job-related health stress z(t) affect the marginal cost of
curative care piIm(t) (e.g., equation 6.48) and the marginal benefit of health ϕH(t) (e.g., equation 6.45)
modestly (such that the downward shift is not undone). While transitory changes are assumed to be
small, gradually, as time passes, lower levels of healthy consumption, curative and preventive care and
higher levels of unhealthy consumption and job-related health stress lead to cumulative disadvantage over
the life cycle.
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of health H(t) you can find a corresponding level of investment in curative care Im(t) that
satisfies the first order condition for health (equation 6.15).
A more rigorous discussion of our finding that investment in curative care is negatively
correlated with health can be found in Galama (2010) for the standard Grossman model
with a DRTS health production function. The model presented here differs from that
in Galama (2010) due to the introduction of life-style and working environment factors,
which complicates a qualitative discussion.
Stylized representations of the first-order conditions
Figure 6.2 provides a stylized representation of the first-order conditions for healthy con-
sumption Ch(t) (equation 6.19), unhealthy consumption Cu(t) (equation 6.22), job-related
health stress z(t) (equation 6.25) and investment in preventive care Ip(t) (equation 6.28).
Healthy and unhealthy consumption
The top-left corner of Figure 6.2 shows the first-order condition for healthy consumption
Ch(t) (equation 6.19) which equates the marginal utility of healthy consumption (solid
line labelled ∂U/∂Ch) to the net marginal cost of healthy consumption (solid line labelled
qaA(0)(pi
a
Ch
− ϕadCh))13. The marginal utility of healthy consumption is downward sloping
to represent the diminishing marginal utility of greater consumption. The net marginal
cost of healthy consumption increases with the marginal cost of healthy consumption
piCh(t) and decreases with the additional health benefit ϕdCh(t). A priori it is not clear
whether the relationship between the inputs (good/services and own time) and healthy
consumption Ch(t) exhibits decreasing- or increasing-returns-to-scale (see equation 6.55
for an example functional form). For simplicity assume constant returns to scale so that
the marginal cost of healthy consumption piCh(t) is independent of the level of consumption
(dotted horizontal line labelled qaA(0)pi
a
Ch
). Diminishing marginal additional health benefit
ϕdCh(t) is represented by a downward sloping curve (dotted line labelled q
a
A(0)ϕ
a
dCh
).
The net marginal cost of healthy consumption (solid line labelled qaA(0)(pi
a
Ch
− ϕadCh))
is the difference between the two dotted curves. The point where the marginal utility
of healthy consumption ∂U/∂Ch crosses the net marginal cost of healthy consumption
qaA(0)(pi
a
Ch
−ϕadCh) defines the optimal solution for healthy consumption Cah (vertical dashed
line).
The top-right corner of Figure 6.2 shows the first-order condition for unhealthy con-
sumption Cu(t) (equation 6.22). The first-order condition is similar to the condition for
13In labelling the curves we have omitted the term e(β−δ)t.
Figure 6.2: Marginal benefits versus marginal costs of life-style variables
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healthy consumption described in the preceding paragraph. The difference lies in the
additional cost of unhealthy consumption (dotted line labelled qaA(0)pi
a
dCu
) which has to
be added rather than subtracted from the marginal cost of unhealthy consumption (dot-
ted line labelled qaA(0)pi
a
Cu
) to obtain the net marginal cost of unhealthy consumption
(solid line labelled qaA(0)(pi
a
Cu
+ piadCu)). The figure shows CRTS in the additional cost
of unhealthy consumption pidCu(t), since it is unclear a priori whether the effect of un-
healthy consumption on the deterioration rate exhibits in- or decreasing returns to scale.
The point where the marginal utility of unhealthy consumption ∂U/∂Cu crosses the net
marginal cost of unhealthy consumption qaA(0)(pi
a
Cu
+ piadCu) defines the optimal solution
for unhealthy consumption Cau (vertical dashed line).
Assuming a simple functional relationship between the inputs (good/services and own
time) and healthy consumption Ch(t) one finds that the marginal cost of healthy con-
sumption piCh(t) increases with the price of consumption goods pXh(t) and the wage rate
w(t) (see equation 6.55 in the Appendix). Equation (6.56) presents a similar relationship
for the marginal cost of unhealthy consumption piCu(t). The marginal costs of consump-
tion piCh(t) and piCu(t) thus represent the direct monetary costs of consumption in terms
of the price of goods and the opportunity cost of time (the wage rate). The additional
health benefit of healthy consumption ϕdCh(t) and the additional cost of unhealthy con-
sumption pidCu(t), on the other hand, represent the indirect savings (healthy consump-
tion) and losses (unhealthy consumption) in investment in curative care: they are the
product of the marginal cost of investment in curative care piIm(t) and the “amount” of
health saved [∂d(t)/∂Ch(t)]H(t) (healthy consumption; see equation 6.21) or health lost
[∂d(t)/∂Cu(t)]H(t) (unhealthy consumption; see equation 6.24).
Further, as one can see from Figure 6.2, the optimal level of healthy consumption Cah is
higher due to the additional benefit of healthy consumption in comparison to a situation
in which this benefit were absent14. The opposite is true for the optimal level of unhealthy
consumption Cau which is lower due to the additional cost of unhealthy consumption.
Job-related health stress
The bottom-left corner of Figure 6.2 shows the first-order condition for job-related health
stress z(t) (equation 6.25) which equates the marginal benefit to the marginal cost of job-
related health stress. The marginal benefit of job-related health stress (equation 6.27) is
downward sloping (solid line labelled ϕz) to represent diminishing marginal benefit. The
marginal cost of job-related health stress (equation 6.26; solid line labelled piadz) is shown
14The solid line labelled qaA(0)(pi
a
Ch
− ϕadCh) is shifted downwards compared to the dotted line labelled
qaA(0)pi
a
Ch
.
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with constant returns to scale, since it is unclear a priori whether it would exhibit in-
or decreasing returns to scale15. The optimal solution for job-related health stress za is
indicated by the vertical dashed line.
Investment in preventive care
The bottom-right corner of Figure 6.2 represents the first-order condition for investment
in preventive care Ip(t) (equation 6.28). Analogous to the first-order condition for job-
related health stress the marginal benefit of investment in preventive care (equation 6.30)
is downward sloping (solid line labelled ϕaIp) to represent diminishing marginal benefit and
the marginal cost (equation 6.29; solid line labelled piIp) is shown with constant returns
to scale, since it is unclear a priori whether it would exhibit in- or decreasing returns
to scale16. The optimal solution for investment in preventive care Iap is indicated by the
vertical dashed line.
6.3.3 Health and socioeconomic status
Individuals have partial control over their health through choices made in investment in
curative care Im(t), life style (operating through healthy consumption Ch(t), unhealthy
consumption Cu(t) and investment in preventive care Ip(t)) and in working environment
(operating through job-related health stress z(t)). In this section we explore the (cumula-
tive) effect on health over the life cycle through choices made in curative care, in life style
and in working environment. Our emphasis will be on exploring differences in constraints
(e.g., differences in wealth, skills, experience, education, prices and initial health) rather
than differences in preferences (e.g., differences in time preferences and in the utility of
health and consumption). Naturally differences in the level of patience and in preferences
for health and consumption exist across individuals. Research on the possible role of
differences in preferences in explaining the SES health gradient is important17. In the
15Note that the marginal cost of job-related health stress is a function of job-related health stress z(t)
through the marginal cost of investment in curative care piIm(t) (see equation 6.47) which is a function of
the wage rate w(t) (see equation 6.10) and through the dependence of the deterioration rate on job-related
health stress (e.g., equation 6.46).
16Note that whereas the marginal cost of job-related health stress (equation 6.26) is a function of the
marginal cost of investment in curative care piIm(t) and the “natural” deterioration rate d(t), in the case
of investment in preventive care it is the marginal benefit (not the cost; see equation 6.30) that shows a
comparable dependence on piIm(t) and d(t).
17For example, Fuchs (1982, 1986) has argued that the strong correlation between education and
health may be due to differences in the time preferences of individuals, which affects investments in both
education and health and helps to explain variations in cigarette smoking, diet, and exercise. Other third
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following discussion, however, we focus on explaining behavior as the result of rational
decisions based on differences in the constraints faced by individuals.
In the following discussion we define a high SES individual as (i) wealthy (life-time
wealth) and (ii) wise (highly educated, experienced, skilled). Common measures for SES
employed in empirical research are wealth, income and education. In the following subsec-
tions we discuss the relations between wealth and health, income and health and education
and health. We consider two individuals a and b who differ in one particular SES indi-
cator, but are otherwise identical. Both individuals have the same initial level of health
H(t), are of the same age t, face the same environments (e.g., same interest rate δ),
and have the same preferences (i.e., same utility function U [Ch(t), Cu(t), H(t)] and same
time preference β). We are interested in the predictions of our model for the subsequent
evolution of health for these two individuals, given a ceteris paribus change in one SES
indicator. We also briefly discuss the formation of the SES health gradient and the role
of institutions.
Wealth and health: pure “asset” effect
Consider two individuals a and b who differ in life-time wealth qA(0). Individual b has
greater life-time wealth, i.e., qaA(0) > q
b
A(0) but is otherwise identical. Because of the sim-
ilarities between the two individuals the difference in life-time wealth is to be interpreted
as due to differences in endowed physical capital (e.g., assets A(0)).
Because both individuals have the same health stock H(t) it follows that qaA(0)[σ
a
H(t)−
ϕaH(t)] = q
b
A(0)[σ
b
H(t)−ϕbH(t)] (equation 6.15) and hence σaH(t)−ϕaH(t) < σbH(t)−ϕbH(t).
Assume that both individuals have the same income function Y [H(t)], i.e., approximately
ϕaH(t) ∼ ϕbH(t) and hence σaH(t) < σbH(t)18. Assuming further that the secondary effect of
changes in the control functions Ch(t), Cu(t), z(t) and Ip(t) on the “natural” deterioration
rate is small, we find piaIm(t) < pi
b
Im
(t) (see equation 6.16).
factors of interest that may produce a spurious correlation between education and health are general
ability and intelligence (see e.g. Deary, 2008). Our model provides a framework for analyzing the role of
such differences in individual preferences.
18This amounts to assuming that, as a first approximation, the optimal level of job-related health stress
z(t) is not much different as a result of the difference in life-time wealth (see equation 6.45 and note that
both individuals have the same level of initial health H(t) and are assumed to be identical in their level
of education E and experience x(t)).
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Investment in curative care:
As discussed earlier, piaIm(t) < pi
b
Im
(t) implies Iam(t) < I
b
m(t) (see equation 6.48)
19. Thus
our model predicts that wealthy individuals invest more in curative care Im(t). As a
result, even without the inclusion of additional potential mechanisms responsible for the
SES health gradient beside utilization of curative care, the model predicts differences in
the rate of “effective” health deterioration between high and low SES individuals due to
different levels of investment in curative care Im(t). In other words, a DRTS health pro-
duction function as advocated here can address the criticism levelled by Case and Deaton
(2005).
Healthy and unhealthy consumption:
The top-left figure of Figure 6.2 shows the shift in the level of healthy consumption (Cbh;
vertical dashed line). As a result of greater life-time wealth (qbA(0) < q
a
A(0)) the product of
the shadow price of life-time wealth qbA(0) and the marginal cost of healthy consumption
pibCh shifts downward. The additional benefit of healthy consumption ϕdCh(t) (equation
6.21) is proportional to the product of the marginal cost of investment in curative care and
the health stock piIm(t)H(t). Since individual a and b are assumed to be equally healthy
we find that wealthy individuals (pibIm(t) > pi
a
Im
(t); see prior discussion) have greater ad-
ditional benefit from healthy consumption ϕdCh(t). The net result of greater additional
benefit from healthy consumption qbA(0)ϕ
b
dCh
remains however relatively unchanged be-
cause of the competing effect of greater life-time wealth (lower qbA(0) < q
a
A(0))
20. On the
one hand the marginal cost of investment in curative care piIm(t) is greater for wealthier
individuals. This increases the benefit of healthy consumption ϕdCh(t). On the other
hand greater wealth enables purchases of curative care to compensate for health losses,
approximately balancing the effect. The resulting net marginal cost of healthy consump-
tion (solid line labelled qbA(0)(pi
b
Ch
− ϕbdCh)) is shown as being lower in level (the “wealth
shift” through qA(0)) but with the same slope (q
b
A(0)ϕ
b
dCh
∼ qaA(0)ϕadCh). The optimal
solution for healthy consumption of a wealthier individual Cbh (vertical dashed line) is
higher than that of a poorer individual (Cbh > C
a
h). For simplicity, the marginal utility of
19Again, we assume that, as a first approximation, the optimal level of job-related health stress z(t) is
not much different as a result of the difference in life-time wealth so that the wages of individual a and b
are comparable (see, e.g., equation 6.10).
20Since qaA(0)[σ
a
H(t) − ϕaH(t)] = qbA(0)[σbH(t) − ϕbH(t)], and assuming as before that ϕbH(t) ∼ ϕaH(t)
we have qbA(0)σ
b
H(t) ∼ qaA(0)σaH(t) and hence qaA(0)piaIm ∼ qbA(0)pibIm . As a result qbA(0)ϕbdCh(t) =
qbA(0)pi
b
Im
(t)∂d(t)/∂Cbh(t)H(t) ∼ qaA(0)piaIm(t)∂d(t)/∂Cbh(t)H(t) ∼ qaA(0)ϕadCh(t).
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healthy consumption ∂U/∂Ch is shown as unchanged
21. Thus it is plausible that wealthy
individuals consume more healthy consumption than the less wealthy (Cbh > C
a
h).
The top-right figure of Figure 6.2 shows the shift in the level of unhealthy consump-
tion (Cbu; vertical dashed line). As with healthy consumption, greater life-time wealth
(qbA(0) < q
a
A(0)) shifts the product of the shadow price of life-time wealth q
b
A(0) and the
marginal cost of unhealthy consumption pibCu downward. Analogous to healthy consump-
tion, the net result of the additional cost of unhealthy consumption is small. On the
one hand, higher demand for curative care increases the additional cost of unhealthy
consumption (pibIm(t) > pi
a
Im
(t) and hence pibdCu(t) > pi
a
dCu
(t)). On the other hand greater
wealth enables purchases of curative care to compensate for health losses. The marginal
utility of unhealthy consumption ∂U/∂Cu is shown as unchanged because a priori it is
unclear whether the marginal utility of unhealthy consumption increases or decreases as
a result of changes in the level of healthy consumption. The resulting optimal level of
unhealthy consumption is higher Cbu > C
a
u. These patterns suggest that wealthy individu-
als consume more unhealthy goods/services than less wealthy individuals (Cbu > C
a
u) but
because wealthy individuals have greater additional benefit from healthy consumption
ϕdCh(t) and greater additional cost of unhealthy consumption pidCu(t), wealthy individu-
als consume less unhealthy consumption as a share of their total consumption than less
wealthy individuals (Cbu/(C
b
h + C
b
u) < C
a
u/(C
a
h + C
a
u).
However, it is plausible that healthy and unhealthy consumption are substitutes.
Greater wealth (qbA(0) < q
a
A(0)) could then lead to a solution in which the level of healthy
consumption increases (Cbh(t) > C
a
h(t)) while the level of unhealthy consumption decreases
(Cbu(t) < C
a
u(t)). Smoking might be an example of unhealthy consumption that fits this
pattern, if e.g. smoking reduces the marginal utility of exercise. High SES individuals
smoke substantially less than low SES individuals.
Job-related health stress and investment in preventive care:
The first-order conditions for job-related health stress z(t) and for investment in preventive
care show no direct dependence on life-time wealth (no dependence on qA(0)). This is
because the wealth effect is the same for the marginal cost as it is for the marginal benefit
for both job-related health stress and for investment in preventive care (in the first-order
21This assumption would be correct if the utility function were additive, consisting of separate functions
for healthy and for unhealthy consumption, e.g. U(t) = fh[Ch(t), H(t)] + fu[Cu(t), H(t)]. However, for
other forms of the utility function changes in the level of healthy consumption Ch(t) and unhealthy
consumption Cu(t) potentially shift the marginal utility of healthy consumption upward or downward,
depending on whether healthy and unhealthy consumption are substitutes or complements and depending
on whether the optimal solution for unhealthy consumption is higher or lower for the wealthier individual.
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conditions for job-related health stress and for investment in preventive care [see the
Appendix] both the marginal cost and the marginal benefit are multiplied by qA(0)).
Intuitively, higher wealth decreases the marginal benefit of job-related health stress since
there is no strong need to increase wages. Yet, at the same time greater wealth decreases
the marginal cost of job-related health stress, since there are more financial resources
available to invest in curative care to compensate for any detrimental impact on health.
These effects cancel out. For the cost and benefit of preventive care a similar story can
be told.
However, there is an indirect effect of greater life-time wealth. Both the marginal
cost of job-related health stress pidz(t) (equation 6.26) and the marginal benefit of pre-
ventive care ϕdp(t) (equation 6.30) are proportional to the product of the marginal cost
of investment in curative care and health piIm(t)H(t). Higher wealth (individual b) im-
plies piaIm(t) < pi
b
Im
(t) (see previous discussion). Thus wealthier individuals have greater
marginal cost of job-related health stress pidz(t) and greater marginal benefit of preventive
care ϕdp(t). Consequently the optimal level of job-related health stress is lower (z
b < za;
bottom-left corner of Figure 6.2) and the optimal level of investment in preventive care is
higher (Ibp > I
a
p ; bottom-right corner of Figure 6.2) for wealthy individuals compared to
less-affluent peers.
The effect of wealth on health:
In sum, wealthy individuals invest more in curative care Im(t). Associated with greater
wealth is a higher marginal cost of curative care piIm(t). As a result, wealthy individuals
derive greater benefit from healthy consumption ϕdCh(t) and from preventive care ϕdp(t)
because of the savings these represent in terms of (costly) curative care. Their optimal
levels of healthy consumption and investment in preventive care are higher. Similarly,
wealthy individuals have greater cost of unhealthy consumption pidCu(t) and of job-related
health stress pidz(t) because these behavioral choices result in additional costly curative
care. Wealthy individuals invest more in health through higher investment in curative
and preventive care, engage in work that is more conducive to health (jobs associated
with lower levels of job-related health stress) and shift from unhealthy toward healthy
consumption. As a result their health deteriorates slower. Wealth protects health by
encouraging healthy life styles and enabling individuals to work in healthy environments.
It has to be noted that the effect of wealth on health disappears in the pure investment
formulation of the model, i.e. if health does not enter the utility function.
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Income and health: pure “wage” effect
Income Y (t) is a function of the wage rate w(t) times the amount of time spent working
τw(t) (see equation 6.9). Again, consider two individuals a and b but this time the
difference is in their level of income. Individual b earns a higher income than individual
a (Y b(t) > Y a(t)) and hence earns a higher wage rate wb(t) > wa(t)22. It is important to
distinguish between transitory and permanent wage responses.
Transitory wage change: In our model of perfect certainty a transitory change in
wage does not affect the parameter qA(0) (e.g., life-time wealth) as the change is fully
anticipated by the individual. Such a response is referred to as an evolutionary wage
change (along an individual’s wage profile). The effect of a transitory wage change is best
understood as occurring within a person. Assume that for situation b the wage change
has occurred while it has not (yet) occurred in situation a. Alternatively, one can assume
that individual a’s wage has not (yet) changed while individual b’s wage rate has increased
(wb(t) > wa(t); but otherwise individual a and b follow similar wage trajectories).
A transitory increase in the wage rate w(t) increases firstly the opportunity cost of
time, but secondly also increases the production benefits of health (see equations 6.9,
6.18 and 6.45). As before, the marginal cost of investment in curative care piIm(t) is
determined by the first-order condition for health (equation 6.15). Because health H(t)
is as yet unchanged (it is a stock), the net marginal cost of maintaining the health stock
is unchanged and σaH(t) − ϕaH(t) = σbH(t) − ϕbH(t). Both the user cost of health capital
σH(t) (through the marginal cost of investment in curative care piIm(t)) and the marginal
production benefit of health ϕH(t) increase with the wage rate w(t). It follows that
ϕbH(t) > ϕ
a
H(t) and σ
b
H(t) > σ
a
H(t). The net effect of a wage increase on the level of
investment in curative care Im(t) is consequently unknown and investment in curative
care could either increase or decrease.
Both the direct cost piCh(t) (equation 6.20) and the additional marginal benefit ϕdCh(t)
(equation 6.21) of healthy consumption increase with the wage rate w(t) and the net result
of a wage increase on the level of healthy consumption Ch(t) is unknown. Similarly the
marginal benefit ϕz(t) (equation 6.26) and the marginal cost pidz(t) (equation 6.27) of job-
related health stress z(t), and the marginal benefit ϕdp(t) (equation 6.30) and marginal
cost piIp(t) (equation 6.29) of investment in preventive care Ip(t) increase with the wage
22Higher income Y (t) implies that individual b receives a higher wage rate w(t) than individual a
because the direct effect of higher wages is to increase income (the wage rate multiplied by the time
spent working) while the secondary effect is, ceteris paribus, an increase in time spent working (own-time
inputs in health investment and consumption decrease as a result of the increased opportunity cost of
time; see equations 6.50, 6.60, 6.61 and 6.62). Both effects increase income Y (t).
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rate w(t)23. The net result of a wage increase on the level of job-related health stress z(t)
and the level of investment in preventive care Ip(t) is thus unknown. The only exception
to this pattern is unhealthy consumption. Both the direct cost piCu(t) (equation 6.23) and
the additional marginal cost pidCu(t) (equation 6.24) of unhealthy consumption increase
with the wage rate w(t) and the result of a wage increase is a lower level of unhealthy
consumption (Cbu < C
a
u). In sum, because an increase in transitory wages increases both
the various marginal costs and the marginal benefits, it could be either good or bad for
health. The only unambiguous prediction is that a transitory increase in the wage rate
leads to a reduction in unhealthy consumption.
If, however, the marginal production benefit of health ϕH(t) is small compared to the
user cost of health capital σH(t)
24, then σbH(t) ∼ σaH(t) and pibIm(t) ∼ piaIm(t). A higher wage
rate then reduces the level of investment in curative care Ibm < I
a
m, see equation (6.48).
In contrast, the additional benefit of healthy consumption (ϕdCh(t); equation 6.21), the
additional cost of unhealthy consumption (pidCu(t); equation 6.24), the marginal cost of
job-related health stress (pidz(t); equation 6.26) and the marginal benefit of preventive
care (ϕdp(t); equation 6.30) are unchanged in this scenario. The direct cost of healthy
consumption (piCh(t); equation 6.20) and unhealthy consumption (piCu(t); equation 6.23)
however increase with the wage rate w(t) due to higher opportunity cost (see equations
6.55 and 6.56). Hence the level of healthy Ch(t) and unhealthy Cu(t) consumption is
reduced. In addition, the marginal benefit of job-related health stress ϕz(t) increases
with the wage rate (equation 6.27) as does the marginal cost of investment in preventive
care pip(t) (equations 6.27 and 6.44). As a result the level of job-related health stress z(t)
is higher and the level of investment in preventive care Ip(t) lower. Thus, on balance, if
the production benefit of health is small, a transitory wage change is bad for health. As
a result of the greater opportunity cost of time the level of investment in health (curative
and preventive) and the level of healthy consumption is lower and the level of job-related
health stress is higher. The only exception is that the level of unhealthy consumption is
lower.
Permanent wage change: Now consider again two individuals a and b. Individual b
has a permanently higher level of wages, i.e., person b has greater life-time wealth (and
23In our formulation the marginal benefit of job-related health stress is increasing in the wage rate.
Case and Deaton (2005) in their narrower definition of z(t) as manual, risky labor (i.e., not including
the psychosocial aspects of work), assume that the marginal benefit of additional manual labor is lower
among those with higher wages.
24Note that it is always true that σH(t) ≥ ϕH(t), otherwise the investment in curative care would
finance itself through negative net marginal costs of maintaining the health stock and individuals would
achieve infinite health.
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hence qbA(0) < q
a
A(0)). The effect of a “pure” asset increase (mostly due to a difference in
endowed physical capital, e.g., assets A(t)) was described in section 6.3.3. In the case of a
permanent wage increase, however, there is apart from the life-time wealth effect also the
competing effect of the greater opportunity cost of time. There are reasons to believe that
the wealth effect (greater life-time wealth) dominates the effect of the opportunity cost
of time (higher current wages). First, this is consistent with the result by Dustmann and
Windmeijer (2000) and Contoyannis et al. (2004) that a transitory wage increase affects
health negatively while a permanent wage change affects health positively. Second, it is
consistent with the rich literature on SES and health that consistently finds that high
income individuals are healthier than low income individuals.
For simplicity, assume that the permanent effect dominates the transitory effect. The
net result of a permanent wage change is somewhere in-between the “pure” asset effect
described in section 6.3.3 and the situation described above for the transitory wage effect
on health, with the former effect assumed to dominate the latter effect. Permanently
higher wages are good for health as they increase investment in curative and preventive
care, lower the level of job-related health stress and shift consumption toward healthy
consumption. Our model suggests that the health benefit of a “pure” asset endowment
would be larger than the effect of a “comparable” change in permanent life-time wages
(similar change in the shadow-price of life-time wealth qA(0)) due to the competing effect
of the increased opportunity cost of time.
As a last point, one may be tempted to conclude that individuals invest less in curative
care during middle and old age because of the high opportunity cost of time associated
with high earnings at these ages (see equation 6.11). However, as health deteriorates with
age the demand for curative care increases (see section 6.3.2). If the latter effect domi-
nates the model is capable of reproducing the observation that young individuals invest
little, the middle-aged invest more and the elderly invest substantially in curative care.
The effect of income on health:
In sum, a transitory increase in wages could affect health positively or negatively, de-
pending on whether the higher marginal production benefit outweighs the increased op-
portunity cost of time. A permanent increase in income operates similar to an increase in
wealth and is beneficial to health, though the wealth effect is moderated by the increased
opportunity cost of time.
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Education and health: the additional “efficiency” effect
Consider two individuals a and b who differ in their level of education E. Individual b
has obtained more education but is otherwise identical. As a result, individual b has a
higher wage rate w∗(t) than individual a, which follows directly from the Mincer-type
wage equation defined in (6.11). Thus the effect of education is similar to the effect of
a permanent wage increase and the discussion presented in section 6.3.3 applies here as
well.
But education also improves the efficiency of investment in curative care µIm(t), in-
vestment in preventive care µIp(t), and to a lesser extent healthy consumption µCh(t)
and unhealthy consumption µCu(t)
25. Assume the effects of a permanent wage increase
as described in section 6.3.3 and consider the additional effect of increased efficiency of
investment in curative and preventive care. The marginal cost of investment in curative
care piIm(t) is determined by the first-order condition for health (equation 6.15). For a
permanent wage change we found pibIm > pi
a
Im
(or pibIm ∼ piaIm if the marginal production
benefit of health ϕH(t) is small compared to the user cost of health capital at the margin
σH(t)). Since the marginal cost of investment in curative care piIm(t) increases in the level
(Im(t)) and decreases in the efficiency (µIm(t)) of investment in curative care, a higher
efficiency due to education implies a higher level of investment in curative care compared
to the pure “wage” effect.
A higher efficiency of investment in preventive care µIp lowers the marginal cost of
preventive care piIp(t) (equation 6.54) while the marginal benefit ϕdp(t) (equation 6.30)
is unchanged compared to the pure “wage” effect described in section 6.3.326. Thus the
optimal level of investment in preventive care is higher compared with the pure “wage”
effect. If the efficiencies of healthy and unhealthy consumption do not (or only moder-
ately) respond to education then the levels of healthy and unhealthy consumption are
unchanged compared to the pure “wage” effect (section 6.3.3).
The effect of education on health:
An increase in education operates much in the same way as an increase in permanent
income (the pure “wage” effect). But education has an independent effect on health,
25Grossman (1972a, 1972b) assumes that the higher educated are more efficient producers and con-
sumers of curative care. We extend his definition to preventive care. However, it is less clear whether the
higher educated are more efficient producers and consumers of consumption goods and services.
26The marginal cost of investment in curative care piIm(t) is determined by the first-order condition for
health (equation 6.15) and hence increased efficiency µIm does not change the marginal cost piIm(t), but
rather leads to an increase in the level of investment in curative care.
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over and above generating greater life-time income and wealth, through enhancing the
efficiency of curative and preventive care. This leads to a higher demand for both curative
and preventive care, while the effect on healthy and unhealthy consumption is ambiguous.
The formation of the SES health gradient
As the discussion in section 6.3.3 suggests greater initial wealth, permanently higher in-
come (over the life cycle) and a higher level of education induce individuals to invest more
in curative and in preventive care, shift consumption toward healthy consumption and
enable individuals to afford healthier working and living environments. As a result, even
for individuals who are initially equally healthy, the health trajectories of high and low
SES individuals will begin to diverge. As the health of high SES individuals deteriorates
at a slower pace, higher levels of health further reinforce the divergence of health tra-
jectories as the marginal cost of unhealthy lifestyles, (e.g., unhealthy consumption and
job-related health stress; see equations 6.24 and 6.26) and the marginal benefit of healthy
lifestyles (e.g., healthy consumption and preventive care; see equations 6.21 and 6.30)
are greater for higher levels of the health stock. Curative care is an exception. Greater
health is associated with a lower level of investment in curative care. However, there is a
competing effect in that high SES individuals invest more in curative care. In addition,
the higher the health stock, the greater the earnings (e.g., see equation 6.9) such that
reverse causality (from health to SES) could further reinforce the SES health gradient.
Jointly these mechanisms gradually lead to cumulative health advantage with age.
The role of institutions
The extent to which wealth, life-time earnings and education relate to health outcomes
is reasonably expected to depend on the institutional organization of the labor market
and capital markets. In this paper we assume perfect capital and insurance markets27.
Another important institutional feature is the organization of the health care market.
In countries with universal health care coverage and low deductibles (such as, e.g., in
Northern Europe) the price of curative care is small and health care is affordable to
everyone. Still, the observed SES health gradient over the life cycle is strikingly consistent
across countries with relatively low levels of protection from loss of work and health risks,
such as the US, and those with stronger welfare systems, such as the Netherlands (e.g.,
27Note that an imperfect capital market could contribute to the association between income and health
if individuals with little income cannot borrow and as such underinsure and invest too little in their health.
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Smith, 1999; 2005a; 2007; Case and Deaton, 2005; Van Kippersluis et al., 2010). A
legitimate question to answer is to what extent our model explains this phenomenon.
In the following we focus on discussing the effect of wealth, i.e. differences in qA(0).
The discussion of the effect of life-time earnings and education is similar (and follows the
reasoning in sections 6.3.3). The marginal cost of curative care piIm(t) is governed by the
first-order condition for health (equation 6.15) and is largely determined by the level of
the health stock H(t) and by wealth qA(0) (assuming similar preferences). Thus, even if
the price of curative care pm(t) is very small, the marginal cost of curative care piIm(t)
in general is not. The price of curative care is only one component that determines the
marginal cost of curative care; the others are the opportunity cost of time (wages w(t)),
the efficiency of curative care µIm(t) and the level of curative care investment Im(t) (e.g.,
see equation 6.48 for an example functional form)28. A low price of curative care is likely
to result in greater demand for curative care Im(t)
29, but not in a lower marginal cost
(assuming similar opportunity cost of time and efficiency of care).
Further, the marginal cost of curative care piIm(t) cannot be constant across individ-
uals with differences in health H(t) and wealth qA(0). Wealthy individuals demand more
curative care Im(t) and have a higher marginal cost of curative care piIm(t) compared to
their less affluent peers (assuming similar health). As the marginal cost of unhealthy
lifestyles, (e.g., unhealthy consumption and job-related health stress; see equations 6.24
and 6.26) and the marginal benefit of healthy lifestyles (e.g., healthy consumption and
preventive care; see equations 6.21 and 6.30) are proportional to the marginal cost of cura-
tive care piIm(t), our model predicts not only differences in curative care between low SES
and high SES individuals but also in the choice of working and living environment, the
demand for preventive care and the level of healthy and unhealthy consumption. Conse-
quently, higher wealth not only translates in greater investment in curative care, but also
encourages healthy lifestyles and the choice of healthy working and living environments,
irrespective of the way in which health care is provided. Hence also in countries with
28Inserting pm(t) = 0 in equation (6.48) results in piIm(t) = 0 and is in conflict with the first-order
condition for health (equation 6.15) which demands that the marginal cost of curative care piIm(t) is
positive. If the marginal cost of curative care could be negligible, individuals would demand infinite
health. For low prices of curative care pm(t) it is reasonable to assume that the marginal cost of curative
care is dominated by the opportunity cost of time. This suggests that the example functional form
(equation 6.48) is not valid for low prices pm(t). Note that these specifications are not strictly part of
the formulation and are provided to aid interpretation of the model. Other suitable functional forms can
be constructed.
29However, in countries with universal health care coverage and low deductibles there are other means
than price (out-of-pocket expenses) to reduce the consumption of care. For example the primary physician
may act as gate keeper.
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universal health care coverage and low deductibles there will be a significant SES health
gradient.
6.4 Discussion
Two important mechanisms that are part of our formulation but that we did not explic-
itly take into account to facilitate derivations are differential mortality and health-related
labor-force withdrawal. With regard to the former, the Grossman model provides a nat-
ural way to include length of life. In Grossman’s original formulation (Grossman 1972a;
1972b) length of life is determined by a minimum health level Hmin. If health falls below
this level H(t) ≤ Hmin an individual dies. Ehrlich and Chuma (1990) specify a demand
function for longevity in the Grossman model and argue that the demand for health
must be derived in conjunction with that for longevity and consumption. With regard to
the latter, as emphasized by Smith (1999; 2005a) and Case and Deaton (2005), reverse
causality from health to income through labor force participation could be an important
mechanism explaining the SES-health gradient. In our model, this could be incorporated
by an endogenous retirement age (as in Galama et al., 2009).
To include endogenous length of life and endogenous retirement, one has to assume
suitable functional forms for the utility function U(t), the relation between income Y (t)
and health, years of schooling and years of working experience, the dependence of the
“natural” deterioration rate d(t) on job-related health stress, healthy and unhealthy
consumption, and preventive care and the relations between the outputs consumption
Ch(t) and Cu(t) and health investments Im(t) and Ip(t) and the inputs of own-time and
goods/services purchased in the market. Using these assumed relations one can then in
principle solve the first-order conditions and obtain the optimal solutions for healthy con-
sumption Ch(t), unhealthy consumption Cu(t) and health H(t) (as well as others). These
solutions can then be inserted into the “indirect utility function”, V (R, T )
V (R, T ) ≡
R∫
0
U(t)e−βtdt+
T∫
R
U(t)e−βtdt. (6.31)
Given the increasing complexity of the problem one may have to resort to numerically
solving for the optimal length of life T and the optimal retirement age R through identi-
fying the maximal indirect utility V (R, T ) by varying R and T . Such analyses have been
performed for retirement R (Galama et al., 2009) and for length of life T (Ehrlich and
Chuma, 1990).
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Another potentially important mechanism, which we do not explicitly take into ac-
count, is the influence of the wider social context and social relationships of the family or
neighborhood on health (House et al., 1988; Robert, 1998; Kawachi and Berkman, 2003).
Less affluent areas are more polluted, have lower quantity and quality of municipal ser-
vices (such as policing, fire protection, and sanitation), have higher crime rates, and are
associated with unhealthy lifestyles (Robert, 1998). Also, the social isolation induced by
poor quality and quantity of social contacts is an important risk factor for health (House
et al., 1988).
To some extent these factors are exogenous to an individual; the neighborhood in which
you live, including poor access to schooling and sanitation are not always controllable.
In our model, this is partly captured, by the exogenous part of the deterioration rate
(exogenous environmental factors). However, it is likely that social factors, such as the
neighborhood in which you live, the household size, and the number of social contacts
are partly endogenous to socioeconomic status (Robert, 1998). Some of this can be
captured in our model by extending the definition of healthy consumption to include
housing. Living in an affluent neighborhood is an expensive, yet health-promoting and
utility-generating choice of individuals. However, the choice of neighborhood (housing) is
a constrained choice: low SES individuals cannot afford to live in more affluent areas.
6.5 Conclusions
The aim of this paper is to provide a theory of the relation between health and socioeco-
nomic status (SES) over the life cycle. Our life-cycle model incorporates multiple mech-
anisms that could explain (jointly) a large part of the observed disparities in health by
SES. In our model, lifestyle factors (preventive care, healthy and unhealthy consumption),
working conditions (physical and psychosocial health stresses), living conditions (hous-
ing, neighborhood social environment), curative care and the constraining effect of health
on work are mechanisms through which SES (education, income, wealth) and health are
related.
Our model is one of cumulative advantage in health (House et al., 1994; Lynch et
al., 1997), and is consistent with fundamental cause theory (House et al., 1990; Link and
Phelan, 1995; Phelan and Link, 2005) which suggests that the pathways that cause disease
may change over time and across populations but that the association between SES and
health is maintained. Our model broadly describes the role of fundamental indicators
of SES such as education, wealth and income (fundamental causes) and their relation to
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health. This is not a theory of detailed disease pathways but rather a theory of social and
economic resources and the way these relate to health.
Compared to Grossman (1972a; 1972b) and Case and Deaton (2005) the model pre-
sented in this paper contains several improvements and extensions: (i) The introduction
of decreasing-returns-to-scale (DRTS) to investment in curative care addresses the issue
of the indeterminacy of curative care, predicts differences in the effective health deterio-
ration rate (as well as the level of health), and reproduces the observed negative relation
between health and curative (medical) care. (ii) We have included the concept of healthy
consumption (as well as unhealthy consumption as in Case and Deaton, 2005) and allow
the demand for consumption to be governed both by the direct monetary price of con-
sumption as well as the indirect health benefit (healthy consumption) or indirect health
cost (unhealthy consumption). Case and Deaton (2005) on the other hand consider an
unhealthy consumption good whose price is only paid in terms of health. (iii) We have
broadened the concept of “job-related health stress” to include not only hard/risky labor
(as in Case and Deaton, 2005) but also psychosocial aspects of work that are detrimen-
tal to health. (iv) We have argued that the effect of housing and neighborhood social
environment can be included by extending the definition of healthy consumption as well
as exogenous environmental factors to include relevant aspects of housing and neighbor-
hood characteristics. (v) We have introduced the concept of preventive care. (vi) We
have introduced length of life (mortality; as in Ehrlich and Chuma, 1990) and labor-force
withdrawal (retirement; as in Galama et al., 2009) as potentially important in explaining
the SES health gradient, though in order to facilitate derivations we have treated them
as exogenous in this work.
Considering the effect of differences in wealth between otherwise identical individuals,
we find that individuals with greater initial wealth (pure “asset” effect) invest more in
curative and in preventive care, have higher levels of both healthy and unhealthy con-
sumption, yet shift their consumption toward healthy consumption, and are able to afford
healthier working environments (associated with lower levels of job-related health stress).
If healthy and unhealthy consumption are substitutes it is even possible that greater ini-
tial wealth leads to a reduction in unhealthy consumption. Smoking might be an example
of this: high SES individuals smoke less than low SES individuals.
The mechanism through which initial wealth operates is by increasing the marginal
cost of, and demand for, curative care. The greater marginal cost of curative care in
turn increases the health benefit of (and hence demand for) preventive care and healthy
consumption, and the health cost of (and hence reduced demand for) unhealthy working
and living environments, and unhealthy consumption. Greater financial resources induce
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healthy lifestyles, greater investment in curative care and protect individuals from the
health risks of physical working conditions (e.g., hard labor) and/or psychosocial aspects
of work (e.g., low status, limited control, repetitive work, etc) that are detrimental to
health. Gradually, as time passes, higher levels of curative and preventive care, a shift
toward healthy consumption and lower job-related physical and psychosocial stress lead
to cumulative health advantage over the life cycle.
Considering the effect of differences in the wage rate between individuals (the pure
“wage” effect), we found that a transitory wage increase (along an individual’s wage
profile, i.e., differences within an individual) is potentially bad for health as a result of
the increased opportunity cost of time. However, the effect is hard to predict given the
competing effect of the greater production benefit of health. A permanent wage increase
on the other hand (i.e., an increase in life-time wages; differences across individuals)
operates similar to an increase in initial wealth (pure “asset” effect) but its effect is
moderated by the higher opportunity cost of time. Empirical analyses (e.g., Dustmann
and Windmeijer, 2000; Contoyannis et al., 2004) suggest a positive effect on health from
a permanent wage increase and a negative effect from a transitory wage increase. This
suggests that the permanent effect dominates the transitory (opportunity cost) effect.
High income (over the life cycle) individuals, like wealthy individuals, invest more in
curative and preventive care, engage in work that is more conducive to health (lower level
of job-related health stress) and shift consumption toward healthy consumption.
The effect of a higher level of education is similar to an increase in permanent income,
but with the additional effect of increasing the efficiency of the production and consump-
tion of curative and preventive care. Compared to an increase in permanent income of
the same magnitude (the pure “wage” effect), investment in curative and preventive care
is higher due to the more efficient use of goods/services and own time. Compared to a
ceteris paribus change in wealth (the pure “asset” effect), the effect of a higher education
level could be either more beneficial or less beneficial to health, depending on whether
the effect of greater efficiency outweighs the greater opportunity cost of higher wages.
Given the strong effect of education on health outcomes observed in empirical studies
(e.g., Grossman, 2000; Lleras-Muney, 2005; Oreopoulos, 2006; Cutler and Lleras-Muney,
2008) even when controlling for various other socioeconomic indicators, it is plausible that
the greater efficiency more than compensates for the higher opportunity costs.
Our model makes a number of predictions. First, it predicts a gradual increase in
health disparities with age as lower levels of healthy consumption, curative and preventive
care and higher levels of unhealthy consumption and job-related health stress for low SES
individuals lead to cumulative disadvantage in health over the life cycle.
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Results from earlier studies (Ehrlich and Chuma, 1990; Galama et al., 2009) suggest
that the more rapidly worsening health of low SES individuals could lead to early with-
drawal from the labor force and shorter life spans. Early withdrawal from the labor force
may attribute to further cumulative disadvantage (widening of the SES health gradient)
as the associated loss of income disproportionally affects low SES individuals. Shorter life
spans of low SES individuals might explain the observed narrowing of SES health dispar-
ities beginning in late middle age as high SES individuals survive into old age. Properly
accounting for labor-force withdrawal and mortality may require numerical approaches to
solving the model (see section 6.4).
Second, the model predicts strong positive effects on health of high initial wealth
(pure “asset” effect), permanently high wage income (pure “wage” effect) and education.
Education potentially has the greater positive impact of the SES indicators because it
not only gives rise to permanently higher income over the life cycle (which is qualitatively
similar to wealth) but also increases the efficiency of investment in curative and preventive
care.
Third, we expect empirical studies to find a strong causal impact of education, per-
manent income and initial wealth on health after substantial exposure, but not of current
income. Our model predicts a strong effect of education on health and empirical studies
are likely to confirm this prediction because education is generally obtained in childhood
and early adulthood and hence ample time has passed by the time individuals are ob-
served. The same cannot be said for income because current income is not a good measure
of cumulative exposure to low income. Further, most empirical studies will control for
education, and as such essentially control for life-time wealth. Thus the comparison is
made between individuals of very similar life-time wealth and is more likely to pick up a
transitory rather than a permanent wage effect on health. As we discussed, the sign of a
transitory wage effect is ambiguous and could be small because of competing effects.
Fourth, our model suggests that the SES health gradient could be strong in countries
with universal health care coverage and low deductions as well as in countries with large
uninsured populations and high out-of-pocket expenditures as the marginal cost of cu-
rative care is determined by the level of the health stock on the one hand and wealth,
life-time earnings and education on the other. In our model the organizational structure of
health care in a country affects the level of investment in curative care but does not alter
the marginal cost of care. And, it is the marginal cost of curative care that determines
lifestyles and the choice of living and working environments. Hence also in countries with
universal health care coverage and low deductibles there will be a significant SES health
gradient.
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Empirical estimation of the model is needed to assess the relative importance of mech-
anisms, study interactions between mechanisms, and disentangle the different patterns of
causality. This will require developing structural- and reduced-form relations. Model esti-
mates may allow for a comprehensive, as opposed to partial, explanation for the relations
between SES and health, and to simulate the long-term effects of policy interventions.
Our model includes major mechanisms identified in a review of the literature as ex-
plaining (jointly) a large part of the observed disparities in health by SES. Given the
complexity (e.g., Cutler et al., 2008) of the various relations between SES and health, we
have focussed on potential explanations that a) explain a large part of the gradient and
b) are relatively straightforward to include in our theoretical framework. Two important
mechanisms that are part of our formulation but were not explicitly taken into account to
facilitate derivations are differential mortality (see Ehrlich and Chuma 1990) and health-
related labor-force withdrawal (see Galama et al., 2009). Given the increasing complexity
of the model one may have to resort to numerically solving for the optimal length of life T
and the optimal retirement age R (see section 6.4). An important extension of our model
would be to incorporate insights from the literature on socioeconomic differences in the
evolution of child health (e.g., Case et al., 2002; Currie and Stabile, 2003; Currie et al.,
2007; Murasko, 2008), and from the literature on the impact of fetal and early-childhood
conditions on health in adulthood (e.g., Barker et al., 1993; Case et al., 2005; van den
Berg et al., 2006). This might be feasible by including the production of health by the
family (including the health of the child) similar to, e.g., Jacobson (2000) and Bolin et al.
(2001; 2002a; 2002b). The role of the wider social context, social relationships, and other
psycho-social risk factors (House et al., 1988; 1994; Robert, 1998; Kawachi and Berk-
man, 2003) can partially be captured in our model by extending the definition of healthy
consumption to include choice of housing / neighborhood social environment (see section
6.4). This might be further extended by including social capital similar to, e.g., Bolin et
al. (2003). Insights from the behavioral-economic and psychological literature regarding
myopia and lack of self-control (e.g., Blanchflower et al., 2009) might be incorporated
following Laibson (1998). Uncertainty (e.g., health shocks) could be included similar to,
e.g., Cropper (1977), Dardanoni and Wagstaff (1990) and Liljas (1998).
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Appendix
First-order conditions
Associated with the Lagrangian (equation 6.12) we have the following conditions:
q˙A(t) = −∂=(t)
∂A(t)
⇒
q˙A(t) = −δqA(t)⇔
qA(t) = qA(0)e
−δt, (6.32)
q˙H(t) = − ∂=(t)
∂H(t)
⇒
q˙H(t) = qH(t)d(t)− ∂U(t)
∂H(t)
e−βt − qA(0)∂Y (t)
∂H(t)
e−δt
= qH(t)d(t)− ∂U(t)
∂H(t)
e−βt − qA(0)ϕH(t)e−δt, (6.33)
∂=(t)
∂Xh(t)
= 0⇒
∂U(t)
∂Ch(t)
= qA(0)
pXh(t)
∂Ch(t)/∂Xh(t)
e(β−δ)t + qH(t)
∂d(t)
∂Ch(t)
H(t)eβt
≡ qA(0)piCh(t)e(β−δ)t − qH(t)
ϕdCh(t)
piIm(t)
eβt, (6.34)
∂=(t)
∂τCh(t)
= 0⇒
∂U(t)
∂Ch(t)
= qA(0)
w(t)
∂Ch(t)/∂τCh(t)
e(β−δ)t + qH(t)
∂d(t)
∂Ch(t)
H(t)eβt
≡ qA(0)piCh(t)e(β−δ)t − qH(t)
ϕdCh(t)
piIm(t)
eβt, (6.35)
∂=(t)
∂Xu(t)
= 0⇒
∂U(t)
∂Cu(t)
= qA(0)
pXu(t)
∂Cu(t)/∂Xu(t)
e(β−δ)t + qH(t)
∂d(t)
∂Cu(t)
H(t)eβt
≡ qA(0)piCu(t)e(β−δ)t + qH(t)
pidCu(t)
piIm(t)
eβt, (6.36)
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∂=(t)
∂τCu(t)
= 0⇒
∂U(t)
∂Cu(t)
= qA(0)
w(t)
∂Cu(t)/∂τCu(t)
e(β−δ)t + qH(t)
∂d(t)
∂Cu(t)
H(t)eβt
≡ qA(0) piCu(t)e(β−δ)t + qH(t)
pidCu(t)
piIm(t)
eβt, (6.37)
∂=(t)
∂mm(t)
= 0⇒
qH(t) = qA(0)
{
pm(t)Im(t)
1−α
α[∂Im(t)/∂mm(t)]
}
e−δt
≡ qA(0) piIm(t)e−δt, (6.38)
∂=(t)
∂τIm(t)
= 0⇒
qH(t) = qA(0)
{
w(t)Im(t)
1−α
α[∂Im(t)/∂τIm(t)]
}
e−δt
≡ qA(0)piIm(t)e−δt, (6.39)
∂=(t)
∂z(t)
= 0⇒
0 = qH(t)
∂d(t)
∂z(t)
H(t)− qA(0)∂Y (t)
∂z(t)
e−δt
≡ qH(t) pidz(t)
piIm(t)
− qA(0)ϕz(t)e−δt, (6.40)
∂=(t)
∂mp(t)
= 0⇒
0 = qH(t)
∂d(t)
∂Ip(t)
H(t) + qA(0)
pp(t)
∂Ip(t)/∂mp(t)
e−δt
≡ −qH(t)
pidIp(t)
piIm(t)
+ qA(0)piIp(t)e
−δt, (6.41)
∂=(t)
∂τIp(t)
= 0⇒
0 = qH(t)
∂d(t)
∂Ip(t)
H(t) + qA(0)
w(t)
∂Ip(t)/∂τIp(t)
e−δt,
≡ −qH(t)
pidIp(t)
piIm(t)
+ qA(0)piIp(t)e
−δt, (6.42)
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Equation (6.34) or (6.35) combined with (6.38) or (6.39) provide the first-order con-
dition for maximization of (6.1) with respect to consumption (equation 6.19). Similarly,
equation (6.36) or (6.37) combined with (6.38) or (6.39) provide the first-order condition
for maximization of (6.1) with respect to consumption (equation 6.22). Using (6.38) or
(6.39) to obtain an expression for q˙H(t) and substituting the results for qH(t) and q˙H(t)
in (6.33) we find the first-order condition for maximization of (6.1) with respect to health
(equation 6.15). Combining equations (6.38) or (6.39) and (6.40) to eliminate qH(t) we
find the first-order condition for maximization of (6.1) with respect to job-related health
stress (equation 6.25). Lastly, combining equations (6.38) or (6.39) and (6.41) or (6.42)
to eliminate qH(t) we find the first-order condition for maximization of (6.1) with respect
to preventive care (equation 6.28).
Simple functional forms
To aid interpretation of the first-order conditions it is helpful to specify suitable functional
forms for the utility function U(t), the relation between income Y (t) and health, years of
schooling and years of working experience, the dependence of the “natural” deterioration
rate d(t) on job-related health stress, healthy and unhealthy consumption, and preven-
tive care and the relations between the ouputs consumption Ch(t) and Cu(t) and health
investments Im(t) and Ip(t) and the inputs of own-time and goods/services purchased in
the market.
Assume that sick time is a power law in health
s[H(t)] = Ω
{
1− [H(t)/Hmax]β2
}
, (6.43)
where β2 is a positive constant.
30
We assume a Mincer-type wage relation for the “effortless” wage rate w∗(t) (e.g.,
Mincer, 1974; see equation 6.11). Thus wages w(t) (equations 6.10 and 6.11) increase
with years of schooling E, experience x(t) and the level of job-related health stress z(t).
We then find (see equation 6.9),
Y [H(t), z(t);E, x(t)] = w∗(t)[1 + z(t)]γwΩ
[
H(t)
Hmax
]β2
[1− (t)] (6.44)
30Wagstaff (1986) and Grossman (1972a, 1972b, 2000) assume s(t) = β1H(t)−β2 . In keeping with the
literature, we follow their formulation but note that negative values of β1 and β1 can be allowed as long
as β1β2 > 0. We specify sick time instead as s(t) = β0 − β1H(t)β2 . We assume that the health stock has
natural bounds between 0 and a maximal value Hmax. The relevant properties of sick time are then as
follows: limH→Hmax s[H(t)] = 0 and limH↓0 s[H(t)] = Ω. These properties lead to expression (6.43).
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where the term Ω[H(t)/Hmax]
β2 represents healthy time h(t) ≡ Ω − s[H(t)] and (t) ≡
[τIm(t)+τIp(t)+τCh(t)+τCu(t)]/h(t) is the ratio of the total time input into the production
of curative care, preventive care and consumption to the total amount of healthy time
h(t).
Further, using equations (6.9), (6.10) and (6.44), we have
ϕH(t) = β2ΩH
−β2
maxw∗(t)[1 + z(t)]
γwH(t)−(β2+1). (6.45)
We assume the health deterioration rate d(t) to be a function of various endogenous
as well as exogenous functions
d(t) = d∗eβtt+βξξ(t)[1 + z(t)]γd [1 + Ch(t)]−γCh [1 + Cu(t)]γCu [1 + Ip(t)]−γp , (6.46)
where ξ(t) is a vector of exogenous environmental variables (e.g., exogenous living con-
ditions) that affect the deterioration rate. The deterioration rate d(t) increases with
job-related health stress z(t), decreases with healthy consumption Ch(t), increases with
unhealthy consumption Cu(t) and decreases with investment in preventive care Ip(t);
γd ≥ 0, γCh ≥ 0, γCu ≥ 0 and γp ≥ 0. For minimal job-related health stress (z(t) = 0),
“health neutral” consumption (γCh = γCu = 0) and no preventive care (Ip(t) = 0) individ-
uals “age” at an exogenous rate d(t) = d(0)eβtt+βξ[ξ(t)−ξ(0)] (as in Cropper, 1981; Wagstaff,
1986).
Assume a production function of the following form
Im(t) = µIm(t)mm(t)
αImτIm(t)
βIm , (6.47)
where µIm(t) is an efficiency factor and αIm and βIm are the elasticities of investment in
curative care Im(t) with respect to goods and services mm(t) purchased in the market
(e.g., curative care) and with respect to own-time τIm(t), respectively. The production
function exhibits DRTS for 0 < αIm + βIm < 1, CRTS for αIm + βIm = 1 and increasing-
returns-to-scale (IRTS) for αIm + βIm > 1. Using equations (6.17) and (6.47) we have
piIm(t) =
pm(t)
αIm/(αIm+βIm )w(t)βIm/(αIm+βIm )
αµIm(t)
1/(αIm+βIm )αIm(t)
αIm/(αIm+βIm )βIm(t)
βIm/(αIm+βIm )
× Im(t)(1−α)+[1−(αIm+βIm )]/(αIm+βIm ). (6.48)
Further
mm(t) =
pm(t)
−βIm/(αIm+βIm )w(t)βIm/(αIm+βIm )
µIm(t)
1/(αIm+βIm )αIm(t)
−βIm/(αIm+βIm )βIm(t)βIm/(αIm+βIm )
Im(t)
1/(αIm+βIm ),(6.49)
τIm(t) =
pm(t)
αIm/(αIm+βIm )w(t)−αIm/(αIm+βIm )
µIm(t)
1/(αIm+βIm )αIm(t)
αIm/(αIm+βIm )βIm(t)
−αIm/(αIm+βIm )
Im(t)
1/(αIm+βIm ).(6.50)
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We can derive similar relationships for investment in preventive care Ip(t), healthy
consumption Ch(t) and unhealthy consumption Cu(t), assuming the following analogous
functional forms:
Ip(t) = µIp(t)mp(t)
αIpτIp(t)
βIp , (6.51)
Ch(t) = µCh(t)XCh(t)
αChτCh(t)
βCh , (6.52)
Cu(t) = µCu(t)XCu(t)
αCuτCu(t)
βCu , (6.53)
which, using equations (6.20), (6.23) and (6.30), lead to
piIp(t) =
pp(t)
αIp/(αIp+βIp )w(t)βIp/(αIp+βIp )
µIp(t)
1/(αIp+βIp )α
αIp/(αIp+βIp )
Ip
β
βIp/(αIp+βIp )
Ip
Ip(t)
[1−(αIp+βIp )]/(αIp+βIp ), (6.54)
piCh(t) =
pXh(t)
αCh/(αCh+βCh )w(t)βCh/(αCh+βCh )
µCh(t)
1/(αCh+βCh )α
αCh/(αCh+βCh )
Ch
β
βCh/(αCh+βCh )
Ch
Ch(t)
[1−(αCh+βCh )]/(αCh+βCh ),(6.55)
piCu(t) =
pXu(t)
αCu/(αCu+βCu )w(t)βCu/(αCu+βCu )
µCu(t)
1/(αCu+βCu )α
αCu/(αCu+βCu )
Cu
β
βCu/(αCu+βCu )
Cu
Cu(t)
[1−(αCu+βCu )]/(αCu+βCu ),(6.56)
where the efficiency factors µ(t) and the elasticities α and β are defined analogous to
those for investment in preventive care Im(t) (see above). Further
mp(t) =
pp(t)
−βIp/(αIp+βIp )w(t)βIp/(αIp+βIp )
µIp(t)
1/(αIp+βIp )αIp(t)
−βIp/(αIp+βIp )βIp(t)
βIp/(αIp+βIp )
Ip(t)
1/(αIp+βIp ), (6.57)
XCh(t) =
pXh(t)
−βCh/(αCh+βCh )w(t)βCh/(αCh+βCh )
µCh(t)
1/(αCh+βCh )αCh(t)
−βCh/(αCh+βCh )βCh(t)
βCh/(αCh+βCh )
Ch(t)
1/(αCh+βCh ),(6.58)
XCu(t) =
pXu(t)
−βCu/(αCu+βCu )w(t)βCu/(αCu+βCu )
µCu(t)
1/(αCu+βCu )αCu(t)
−βCu/(αCu+βCu )βCu(t)βCu/(αCu+βCu )
Cu(t)
1/(αCu+βCu ),(6.59)
and
τIp(t) =
pp(t)
αIp/(αIp+βIp )w(t)−αIp/(αIp+βIp )
µIp(t)
1/(αIp+βIp )αIp(t)
αIp/(αIp+βIp )βIp(t)
−αIp/(αIp+βIp )
Ip(t)
1/(αIp+βIp ), (6.60)
τCh(t) =
pXh(t)
αCh/(αCh+βCh )w(t)−αCh/(αCh+βCh )
µCh(t)
1/(αCh+βCh )αCh(t)
αCh/(αCh+βCh )βCh(t)
−αCh/(αCh+βCh )
Ch(t)
1/(αCh+βCh ),(6.61)
τCu(t) =
pXu(t)
αCu/(αCu+βCu )w(t)−αCu/(αCu+βCu )
µCu(t)
1/(αCu+βCu )αCu(t)
αCu/(αCu+βCu )βCu(t)
−αCu/(αCu+βCu )
Cu(t)
1/(αCu+βCu ),(6.62)
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Discussion
Health differs by socioeconomic status (SES). Low SES individuals not only start adult-
hood with a lower level of health, but their health also deteriorates faster with age than
their high SES peers. From the analyses employed in this thesis and the related literature
two causal pathways prove particularly important in generating inequalities in health by
socioeconomic status. First, education has a large and non-vanishing effect on health
throughout life, even persisting beyond the age of 80. This thesis confirmed that educa-
tion is not only ‘the most important correlate of good health’ (Grossman, 2003), but part
of this association stems from a genuine, causal effect of education on health outcomes,
including mortality. Education is shown to significantly reduce mortality even in old age.
Our analysis reveals that, for Dutch males surviving to the age of 81, an additional year of
schooling reduces the probability that they will die before reaching 89 by 2-3 percentage
points, or 4-6% relative to the baseline probability.
Second, this thesis confirmed that there is a large effect of health on income that
operates through constrained employment. It is shown that ill-health significantly and
permanently reduces both personal and household disposable income. In the Netherlands,
the drop in personal disposable income is around 1,600 Euro on a yearly basis three years
after the initial shock. The effects on household disposable income are more than twice
as large, reaching an amount of 3,600 Euro three years after the health shock, or around 8
percent in relative terms, indicating that there are spill-over effects from the health shock
to other household members.
In contrast, although large health differences across income groups are visible, consen-
sus among economists is growing that these do not derive from a causal impact of income
on health (Adams et al., 2003; Contoyannis et al., 2004; Smith, 2005a; Case and Deaton,
2005; Frijters et al., 2005; Cutler and Lleras-Muney, 2008). This view is however not
unequivocally accepted. Replication is still needed and controversy remains on the extent
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to which these findings apply uniformly to different population segments (Marmot, 2002;
Herd et al., 2008).
The theoretical model presented in this thesis predicts that the main mechanism
through which higher socioeconomic status is translated into higher health is by increasing
the marginal cost of, and demand for, curative care. The greater marginal cost of curative
care increases the health benefit of (and hence demand for) preventive care and healthy
consumption, and the health cost of (and hence reduced demand for) unhealthy working
and living environments, and unhealthy consumption. Greater financial resources induce
healthy lifestyles, greater investment in curative care and protect individuals from the
health risks of physical working conditions (e.g., hard labor) and/or psychosocial aspects
of work (e.g., low status, limited control, repetitive work, etc) that are detrimental to
health. Gradually, as time passes, higher levels of curative and preventive care, a shift
toward healthy consumption and lower job-related physical and psychosocial stress lead
to cumulative health advantage over the life cycle.
In contrast, low SES individuals have little human and financial capital, such that
they have few options but to resort to their health capital in production and consumption.
Given low wealth and low wages they have to increase their nominal wages by accepting
unhealthier working conditions such as manual labor, low status, limited control, and/or
repetitive work. Also, given lower wages and less wealth, the benefits of health protection
are lower. Relative to higher SES individuals they will invest less in preventive care
and healthy consumption, and more in unhealthy consumption as a result. What should
be emphasized here is that the choices of lower socioeconomic groups of an unhealthier
lifestyle and working conditions represent optimal, though heavily constrained, choices
(Case and Deaton, 2005).
This thesis propagates a theory of cumulative disadvantage over the life cycle. This
would start with early-life conditions and parental background affecting health in child-
hood and education. We do not cover the literature on the lifetime economic and health
consequences of early childhood conditions, but the evidence base to support causal effects
is growing (Barker, 1995; Case et al., 2002; 2005; Currie and Stabile, 2003; Currie et al.,
2007; van den Berg et al., 2006; van den Berg and Lindeboom, 2007). From adulthood,
SES and health start interacting and influencing each other. The theoretical model in this
thesis predicts a gradual increase in health inequalities with age, as lower levels of healthy
consumption, curative and preventive care and higher levels of unhealthy consumption
and job-related health stress for low SES individuals lead to cumulative disadvantage in
health over the life cycle. More rapidly worsening health of low SES individuals could
lead to early withdrawal from the labor force and shorter life-spans. So, the health-related
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earnings losses that are partly responsible for the income-health gradient are themselves,
to some extent, the result of socioeconomic differences in lifetime opportunities and their
impact on health. Beyond that, it is shown in this thesis that even after accounting for
the higher risk of a sudden deterioration of health — a health shock — the lower socioe-
conomic groups are least protected against income loss in case such a shock arrives. This
represents double jeopardy for lower SES groups and is likely to exacerbate socioeconomic
inequalities in health.
The objective of this thesis is to uncover the causal pathways and underlying mecha-
nisms responsible for socioeconomic differences in health by taking an economic approach.
As shown in this thesis, an economic approach has the potential to significantly advance
the field. The statistical rigor of econometric analyses triggers it possible to arrive at
causal effects by isolating exogenous variation in socioeconomic status and health. More-
over, economic theory provides an extremely useful behavioral framework to an improved
understanding of constrained individual decision-making in the health sphere. The combi-
nation of econometrics and economics is a distinguishing feature of this thesis and proved
extremely valuable towards understanding socioeconomic differences in health. For ex-
ample, chapter 4 confirms that education causally affects mortality exploiting a change
in the Dutch compulsory schooling law in a Regression Discontinuity Design (RDD). Af-
ter having confirmed the existence of a causal effect, the economic model in chapter 6
proposes some mechanisms through which an individual’s education might affect health
behaviors, and in turn mortality.
Policy implications are numerous. First, regarding the effect of education on health;
education not only raises earnings over the life cycle (e.g. Card, 1999), it also extends the
horizon of the lifetime. This is an important finding in the context of rising education
levels and the ageing of populations worldwide. As more and better educated individuals
reach old age, we can anticipate that mortality rates among the elderly will fall further and
populations will become even more ‘grey’. Also, pensions will be stretched further to meet
the consumption needs of an extended old age. The other side of the coin is that poorly
educated individuals die earlier, enjoying a less extended period of retirement. There is a
double injustice here. Not only does a lack of education lead to a deprivation of life itself,
but it implies a lower return on investments in pensions made over the working life.
Second consideration is that while disability insurance (DI) is developed to insure the
personal earnings loss, it cannot prevent disposable household income to drop by a larger
amount. We find that on average there are spillover effects to other household members,
possibly reflecting a fall in the earnings of the spouse as a result of meeting the care
needs of the disabled person. This explanation is supported by the fact that for those
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experiencing a more severe shock to health, the concomitant drop in household income is
even larger. Whether these actual replacement rates are below or above the desired level,
and should provoke any concern for policy-makers, depends. Definitely the concomitant
effects on other household members of the disabled individual should be studied further
to understand their motives. If the main motive is a voluntary increase in joint leisure
(see e.g. Hurd, 1990), the increase leisure might, to a more or lesser extent, compensate
for the income loss. Yet if spouses are urged to decrease their labour participation in
order to engage into care giving responsibilities, this could be an inefficient solution —
potentially detrimental to welfare.
The drop in disposable income after a health shock is not evenly spread over society.
Groups in the lowest socio-economic classes — those in the bottom quartile of personal
income, and the lower educated — are both the most vulnerable to the health-induced risk
of job loss, and their job loss translates into higher relative drops in personal and household
disposable income. Consequently, the lower socioeconomic groups suffer from double
jeopardy: lower socioeconomic groups are most likely to receive a shock to their health (e.g.
Smith, 2005c), and it follows from this thesis that they are least protected against loss of
job and income in case a health shock arrives. The average actual replacement rate of 80%
faced by individuals in the lowest income quartile compared to the average replacement
rates, does also imply that the experience of a health shock by this group would not
only raise the observed income inequalities, but also put a non-negligible proportion of
individuals in this group at risk of poverty.
Consistent with other studies (e.g. Kunst et al., 2005), the evidence presented in this
thesis shows no evidence of falling socioeconomic inequality in health across generations
in Europe. While a stable level of socioeconomic inequality may be considered a failure, it
should be judged alongside the US evidence of increasing socioeconomic inequality (Pap-
pas et al., 1993; Deaton and Paxson, 1998). Whether stable inequalities are necessarily
problematic, is open to debate. An extremely important caveat applies to the goal of
reduction of socioeconomic inequalities in health. As Deaton (2002a) argues some Pareto
improvements in average population health, such as an innovative medical technology that
is adopted sooner by the higher educated, will lead to larger health inequalities. If the
sole goal is reducing health inequalities these treatments should be abandoned, effectively
resulting in some people dying who could have lived, without preventing any other deaths.
Therefore, a policy should never be focused solely on reducing health disparities, it should
also account for average health, and wider well-being (Deaton, 2002a; CSDH, 2008).
Overturning these processes of cumulative disadvantage and double jeopardies repre-
sents a major challenge even to countries as egalitarian as the Netherlands. The potential
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rewards are, however, immense. Getting closer to a goal of equality of opportunity could
raise national welfare and wealth by breaking or at least limiting the connection between
low education, poor health and early labor force exit. If average health improves, there
could also be substantial savings on age-specific health care expenditures and increases
can be expected in labor supply, productivity, educational attainment, and savings and
investment (Bloom and Canning, 2000). Since education has been shown to causally
impact health and mortality, a potentially fruitful way of improving average health and
reducing health inequalities is stimulating education among the lower SES groups. Of
course, breaking the cycle requires identifying the specific mechanisms that link educa-
tion with later life health outcomes. The theoretical framework in this thesis provides
a first step towards disentangling these mechanisms. Yet, not all educational disparities
in health derive from inequality of opportunity in the sphere of health choices. Some
must reflect ill-health in childhood and adolescence constraining choices over education.
Besides ensuring adequate access to schooling for less healthy children, education policy
can do little to address this source of health disparities. In general, if third factors such as
cognitive ability or time preference partly contribute to the observed health inequalities,
there is little public policy can do to prevent these inequalities.
Policies aimed at improving health conditions at work are potentially important in pre-
venting health related labor force exits, thereby extending working lives and maintaining
the financial sustainability of social security systems. Financial protection against health
related loss of employment inevitably creates moral hazard, which has been a particular
problem in the Netherlands. Therefore, it seems crucial to enact policies in the workplace
that can both prevent the development of health problems and reduce the impact of those
problems on work capacity, by providing appropriate support to partially disabled workers
and those with a diagnosed condition. In that sense, recent Dutch policy changes seem
to operate in the right direction. Yet there are obvious limitations on the extent to which
workplace interventions can reduce health inequalities. They can do little to halt health
deterioration that derives from early life experiences. Nor can they do much to correct
differences in health by income that derive from education related differences in life style.
While this thesis has contributed to understanding the main causal pathways, and
has proposed several potentially important underlying mechanisms, empirical research
is clearly warranted to distinguish between important and less important mechanisms
generating the socioeconomic gradient in health. Scholars are invited and encouraged to
continue replicating existing studies on the causal effects of SES on health and vice versa,
whether based on economic theory or using quasi-natural experiments, both of which have
proved extremely valuable in our improved understanding of socioeconomic inequalities.
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Also, although this thesis has provided a foundation of a theory of socioeconomic health
inequality, the theory needs to be developed further, including more realistic notions
such as uncertainty, insights from behavioural economics, and to include potentially other
important mechanisms, such as social or family contexts, and other psychosocial mech-
anisms such as rank. It seems especially important to include labour force withdrawal
into the framework, given that this has been identified as one of the major contributors
of inequalities in health by socioeconomic status.
Economists are especially invited to take note of recent research in other disciplines,
including demography, sociology and epidemiology, which have proposed interesting the-
ories of inequalities in health by SES, and are potentially very useful to include in our
existing theories or empirical research. On the other hand, researchers of other disciplines
are encouraged to take of note of economic models to provide a different mode of analysis,
and to apply the rigour and prudence of economists in claiming and estimating causal ef-
fects. A cross-fertilisation of disciplines and modes of analysis is likely to be the only way
forward in reducing socioeconomic inequalities in health to an acceptable level, tackling
double injustices, and improving welfare.
Nederlandse Samenvatting
Inleiding en motivatie
Gezondheid is van fundamenteel belang. Gezondheid heeft zowel intrinsieke als instru-
mentele waarde: het is niet alleen van centraal belang voor het menselijk welzijn, maar
een goede gezondheid is ook een vereiste om als mens te kunnen functioneren (Anand,
2002; Sen, 2002). Het recht op het hoogst mogelijke gezondheidsniveau is vastgelegd in de
statuten van de World Health Organization (WHO) en talloze internationale verdragen
(bv. United Nations, 2000). Ondanks dit recht verkeert het grootste gedeelte van de
wereldbevolking niet in de goede gezondheid die biologisch gezien mogelijk is.
In het bijzonder is er een sterke relatie tussen gezondheid en sociaaleconomische klasse,
waarbij mensen in de lagere sociaaleconomische klassen een veel mindere gezondheid en
lagere levensverwachting hebben dan mensen in de hogere sociaaleconomische klassen. In
Nederland leven hoger opgeleiden — mensen met een hbo of universitaire opleiding — zo’n
6 tot 7 jaar langer dan lager opgeleiden — mensen die alleen basisschool hebben gevolgd.
Het verschil in levensverwachting in goede gezondheid tussen de twee groepen is zelfs nog
veel groter: 16 tot 19 jaar (CBS, 2008). Omdat gezondheid noodzakelijk wordt geacht
in ons dagelijks functioneren, kunnen deze ongelijkheden in gezondheid als oneerlijk en
onrechtvaardig worden bestempeld (Rawls, 1971; Anand, 2002; Sen, 2002). Het terug-
dringen van ongelijkheden in gezondheid is derhalve een ethische verplichting (CSDH,
2008). Naast deze ethische en sociale redenen is het verbeteren van de volksgezondheid
ook economisch gezien aantrekkelijk. Een betere volksgezondheid heeft positieve effecten
op arbeidsparticipatie, arbeidsproductiviteit, opleidingsniveau en investeringen (Bloom
en Canning, 2000). Gegeven deze sociale en economische motieven zal het geen verbazing
oproepen dat het belangrijkste gezondheids-gerelateerde doel van regeringen wereldwijd
is om ongelijkheden in gezondheid terug te dringen.
Om dit doel te verwezenlijken is het van vitaal belang te begrijpen waarom sociaaleco-
nomische ongelijkheden in gezondheid bestaan. Dit is echter niet gemakkelijk. Is het zo
dat mensen uit lagere sociaaleconomische klassen eerder last krijgen van gezondheidspro-
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blemen in hun latere leven? Of is het zo dat gezondheidsproblemen tijdens de kinderjaren
invloed hebben op het opleidingsniveau en arbeidsmarktuitkomsten? Het is duidelijk dat
gezondheid en sociaaleconomische status elkaar be¨ınvloeden. Extra complicatie is dat
er variabelen kunnen zijn die een invloed hebben op zowel gezondheid als sociaalecono-
mische status, zoals intelligentie of tijdsvoorkeur (Deary, 2008; Fuchs, 1982). Mede door
deze complicaties en ondanks een enorme hoeveelheid literatuur op dit gebied is het begrip
van sociaaleconomische verschillen in gezondheid beperkt. Tot op de dag van vandaag
ontbreken er grofweg twee essentie¨le onderdelen van het vraagstuk: (i) robuuste, causale
studies naar de belangrijkste relaties tussen gezondheid en sociaaleconomische status, en
(ii) kennis van de mechanismen die deze belangrijkste relaties bepalen.
Het doel van dit proefschrift is door middel van economische analyses een beter inzicht
te krijgen in deze twee missende onderdelen. De bijdrage van dit proefschrift is tweeledig.
Ten eerste benutten we exogene variatie in zowel sociaaleconomische status als gezondheid
om causale effecten te schatten van twee belangrijke paden: (i) het effect van opleiding op
gezondheid en sterfte, en (ii) het effect van gezondheid op arbeidsparticipatie en inkomen.
Door accuraat gebruik te maken van quasi-natuurlijke experimenten omzeilen we varia-
belen die mogelijk op zowel gezondheid als sociaaleconomische status van invloed zijn.
Tweede bijdrage is de formulering van een theoretisch model van gezondheid en sociaal-
economische status over de levenscyclus. Dit model fungeert als een kader waarbinnen we
de mechanismen die leiden tot de grote correlatie tussen gezondheid en sociaaleconomische
status beter kunnen begrijpen.
Het proefschrift is als volgt opgebouwd. Het eerste deel — hoofdstukken 2 en 3 —
omvat een beschrijvende analyse van sociaaleconomische verschillen in gezondheid over
de levenscyclus. Deze analyse geeft een idee hoe groot de verschillen zijn en welke relaties
nader onderzocht dienen te worden. Uit deze hoofdstukken kunnen echter geen harde
beleidsconclusies getrokken worden; een beschrijvende analyse zegt niets over de richting
van causaliteit en variabelen als tijdsvoorkeur en intelligentie kunnen de geobserveerde
relaties be¨ınvloeden. Het tweede deel van het proefschrift — hoofdstukken 4 en 5 —
benut exogene variatie in gezondheid en sociaaleconomische status om de causale effecten
van opleiding op sterfte (hoofdstuk 4) en gezondheid op arbeidsparticipatie en inkomen
(hoofdstuk 5) te schatten. Het laatste deel van het proefschrift — hoofdstuk 6 — omvat
een theoretisch model om de verschillende mechanismen die leiden van sociaaleconomische
status naar gezondheid en vice versa beter te begrijpen. Hoofdstuk 7 concludeert.
Nederlandse samenvatting 177
Sociaaleconomische verschillen in gezondheid
Hoofdstuk 2 beschrijft hoe gezondheid en ongelijkheid in gezondheid zich over de levens-
cyclus ontwikkelen in 11 Europese landen. Vanaf een bepaalde leeftijd is een daling van
gezondheid onvermijdelijk, maar vanaf welke leeftijd is dit gemiddeld genomen? En hoe
snel worden mensen ongezonder? De antwoorden op deze vragen hebben belangrijke
implicaties, bijvoorbeeld voor de recente discussie omtrent de ophoging van de pensioen-
gerechtigde leeftijd. Het is verder duidelijk dat er grote verschillen bestaan in gezondheid,
maar op welke leeftijd zijn deze verschillen het grootst? Worden de verschillen groter
naarmate mensen ouder worden — een proces van cumulative advantage — of verdwijnen
verschillen in gezondheid juist wanneer mensen ouder worden als de biologische component
belangrijker wordt in het gezondheidsproces — age-as-leveller?
Gezondheid en ongelijkheid in gezondheid evolueren echter niet alleen over de levens-
cyclus, maar kunnen ook verschillen over generaties. Technologische vooruitgang en het
algemene economische klimaat kunnen hun weerslag hebben op (ongelijkheid in) gezond-
heid in de populatie. Deze zogenaamde cohort effecten verstoren het levenscyclus pa-
troon, maar zijn zelf ook bijzonder interessant, bijvoorbeeld voor het voorspellen van de
gevolgen van vergrijzing. Zijn jongere generaties gezonder dan oudere generaties? En is
ongelijkheid in gezondheid toe- of afgenomen?
De resultaten laten zien dat zelf-gerapporteerde gezondheid gemiddeld genomen maar
licht daalt tot een jaar of 70, waarna een snelle daling inzet. Dit patroon is verrassend
consistent over de 11 Europese landen. Dit suggereert dat gezondheid geen significante
beperking zou opleveren voor het ophogen van de pensioengerechtigde leeftijd tot een jaar
of 70, maar wel een grote beperking kan zijn na deze leeftijd. Opvallend is dat gezondheid
in de Zuid-Europese landen en Ierland sterk is verbeterd over generaties, terwijl in de
Noord-Europese landen gezondheid niet is verbeterd. Sociaaleconomische ongelijkheid in
gezondheid volgt een omgekeerde U-vorm, waarbij de verschillen het grootst zijn net voor
de pensioenleeftijd. Dit suggereert een grote rol voor arbeidsparticipatie in het genereren
van ongelijkheden in gezondheid. Tenslotte vinden we dat sociaaleconomische ongelijkheid
in gezondheid niet is afgenomen over de laatste generaties. Ondanks inspanningen van
overheden is het niet gelukt deze verschillen in gezondheid te verkleinen.
Ingegeven door de hardnekkige ongelijkheden in gezondheid probeert hoofdstuk 3 deze
wat verder te ontrafelen voor Nederland. Meer specifiek probeert hoofdstuk 3 te onder-
zoeken hoe gezondheid evolueert over de levenscyclus en hoe dit verschilt voor verschil-
lende sociaaleconomische groepen. Het blijkt dat de patronen die we vinden voor Neder-
land opvallend veel gelijkenissen vertonen met de patronen in de Verenigde Staten (Smith,
178 Nederlandse samenvatting
2005a; Case en Deaton, 2005). Dit duidt erop dat bepaalde fundamentele relaties tussen
gezondheid, opleiding, werk en inkomen niet erg gevoelig zijn voor de inrichting van de
gezondheidszorg sector en andere beleidsinstrumenten. De verschillen zijn ook zeker niet
verwaarloosbaar: rond de leeftijd van 55 beschouwt 30 % van de mannen in de laagste
inkomensgroepen zijn gezondheid als slecht, tegenover slechts 5 % van de mannen in de
hoogste inkomensklassen.
Onze interpretatie van de resultaten is dat arbeidsparticipatie een sleutelrol vervult in
het genereren van sociaaleconomische ongelijkheden in gezondheid. Als we ons beperken
tot de populatie die werkt, verdwijnen ongelijkheden in gezondheid vrijwel in zijn geheel.
De grootste verschillen in gezondheid worden gevonden tussen werkende en niet-werkende
mensen, wat duidt op een sterk effect van gezondheid op arbeidsparticipatie en uiteindelijk
inkomen. Wel is er een effect van opleiding op gezondheid dat niet verdwijnt als er
gecorrigeerd wordt voor arbeidsparticipatie. Ten slotte vinden we — net als in hoofdstuk
2 — dat ongelijkheden in gezondheid pieken rond een jaar of 55-60 waarna de verschillen
kleiner lijken te worden. Echter, uit onze analyse blijkt dat er ook grote verschillen zijn in
sterfte tussen sociaaleconomische klassen rond die leeftijd, zodat de schijnbare vernauwing
van ongelijkheden in gezondheid tot op zekere hoogte een artefact is van deze verschillen
in sterfte. Immers, alleen de robuuste, relatief gezonde groep uit de lagere sociaalecono-
mische klassen blijft over na een jaar of 60, zodat het lijkt alsof gezondheidsverschillen
tussen groepen kleiner worden.
Causale effecten in de relatie tussen gezondheid en
sociaaleconomische status
De beschrijvende analyse suggereert dat de twee belangrijkste paden in het genereren
van sociaaleconomische verschillen in gezondheid zijn: 1) het effect van opleiding op
gezondheid, en 2) het effect van gezondheid op arbeidsparticipatie en inkomen. Het tweede
deel van dit proefschrift benut econometrische technieken om het bestaan van een causale
component in deze relaties vast te stellen. Hoofdstuk 4 gebruikt de uitbreiding van de
Leerplichtwet van 1928 — kinderen moesten niet langer 6 jaar maar 7 jaar verplicht naar
school — als exogene variatie in opleiding om het causale effect te schatten op sterfte in
de leeftijdsgroep van 80 tot 88. De aanname van dit zogenaamde Regression Discontinuity
Design is dat mensen die net niet onder de nieuwe leerplichtwet vallen (geboren in 1916)
in alle opzichten vergelijkbaar zijn met mensen die er net we´l onder vallen (geboren in
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1917). Alle verschillen in sterfte (bovenop het jaar leeftijdsverschil) kunnen nu worden
toegeschreven aan het extra jaar opleiding.
De resultaten laten zien dat opleiding een significant effect heeft op sterfte. Een extra
jaar opleiding verkleint de kans om te overlijden in de leeftijdscategorie 80 tot 88 met zo’n
4 tot 6 %. De sterke geobserveerde correlatie tussen opleiding en gezondheid komt dus
(deels) voort uit een causaal effect van opleiding op gezondheid en sterfte. Onze resul-
taten impliceren dat de opbrengsten van opleiding verstrekkend zijn. Niet alleen zijn er
monetaire opbrengsten in de vorm van een hoger loon (e.g. Card, 1999), maar ook neemt
de levensverwachting significant toe, zelfs na 80 jaar. De andere kant van de medaille is
dat lager opgeleiden niet alleen korter leven, maar ook minder lang van hun opgebouwde
pensioen kunnen genieten.
Hoofdstuk 5 beoogt het causale effect van gezondheid op arbeidsparticipatie en inkomen
te schatten. Uitgegaan wordt van een groep gezonde, werkende mensen in de leeftijd 17
tot 64 jaar. Voor deze groep mag ervan uitgegaan worden dat een acute opname in het
ziekenhuis een exogene schok voor de gezondheid betekent. Door middel van Propensity
Score Matching gecombineerd met Difference-in-Difference wordt gecorrigeerd voor het
feit dat niet iedereen eenzelfde kans heeft op een acute opname. Gegeven een uitgebreide
set van achtergrondkenmerken is de kans op een acute ziekenhuisopname random, waarbij
een klein deel daadwerkelijk een acute opname ondergaat (de treatment groep) en een
groot deel niet (de controle groep). Door mensen in de treatment groep over de tijd te
vergelijken met mensen met vergelijkbare kenmerken in de controle groep kan het causale
effect van een gezondheidsschok bepaald worden op arbeidsparticipatie en inkomen.
Niet verwonderlijk leidt een gezondheidsschok tot een daling van de arbeidspartici-
patie. Aangezien de vervangingsratio’s van sociale uitkeringen kleiner zijn dan 100 % is
het ook niet opmerkelijk als inkomen uit arbeid lager zou worden. Wellicht interessanter is
bekijken of het totale beschikbare inkomen van een persoon en zijn huishouden verandert
na alle formele en informele mechanismen van compensatie. Kan de echtgenoot van de ar-
beidsongeschikte het inkomensverlies compenseren, of is het verlies aan huishoudensinkomen
nog groter omdat de echtgenoot (en andere leden van het huishouden) ook hun arbeidspar-
ticipatie moeten verminderen om zorg te dragen voor de arbeidsongeschikte? Ook is het
interessant om te bekijken welke groepen in de samenleving slechter zijn beschermd tegen
inkomensverlies dan andere na een gezondheidsschok.
De resultaten bevestigen een sterk effect van gezondheidsschokken op zowel arbeids-
participatie als beschikbaar inkomen. Beschikbaar inkomen daalt met zo’n 8 % drie
jaar na de schok. Twee belangrijke conclusies kunnen worden getrokken uit de analyses:
1) arbeidsongeschiktheidsverzekeringen (WAO/WIA) vermijden grote verliezen van per-
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soonlijk inkomen, maar kunnen niet voorkomen dat het verlies aan huishoudensinkomen
groter is dan het verlies aan persoonlijk inkomen. Ook is het verschil tussen het verlies
aan huishoudensinkomen en persoonlijk inkomen groter naarmate de gezondheidsschok
zwaarder is. Dit duidt erop dat de overige leden van het huishouden — met name
de echtgenoot — hun arbeidsparticipatie verminderen om zorg te dragen voor het ar-
beidsongeschikte huishoudenslid. Echter, de precieze redenen waarom het verlies aan
huishoudensinkomen groter is dan persoonlijk inkomen is niet duidelijk en dient verder
onderzocht te worden. De tweede belangrijke conclusie is dat het inkomensverlies na een
gezondheidsschok niet bepaald evenredig is verdeeld over de samenleving. Mensen in de
lagere sociaaleconomische klassen — de laagste inkomensgroepen en de lager opgeleiden
— zijn niet alleen kwetsbaarder om een schok te krijgen in hun gezondheid, maar zijn
daarnaast ook nog eens slechter beschermd tegen inkomensverlies als gevolg van zo’n
schok.
Onderliggende mechanismen in de relatie tussen gezond-
heid en sociaaleconomische status
Ondanks het belang van het blootleggen van de belangrijkste causale relaties in de voor-
gaande hoofdstukken zijn de mechanismen die leiden van sociaaleconomische status naar
gezondheid en vice versa grotendeels onduidelijk. Bijvoorbeeld, het is nu bekend dat
opleiding een causaal effect heeft op sterfte, maar op welke manier een hogere opleiding
wordt vertaald in een hogere levensverwachting is onbekend. Zonder kennis van deze
mechanismen is het zeer moeilijk om gedegen beleidsadviezen te geven (Deaton, 2002).
Case en Deaton (2005) menen dat het extreem moeilijk is om alle relaties en mechanismen
goed te begrijpen zonder een theoretisch kader. Het standaard economische kader in de
gezondheidseconomie — het Grossman model (Grossman, 1972a; 1972b) — is bijzonder
nuttig in het analyseren van gezondheid en de vraag naar medische zorg, maar schiet
tekort in het verklaren van sociaaleconomische verschillen in gezondheid.
Het Grossman model neemt aan dat mensen nut (utility) halen uit gezondheid en uit
consumptie. Gezondheid wordt geacht elk jaar af te nemen met een bepaalde exogene fac-
tor, maar deze daling van gezondheid kan een halt worden toegeroepen door te investeren
in medische zorg. Er is echter een grens aan deze uitgaven (de budget constraint). De
totale uitgaven aan medische zorg en consumptie kunnen niet groter zijn dan het initie¨le
vermogen plus het inkomen dat wordt verdiend (dat ook afhangt van de gezondheid van
de persoon). In het kort geeft het model dus aan dat gezondheid zowel directe voldoening
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geeft (consumption benefits) alsook mensen in staat stelt om te werken en inkomen te ver-
dienen (production benefits). Mensen optimaliseren hun nutsfunctie gegeven de restricties
in hun inkomen en gezondheid.
Het model dat wordt gepresenteerd in hoofdstuk 6 breidt het standaard Grossman
model uit om sociaaleconomische verschillen in gezondheid beter te verklaren. Ten eerste
nemen we aan dat investeringen in medische zorg afnemende meeropbrengsten vertonen
in tegenstelling tot de constante meeropbrengsten van het standaard model. Het idee
hierachter is dat het eerste medicijn dat geslikt wordt van een bepaalde soort waarschijnlijk
meer effect heeft dan de daaropvolgende. Tweede uitbreiding is dat ons model mensen
in staat stelt om een bepaald beroep te kiezen met hogere gezondheidsrisico’s (zwaar
lichamelijk werk, monotoon werk) tegen een hoger loon. Mensen met een lagere opleiding
hebben vaak weinig andere keus dan zwaar lichamelijk werk te accepteren tegen een
bepaald loon, terwijl hoger opgeleiden niet genoodzaakt zijn hun lichaam hiervoor in
te zetten. Derde belangrijke uitbreiding is te onderkennen dat de prijs van consumptie
niet alleen monetair is, maar dat mensen ook de gezondheidsrisico’s in acht nemen van
bepaalde consumptiegoederen. Bepaalde soorten drugs geven bijvoorbeeld een bepaald
nut aan sommige mensen en de kostprijs is niet extreem hoog. Toch zullen de meeste
mensen niet dagelijks deze vorm van nutsvoorziening gebruiken omdat de prijs in termen
van gezondheid (potentieel) zeer hoog kan zijn. Ten slotte introduceren we ook preventieve
zorg en een realistische relatie tussen opleiding en loon in het model.
Het model voorspelt dat mensen met meer vermogen, hogere inkomens en een hoger
opleidingsniveau meer investeren in medische en preventieve zorg, ongezonde consumptie
meer en meer inwisselen voor gezonde consumptie en een gezondere werkomgeving kiezen.
Deze voorspellingen komen voort uit de hogere marginale kosten van medische zorg voor de
hogere sociaaleconomische klassen, zodat de hogere sociaaleconomische klassen meer profi-
teren van een gezonde leefstijl en werkomgeving. De kosten van een ongezonde leefstijl zijn
groter voor deze mensen en ze hebben meer te verliezen bij ziekte (door hogere marginale
kosten van medische zorg en hogere lonen). Een grotere consumptie van medische zorg
en een gezondere leefstijl en werkomgeving leiden tot een cumulatief gezondheidsvoordeel
over de levenscyclus, in lijn met de empirische studies in voorgaande hoofdstukken en de
literatuur.
Discussie en conclusie
Er zijn grote gezondheidsverschillen naar sociaaleconomische status. Mensen uit lagere so-
ciaaleconomische klassen beginnen vaak al met een gezondheidsachterstand (in de kinder-
182 Nederlandse samenvatting
jaren ofwel bij meerderjarigheid) en deze verschillen worden alleen maar groter met de
jaren. Ondanks de aandacht en verschillende beleidsmaatregelen zijn sociaaleconomische
verschillen in gezondheid niet kleiner geworden over de laatste generaties. Dit proefschrift
en de overige literatuur bewijzen dat er twee causale paden extreem belangrijk zijn in het
genereren van deze ongelijkheden. Ten eerste, het effect van opleiding op gezondheid.
Dit proefschrift bevestigt dat opleiding niet alleen een belangrijke associatie geniet met
gezondheid, maar dat opleiding ook een causaal effect heeft op gezondheid en sterfte.
Voor Nederlandse mannen die de leeftijd van 80 jaar bereiken betekent een jaar extra
onderwijs een daling van de kans op overlijden tussen het 80e en 88e levensjaar van zo’n
4 tot 6 %.
Ten tweede is er een belangrijk en groot effect van gezondheid op arbeidsparticipatie
en inkomen. Een schok in gezondheid leidt tot een permanente daling van arbeidspar-
ticipatie en beschikbaar inkomen. Er treedt niet alleen een verlies op van persoonlijk
inkomen, maar ook huishoudensinkomen ondergaat een gevoelig verlies, zelfs groter dan
dat van persoonlijk inkomen. Waarschijnlijk moeten andere leden van het huishouden
hun arbeidsparticipatie ook verminderen om zorg te dragen voor het zieke lid van het
huishouden. Ondanks de grote verschillen in gezondheid naar inkomen, is de consen-
sus onder economen aan het groeien dat inkomen zelf geen onafhankelijk effect heeft op
gezondheid zodra gecontroleerd wordt voor andere relevante variabelen.
Het theoretisch kader ontwikkeld in dit proefschrift biedt het inzicht dat de belang-
rijkste reden waarom de hogere sociaaleconomische klassen een betere gezondheid hebben
is omdat deze groep hogere marginale kosten van medische zorg ervaart. Dit leidt tot een
gezondere leefstijl en een minder risicovolle werkomgeving. De lagere sociaaleconomische
klassen, echter, hebben geen of weinig vermogen en weinig opleiding genoten zodat voor
hen het een optimale, doch hevig gerestricteerde keuze is om ongezond werk te accepteren
en een ongezondere leefstijl aan te nemen. Over de levenscyclus leidt dit tot steeds groter
wordende verschillen in gezondheid.
Om dit proces van cumulatieve nadelen voor de lagere sociaaleconomische klassen
tegen te gaan is een enorme beleidsuitdaging. De potentie¨le voordelen kunnen echter
gigantisch zijn. Als de relatie tussen een lage opleiding, slechte gezondheid en vroegtijdige
uittreding uit het arbeidsproces kan worden gelimiteerd of zelfs doorbroken, kan dit leiden
tot een enorme stijging van economische groei en maatschappelijk welzijn. Gegeven de
analyses in dit proefschrift zou een beleidsstrategie kunnen zijn om onderwijs te stimu-
leren. Echter, voor een succesvolle strategie is het van belang om ook de onderliggende
mechanismen die leiden van een betere opleiding naar een betere gezondheid verder uit
te diepen. Een andere strategie is het verbeteren van de gezondheidscondities op de
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werkvloer en dan met name het proberen te voorkomen van uittreding als gevolg van
gezondheidsschokken. In die zin lijken recente wijzigingen in de arbeidsongeschiktheid-
wetgeving in de goede richting te gaan.
Echter, de invloed van beleid is maar zeer beperkt wanneer de meeste gezondheidsver-
schillen al in de kinderjaren (of nog eerder) ontstaan. Ook als andere variabelen zoals
tijdsvoorkeur en intelligentie een grote rol spelen is er weinig dat beleid kan doen. Een
beter ge¨ınformeerd beleid is gebaat bij verdiepend onderzoek naar de mechanismen die
leiden van gezondheid naar sociaaleconomische status en vice versa. Dit proefschrift heeft
bijgedragen aan het beter begrijpen van verschillen en een eerste aanzet gegeven tot een
theoretisch kader, maar uitbreidingen hierop zijn dringend gewenst om het inzicht te ver-
groten in gezondheidsverschillen. Dit lijkt de enige manier waarop gezondheidsverschillen
naar sociaaleconomische status kunnen worden teruggebracht naar een acceptabel niveau,
en de volksgezondheid en welzijn kunnen worden verbeterd.
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